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Abstract
This work focuses on the socio-technical aspects of artificial intelligence,
namely how (specific types of) intelligent systems function in human
workplace environments. The goal is first to get a better understand-
ing of human needs and expectations when it comes to interaction with
intelligent systems, and then to make use of the understanding gained in
the process of designing and implementing such systems.
The work presented focusses on a specific problem in developing intel-
ligent systems, namely how the artefacts to be developed can fit smoothly
into existing socio-cultural settings. To achieve this, we make use of
theories from the fields of organisational psychology, sociology, and lin-
guistics. This is in line with approaches commonly found in AI. How-
ever, most of the existing work deals with individual aspects, like how to
mimic the behaviour or emulate methods of reasoning found in humans,
whereas our work centers around the social aspect. Therefore, we base
our work on theories that have not yet gained much attention in intel-
ligent systems design. To be able to make them fruitful for intelligent
systems research and development, we have to adapt them to the specific
settings, and we have to transform them to suit the practical problems at
hand.
The specific theoretical frameworks we draw on are first and foremost
activity theory and to a lesser degree semiotics. Activity theory builds on
the works of Leont’ev. It is a descriptive tool to help understand the unity
of consciousness and activity. Its focus lies on individual and collective
work practise. One of its strengths, and the primary reason for its value in
AI development, is the ability to identify the role of material artefacts in
the work process. Halliday’s systemic functional theory of language (SFL)
is a social semiotic theory that sets out from the assumption that humans
are social beings that are inclined to interact and that this interaction is
inherently multimodal. We interact not just with each other, but with our
own constructions and with our natural world. These are all different
forms of interaction, but they are all sign processes.
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Due to the obvious time and spatial constraints, we cannot address
all of the challenges that we face when building intelligent artefacts. In
reducing the scope of the thesis, we have focused on the problem of ex-
planation, and here in particular the problem of explanation from a user
perspective. By putting social theories to work in the field of artificial
intelligence, we show that results from other fields can be beneficial in
understanding what explanatory capabilities are needed for a given intel-
ligent system, and to ascertain in which situations an explanation should
be delivered. Besides lessons learned in knowledge based system devel-
opment, the most important input comes from activity theory.
The second focus is the challenge of contextualisation. Here we show
that work in other scientific fields can be put to use in the development of
context aware or ambient intelligent systems. Again, we draw on results
from activity theory and combine this with insights from semiotics.
Explanations are themselves contextual, so the third challenge is to ex-
plore the space spanned by the two dimensions ability to explain and con-
textualisation. Again, activity theory is beneficial in resolving this issue.
The different theoretical considerations have also led to some practical
approaches. Working with activity theory helps to better understand what
the relevant contextual aspects of a given application are and helps to
develop models of context which are both grounded in the tradition of
context aware systems design and are plausible from a cognitive point of
view.
Insights from an analysis of research in the knowledge based system
area and activity theory have further lead to the amendment of a toolbox
for requirements engineering, so called problem frames. New problem
frames that target explanation aware ambient intelligent systems are pre-
sented. This is supplemented with work looking at the design of an actual
system after the requirements have been elicited and specified. Thus, the
socio-technical perspective on explanations is coupled with work that ad-
dresses knowledge representation issues, namely how to model sufficient
knowledge to be able to deliver explanations.
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This thesis is submitted to the Norwegian University of Science and Tech-
nology (NTNU) in partial fulfilment of the requirements for aDoctor Scien-
tiarum. It is organised as a collection of papers, with a research overview,
consisting of an introduction, a research description, and conclusions,
given in the first part. The articles, following the originally published
text, can be found in the second part. The work has been conducted at
the Department of Computer and Information Science (IDI), under super-
vision of Professor Agnar Aamodt.
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Part I
Research Overview

1Introduction
This thesis targets research in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) re-
search. It focuses on the socio-technical aspects of artificial intelligence,
namely how (specific types of) intelligent systems function in human
workplace environments. The goal is first to get a better understand-
ing of human needs and expectations when it comes to interaction with
intelligent systems, and then to make use of the understanding gained in
the process of designing and implementing such systems.
AI is a broad and diverse field. It is usually considered to be a subfield
of computer science, but it draws it’s foundations from many different
sources such the cognitive sciences, psychology, and biology. Definitions
of AI found in textbooks or introductory articles are often similar to the
following one given by John McCarthy:
“Q. What is artificial intelligence? A. It is the science and engi-
neering of making intelligent machines, especially intelligent
computer programs. It is related to the similar task of using
computers to understand human intelligence, but AI does not
have to confine itself to methods that are biologically observ-
able.” [McCarthy, 2007]
This preliminary definition poses new questions, the most important of
these arguably being the question of what intelligence is. Although, as
with many areas, there is no universally accepted answer, it is generally
understood that intelligence is a capacity displayed by humans (at least
as a potential ability). Gottfredson offers the following definition:
“Intelligence is a very general mental capability that, among
other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve prob-
lems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quick-
ly and learn from experience. It is not merely book learning,
a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather, it re-
flects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our
3
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surroundings – ‘catching on,’ ‘making sense’ of things, or ‘fig-
uring out’ what to do.” [Gottfredson, 1997]
Gottfredson further contends the accurate measurability of intelligence.
Neisser et al. [1996], on the other hand, point out that no generally agreed
definition of intelligence exists and give an overview of different concepts
of intelligence. Theories highlighting the developmental aspects of intel-
ligence are for example proposed by Vygotsky [1978] and Piaget [1955]
who both acknowledge the importance of acting in the world for the de-
velopment of intelligence.
To avoid the pitfalls of trying to attempt an explicit definition of intelli-
gence, we can instead look at intrinsic aspects of humans as a species ex-
hibiting intelligence. A classical definition of human beings is Aristotle’s
definition of humans as an animal rationale, [Aristotle, 1994]. Although
this definition leads to several problems, these being some of the the rea-
sons for which Descartes [1641] discarded it, we will, for the moment,
accept it as a working definition.
One important aspect of rationality is the ability to express the reasons
behind ones own behaviour. Kant, in his categorical imperative – “Act
so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good
as a principle of universal legislation” [Kant, 1788, p. 30], couples the
ability to act morally (and thus freely) with the ability to give a rational
explanation of behaviour. Accepting this, we can thus ascribe the ability
of explaining ones behaviour and motives to every rational being, that
means to every intelligent entity. We can therefore count explanatory
capabilities, in particular the ability to explain ones own understanding
of the world and ones own behaviour, as a necessary precondition for
appearing intelligent.
Not only is explanatory capacity central to the appearance of intelli-
gence, it is also an important vehicle in conveying information in every-
day human-human interaction. Humans are social beings, and smooth
and ongoing interaction relies on trust. Explanations are an important
way of building this trust, they help us to understand one another and
enhance the knowledge of the communication partners, increasing the
liklihood that they will accept certain statements [Pu and Chen, 2006].
By each partner understanding more, they are better positioned to make
informed decisions.
The importance of explanations also holds for artificial intelligence.
When we look at an intelligent system as an artefact which mimics (some
parts of) human behaviour, it is clear that the ability of the system to
explain itself is an important capability and something that needs to be
incorporated in any system if it is to appear as if being (human-like) intel-
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ligent. This need for explanations to be provided by knowledge-based
systems is well documented [Swartout, 1983; Buchanan and Shortliffe,
1984; Swartout and Smoliar, 1987]. The adequacy of explanations and
justifications, is dependent on background knowledge derived pragmat-
ically. Thus, what counts as a good explanation in a certain situation is
determined by context-dependent criteria [Leake, 1995].
Intelligent (or knowledge based) systems in todays research scenarios
are no longer considered as black boxes that provide a full solution to
a problem. Instead, problem solving is seen as an interactive process (a
socio-technical process). Problem descriptions, as well as other input, can
be incomplete and changing. As a consequence, there has to be commu-
nication between human and software agents. Communication requires
mutual understanding that can be essentially supported by explanations.
Such explanations can improve the problem solving process to a large
degree. Thus, explanations are not only important in creating intelligent
systems which mimic human interaction, they are also important in assist-
ing in the problem solving process, a process that is essentially a social
process.
We return then to the definition of human intelligence that we raised
earlier. The description of humans as animal rationale focuses on the
individual. Human activities, however, are rarely reclusive. If humans
are animal rationale, we are also social animals. Halliday [1978, p. 14]
highlights the fact that the human indivdual “is destined to become one
of a group”. We collaborate directly with other human beings, we build
our own ideas on the ideas of other human beings, and we make use
of artefacts designed, built, and used by other human beings. Leont’ev
[1978] therefore stresses the social aspect in the development of cognitive
abilities.
So far, for the purpose of this work, the following important facets of
intelligent systems can be identified:
• Rationality: Instead of exploring the whole range of what intelli-
gence means, we will focus on the display of rational behaviour by
intelligent systems.
• Ability to explain: This ability is a prerequisite for an entity to
appear rational and has been identified as a core ability intelligent
systems should exhibit.
• Sociality: Human activities take place in social settings. Intelligent
systems should be able to integrate themselves into such settings.
• Contextualisation: Both what constitutes appropriate behaviour and
5
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what is considered a good explanation is context dependant, there-
fore intelligent systems should be contextualised.
Artificial intelligence then, in order to create intelligent artefacts, needs
to take account of both the social and the technical. McCarthy’s defini-
tion of AI cited earlier gives some additional pointers to what should be
considered within its domain. He sees AI as being both a science and an
engineering discipline. The science part opens up for theoretical inquiries
about the nature of human intelligence. The questions asked here are not
unlike those asked in theoretical philosophy and psychology, for example.
But the engineering part ties the field of AI to the construction of artefacts
and poses questions about the design and implementation of intelligent
systems.
We consider our work to be based on the theoretical side. That is, we
will present arguments based on theories from other fields, like organisa-
tional psychology, and apply them to specific problems in artificial intelli-
gence. However, the aim of this work is to make these theories beneficial
for application development, and to this extent it has an engineering fo-
cus. The goal is to examine the theoretical value of social theories and
to develop a framework which can help to design and build intelligent
systems. This dual focus is reflected in the structure of the discussion of
theory in Section 1.3 below.
1.1 Definitions
As we now have laid out the backdrop for the work we are presenting in
this thesis, we can take a closer look at the title – Explanation Awareness
and Ambient Intelligence as Social Technologies – and give a first defini-
tion of some of the concepts involved. These concepts will not be defined
formally, e.g. like the definitions of context-free or context-sensitive gram-
mars in the Chomsky hierarchy, but are meant to guide the reader through
the text.
Mate and Silva [2005] define a socio-technical system as a “complex
inter-relationship of people and technology, including hardware, soft-
ware, data, physical surroundings, people, procedures, laws, and regula-
tions”. We use the term social technologies for technologies which facilitate
interaction, support socialised cognition and activity, and generally en-
hance the socio-technical system. Intelligent social technologies alleviate
the above mentioned sociality facet of intelligent systems.
Ducatel et al. [2001] give a definition of ambient intelligence. At the core
of an ambient intelligent system lies the ability to appreciate the system’s
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environment, be aware of persons in this environment, and respond intel-
ligently to their needs. Ambient intelligent systems support the contextu-
alisation issue described above.
The term explanation awareness, although used as a title for a whole
series of workshops, see for example Roth-Berghofer et al. [2007], does
not appear as yet to be well defined. Our working definition describes
explanation awareness as the ability of an agent to 1. give explanations
about its reasoning and actions and use explanation during the reasoning
process as well and to 2. understand explanations given by others and to
incorporate these into its own reasoning process.
For the purpose of this thesis, we will mainly deal with the ability of an
actant to explain its own behaviour and reasoning since this enhances an
intelligent system’s ability to explain.
1.2 Research Questions
This thesis takes the form of collected papers. As such, each paper has its
own specific research question. These papers do however form a related
set, and while the structure of this thesis negates the need for formal re-
search questions, it nevertheless follows that in presenting a cohesive dis-
cussion, certain questions were addressed. These questions, which reflect
the research process in general, are enumerated below:
1. What are some of the socio-technical issues which have to be ad-
dressed when embedding intelligent systems into workplace envi-
ronments and to what extent do they differ from the problems that
traditional, non intelligent systems face?
2. Can theories from the social sciences, psychology, or linguistics be
useful in tackling some of these problems, particularly those with a
special focus on intelligent systems?
3. If so, what particular theories can help us in understanding the
socio-technical settings?
4. How can theoretical results from answering the questions above be
made useful for the problem of designing such systems, in particular
how can the design process of intelligent systems be improved?
1.3 Theory
The work presented in this thesis is typical for research in artificial intel-
ligence in the sense that it draws from different sources. It focusses on a
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specific problem in developing intelligent systems, namely how the arte-
facts to be developed can fit smoothly into existing socio-cultural settings.
Special attention is paid to the peculiarities of intelligent systems, namely
the change from seeing the artefact as a pure tool to a setting where the
technical system becomes more of a partner, being pro-active and gener-
ally displaying abilities which traditionally are ascribed to humans.
To achieve this, we make use of theories from the fields of organisational
psychology, sociology, and linguistics. This is in line with approaches
commonly found in AI. However, most of the existing work deals with
individual aspects, like how to mimic the behaviour or emulate methods
of reasoning found in humans, whereas our work centers around the so-
cial aspect. Therefore, we base our work on theories which have not yet
gained much attention in intelligent systems design, but they have been
used in other subfields of computer science like software engineering and
human-computer interaction (HCI). To be able to make them fruitful for
intelligent systems research and development, we have to adapt them to
the specific settings, and we have to transform them to suit the practical
problems at hand. This includes the necessity to strip away some aspects
which are important in the descriptive setting in which they are devel-
oped, but are a hinderance in the formative processes to which they will
be put. This must, amongst other things, be done to avoid the trap of
the last instance Althusser [1962]: to say that particular situations are sys-
tematically determined can be helpful in an analytical setting, but it does
not explain every peculiarity of the situation. A dialectic relation between
system and instance is never active in the pure state, but a reflection of
the unity of systematic account and specific act. For example, the notion
of the historicity of human activity is a valuable insight of activity theory,
but the attempt to ground every aspect of human activity which is to be
modelled with the help of computer systems in its historicity is futile.
The specific theoretical frameworks we draw on are first and foremost
activity theory [Nardi, 1996; Leont’ev, 1978], to a lesser degree semiotics
[de Souza, 2005; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004], and superficially actor
network theory [Monteiro, 2000; Latour, 1988]. A major problem with re-
search of this nature, research which attempts to integrate theories from
diverse areas of practice, is the perception that there are very different
underlying philosophies. This is of particular importance when trying to
integrate the strengths of theories for the purposes of solving real world
problems. It is necessary to always have in mind the motivations and as-
sumptions that hold, sometimes rather opaquely, behind a theory. Take
the theories that are examined in this thesis for example. It can be consid-
ered, that there are very different underlying perspectives behind socio-
technical theories such as activity theory or actor network theory, require-
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ments engineering, and intelligent systems. It is necessary that any work
that sets out to bring these potentially collaborative perspectives together
needs to justify this coalition and argue for why they do not represent a
problem.
In bringing out the unifying aspects of these approaches, we need to
consider the underlying theoretical similarities. In Section 1.1 above, we
discussed the dual structure of this thesis in terms of its theoretical and
engineering goals. Let us begin by examining the theoretical approach.
The thesis sets out from the assumption that humans are social by nature.
Thus, intelligence is seen as a social rather than individual aspect. All the
theoretical frameworks we propose to make use of strengthen the idea
that human activities are social in nature and that humans do interact
with artefacts in different manners.
Turning to the engineering aspect of the thesis. This work takes an ap-
proach that seeks to find engineering solutions that mimic social aspects
of human behaviour and cognition rather than the biologically inspired
solutions found in approaches such as neural networks or evolutionary
algorithms. So we can see that both the theoretical and engineering as-
pects focus on the social rather than the biological.
1.4 Methodology
With this thesis, we are following a mixed methods approach [Johnson
and Onwuegbuzie, 2004] where different theories are brought together
for the explicit purpose of solving particular practical problems that intel-
ligent systems design is faced with. The thesis is largely a theoretical ex-
amination of the issues at hand, but it proposes practical consequences as
well. Some qualitative evaluation of particular aspects is also performed.
Due to the obvious time and spatial constraints, we cannot address
all of the challenges that we face when building intelligent artefacts. In
reducing the scope of the thesis, we have focused on the problem of ex-
planation, and here in particular the problem of explanation from a user
perspective. By putting social theories to work in the field of artificial
intelligence, we show that results from other fields can be beneficial in
understanding what explanatory capabilities are needed for a given intel-
ligent system, and to ascertain in which situations an explanation should
be delivered. Besides lessons learned in knowledge based system devel-
opment as outlined above, the most important input comes from activity
theory [Nardi, 1996].
The second focus is the challenge of contextualisation, and here we
show that work in other scientific fields can be put to use in the develop-
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ment of context aware or ambient intelligent systems. Again, we draw on
results from activity theory and combine this with insights from semiotics
[de Souza, 2005].
We have seen that explanations are themselves contextual, so the third
challenge is to explore the space spanned by the two dimensions ability to
explain and contextualisation. Again, activity theory is beneficial in resolv-
ing this issue.
As discussed previously, the different theoretical considerations have
also led to some practical approaches. Working with activity theory helps
to better understand what the relevant contextual aspects of a given ap-
plication are and helps to develop models of context which are both
grounded in the tradition of context aware systems design and are plau-
sible from a cognitive point of view.
Insights from an analysis of research in the knowledge based system
area and activity theory have lead to the amendment of a toolbox for re-
quirements engineering, so called problem frames [Jackson, 2001]. New
problem frames which target explanation aware ambient intelligent sys-
tems are presented. This perspective looks out from the system design
process into the world.
By comparison with this outward focus, the final part ties in with other
work looking inwards, or at the design of an actual system after the re-
quirements have been elicited and specified. Thus, the socio-technical
perspective on explanations is coupled with work that addresses knowl-
edge representation issues, namely how to model sufficient knowledge to
be able to deliver explanations.
We do not aim in this thesis to contribute deeply to the further devel-
opment of the social theories used, such as activity theory, actor network
theory, or semiotics. Having said this, in any instance where theories are
put to work in a practical way, there is a value for the theories. There is
always a methodological problem turning research which gives a posteriori
insights in socio-technical processes into methods which help in a priori
design issues.
On the other hand, such a turn tests the ability of social and semi-
otic theories to provide useful and valuable information with predictive
power, e.g. whether these theories do remain descriptive or have forma-
tive aspects as well. The questions asked from artificial intelligence are
along the lines of what is required from a theory of context for it to be
useful, what is needed from a social semiotic theory of language in or-
der for it to be adequate, what are the challenges, what are the demands.
These questions can ultimately lead to better theories and the potential
for better outcomes for end users.
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1.5 Thesis Outline
The thesis has the form of a paper collection. This initial section includes
the introduction, a research description in Chapter 2, and the conclusions
in Chapter 3. All publications are included in Part II in chronological
order.
For the most part, the articles included in this thesis have been or will
be published in different workshop or conference proceedings, and one
in a journal. Where the majority of papers has been peer reviewed and
accepted, the last article has been submitted for review but not accepted
at the time of completion. The following papers can be found in Part II of
the thesis:
A: Jörg Cassens: A Work Context Perspective on Mixed-Initiative In-
telligent Systems. In: Proceedings of the IJCAI 2003 Workshop on
Mixed-Initiative Intelligent Systems, pages 30–35, Acapulco, 2003.
B: Jörg Cassens: Knowing What to Explain and When. In: Pablo
Gervás and Kalyan May Gupta, editors, Proceedings of the ECCBR
2004 Workshops, number 142-04 in Technical Report of the Departa-
mento de Sistemas Informáticos y Programación, Universidad Com-
plutense de Madrid, pages 97–104, Madrid, 2004.
C: Thomas R. Roth-Berghofer and Jörg Cassens: Mapping Goals and
Kinds of Explanations to the Knowledge Containers of Case-Based
Reasoning Systems. In: Héctor Muñoz-Avila and Francesco Ricci,
editors, Case Based Reasoning Research and Development – ICCBR 2005,
volume 3630 of LNAI, pages 451–464, Chicago, 2005. Springer.
D: Jörg Cassens: User Aspects of Explanation Aware CBR Systems.
In: Maria Francesca Costabile and Fabio Paternó, editors, Human-
Computer Interaction – INTERACT 2005, volume 3585 of LNCS, pages
1087–1090, Rome, 2005. Springer.
E: Frode Sørmo, Jörg Cassens, and Agnar Aamodt: Explanation in
Case-Based Reasoning – Perspectives and Goals. In: Artificial Intel-
ligence Review, 24(2):109–143, October 2005.
F: Anders Kofod-Petersen and Jörg Cassens: Using Activity Theory to
Model Context Awareness. In: Thomas R. Roth-Berghofer, Stefan
Schulz, and David B. Leake, editors,Modeling and Retrieval of Context:
MRC 2005, Revised Selected Papers, volume 3946 of LNCS, pages 1–17,
Edinburgh, 2006. Springer.
G: Jörg Cassens and Anders Kofod-Petersen: Using Activity Theory to
Model Context Awareness: a Qualitative Case Study. In: Geoff C. J.
Sutcliffe and Randy G. Goebel, editors, Proceedings of the Nineteenth
International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference,
pages 619–624, Melbourne Beach, 2006. AAAI Press.
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H: Jörg Cassens and Anders Kofod-Petersen: Designing Explanation
Aware Systems: The Quest for Explanation Patterns. In: Thomas R.
Roth-Berghofer, Stefan Schulz, and David B. Leake, editors, Explana-
tion-Aware Computing – Papers from the 2007 AAAI Workshop, number
WS-07-06 in Technical Report, pages 20–27, Vancouver, BC, 2007.
AAAI Press.
I: Anders Kofod-Petersen and Jörg Cassens: Explanations and Con-
text in Ambient Intelligent Systems. In: Boicho Kokinov, Daniel C.
Richardson, Thomas R. Roth-Berghofer, and Laure Vieu, editors,
Modeling and Using Context – CONTEXT 2007, volume 4635 of LNCS,
pages 303–316, Roskilde, Denmark, 2007. Springer.
J: Jörg Cassens and Anders Kofod-Petersen: Explanations and Case-
Based Reasoning in Ambient Intelligent Systems. In: David C.
Wilson and Deepak Khemani, editors, ICCBR-07 Workshop Proceed-
ings, pages 167–176, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 2007.
K: Jörg Cassens and Rebekah Wegener: Making Use of Abstract Con-
cepts – Systemic-Functional Linguistics and Ambient Intelligence.
Accepted for: IFIP AI 2008 – The Second IFIP International Confer-
ence on Artificial Intelligence in Theory and Practice. 7-10 Septem-
ber, 2008. Milan, Italy.
L: Jörg Cassens and Anders Kofod-Petersen: Modelling with Problem
Frames: The Knowledge Needed for Explanation-Aware Ambient
Intelligent Systems. Submitted to: ECAI 2008 – The 18th European
Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 21-25 July 2008. Patras, Greece.
Although the whole thesis can be read chronologically, there are a number
of other paths through this thesis. In the section below we outline these
paths and the ways in which the articles are related to each other. This is
also visualised in a graph depicted in Figure 1.1.
Readers wishing to set out from the socio-technical background should
begin with Paper A as an appropriate point of departure. This paper
introduces three views on intelligent systems in workplace environments;
1. Work process view (using actor network theory), 2. HCI interface view
(using semiotics), and 3. HCI system view (using activity theory). It is
further exemplified how these theories can help to tackle different issues
in mixed-initiative intelligent systems.
These three views are generalised and further developed in Paper D.
This paper addresses some issues of explanations in intelligent systems.
This path through the thesis explores the relation between socio-technical
theories and explanations. This leads further to a discussion of one par-
ticular view, namely the HCI system view and activity theory, in Paper B.
The question tackled here is how an intelligent system can decide when
to deliver an explanation about its own behaviour.
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Research Questions
Paper E Paper A
Paper FPaper D
Paper H Paper C
Paper GPaper B
Paper KPaper I
Paper J
Paper L
Results and New Research Questions
Figure 1.1.: Relations between the different papers included in the thesis.
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The other path starting from the mixed initiative setting from Paper
A focuses also on activity theory, but in the setting of context aware or
ambient intelligent systems. Paper F takes a knowledge level perspec-
tive on context modelling and establishes a relation between cognitive
sciences and context in intelligent systems. Different concepts from activ-
ity theory are mapped to different categories of context well established in
context aware computing, and a psychologically plausible context model
is proposed. This line of research is further explored by implementing
the proposed structure in a context aware system for a hospital ward do-
main. The results of this work and a qualitative empirical study of its
performance in a simulated environment is given in Paper G.
Another way to start exploring the contributions starts not with a dedi-
cated socio-technical perspective, but with explanations in intelligent sys-
tems from a general user perspective. In Paper E, a systematic overview
on explanation in philosophy and cognitive sciences and a historic over-
view of the use of explanations in artificial intelligence are given. Five
goals a user can have with explanations are introduced, namely 1. Trans-
parency (explain how the system reached the answer), 2. Justification (ex-
plain why the answer is a good answer), 3. Relevance (explain why a
question asked is relevant), 4. Conceptualisation (clarify the meaning of
concepts), and 5. Learning (teach the user about the domain). The use
of explanations in case-based reasoning is reviewed and challenges are
identified.
In order to tie the high level user goals in with a view on explana-
tions from a systematic classification, Paper C explores the relation of the
notion of user goals with work on different kinds of explanation con-
ducted by Roth-Berghofer [2004]. A process model for the design activ-
ity is proposed, and several mappings from user goals over explanation
kinds to the different knowledge containers of case-based reasoning sys-
tems are identified, opening up for moving towards the implementation
of explanatory capabilities from a user goal perspective.
These three paths, coming from the user goal notion of Paper C, the
work on context awareness in Paper G, and research in activity theory
and explanations in Paper B, come together in Papers I and J.
Paper I details the relationships between context awareness and context
sensitivity on the one hand and explanations as a means of reasoning and
a means of communication with the user on the other hand. It is proposed
how concepts from activity theory can be used to address the different
goals a user can have towards explanations, and it is discussed how these
goals can be satisfied in the different phases of the use of the system.
Looking more into the implementation issues in the form of an ambient
intelligent case-based reasoning system is Paper J. The context aware sys-
14
Bibliography
tem for a hospital ward environment introduced in G is explored further,
and it is shown how explanation needs in different phases of the use of a
system are addressed.
Starting from the general overview of explanations in Paper E, Paper H
takes a step towards software engineering issues of designing explanation
aware systems. The five explanation goals introduced in Paper E are revis-
ited and a problem frame diagram suitable for requirements engineering
processes for each of the goals is presented. These goals are intended to
enable software engineers to explicitly model explanatory capabilities.
Going back to the socio-technical start in Paper A, another socio-tech-
nical approach is explored in Paper K. Semiotics is one of the three views
on intelligent systems in workplace environments introduced in Paper
D, and Paper K explores a specific semiotic theory, systemic functional
linguistics, and shows its use in ambient intelligence. The main focus is
on abstract concepts.
All of the paths outlined until now, but especially the results of work on
explanations in ambient intelligent (Paper I) and the requirements engi-
neering method outlined in Paper H, are merged in Paper L. The problem
frames for ambient intelligent and explanation aware system introduced
earlier are further developed. An example of how to use the newly de-
veloped frames in requirements engineering is given. To this end, a step
towards the re-design of an existing application from the hospital ward
domain (Paper G) is taken and it is shown how explanation patterns can
help to model requirements towards the explanatory capabilities of the
system.
Bibliography
Louis Althusser. Contradiction and overdetermination. In For Marx.
Penguin Press, 1962. URL http://www.marxists.org/reference/
archive/althusser/1962/overdetermination.htm.
Aristotle. Metaphysik. rowohlts enzyklopädie. Rowohlt, Hamburg, 1994.
Bruce G. Buchanan and Edward H. Shortliffe. Rule-Based Expert Systems:
The MYCIN Experiments of the Stanford Heuristic Programming Project. Ad-
dison Wesley, Reading, 1984.
Clarisse Sieckenius de Souza. The Semiotic Engineering of Human-Computer
Interaction (Acting with Technology). The MIT Press, 2005. ISBN
0262042207. QA76.9.H85 .D465 2005.
15
Bibliography
René Descartes. Meditationen über die Grundlagen der Philosophie. Num-
ber 27 in Philosophische Bibliothek. Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg,
1641.
Ken Ducatel, Marc Bogdanowicz, Fabiana Scapolo, Jos Leijten, and Jean-
Claude Burgelman. ISTAG scenarios for ambient intelligence in 2010.
Technical report, IST Advisory Group, 2001.
Linda S. Gottfredson. Mainstream science on intelligence: An editorial
with 52 signatories, history, and bibliography. Intelligence, 24(1):13–23,
1997.
Michael A.K. Halliday. Language as a Social Semiotic: the social interpretation
of language and meaning. University Park Press, 1978.
Michael A.K. Halliday and Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen. An Introduction
to Functional Grammar, Third edition. Arnold, London, UK, 2004.
Michael Jackson. Problem Frames – Analysing and Structuring Software De-
velopment Problems. Addison-Wesley, Boston, MA, 2001.
R. Burke Johnson and Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie. Mixed meth-
ods research: A research paradigm whose time has come. ED-
UCATIONAL RESEARCHER, 33(7):14–26, October 2004. doi:
10.3102/0013189X033007014. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/
0013189X033007014.
Immanuel Kant. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Akademie, 1788.
Bruno Latour. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers
Through Society. Harvard University Press, 1988. ISBN 0674792912.
David B. Leake. Goal-based explanation evaluation. In Goal-Driven Learn-
ing, pages 251–285. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995.
Aleksei N. Leont’ev. Activity, Consciousness, and Personality. Prentice-Hall,
1978.
Jose Luis Mate and Andres Silva, editors. Requirements Engineering for
Sociotechnical Systems. Idea Group Publishing, 2005.
John McCarthy. What is ai? Internet, 2007. URL http://www-formal.
stanford.edu/jmc/whatisai/. Last visited 2007-12-09.
Eric Monteiro. Actor-network theory. In Claudio U. Ciborra, editor, From
Control to Drift, pages 71–83. Oxford University Press, 2000.
16
Bibliography
Bonnie A. Nardi, editor. Context and Consciousness. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1996.
Ulric Neisser, Gwyneth Boodoo, Thomas J. Bouchard Jr., A. Wade Boykin,
Nathan Brody, Stephen J. Ceci, Diane F. Halpern, John C. Loehlin,
Robert Perloff, Robert J. Sternberg, and Susana Urbina. Intelligence:
Knowns and unknowns. American Psychologist, 51(2):77–101, 1996.
Jean Piaget. The Construction of Reality in the Child. Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London, 1955.
Pearl Pu and Li Chen. Trust building with explanation interfaces. In
IUI ’06: Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Intelligent user
interfaces, pages 93–100, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM. ISBN 1-59593-
287-9. doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1111449.1111475.
Thomas R. Roth-Berghofer. Explanations and case-based reasoning: Foun-
dational issues. In Peter Funk and Pedro A. González Calero, editors,
Advances in Case-Based Reasoning: Proceedings ECCBR 2004, number 3155
in Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, pages 389–403, Berlin Heidel-
berg, 2004. Springer.
Thomas R. Roth-Berghofer, Stefan Schulz, and David B. Leake, editors.
Explanation-Aware Computing – Papers from the 2007 AAAI Workshop,
number WS-07-06 in Technical Report, Vancouver, BC, 2007. AAAI
Press. ISBN 978-1-57735-333-1. URL http://www.aaai.org/Library/
Workshops/ws07-06.php.
William R. Swartout. What kind of expert should a system be? xplain: A
system for creating and explaining expert consulting programs. Artifi-
cial Intelligence, 21:285–325, 1983.
William R. Swartout and Stephen W. Smoliar. On making expert systems
more like experts. Expert Systems, 4(3):196–207, 1987.
Lew S. Vygotsky. Mind in Society. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1978.
17
Bibliography
18
2Research Description
The purpose of this chapter is to give a detailed overview of the research
results presented in the papers in Part II and their relation to established
fields of research. Sections 2.1 through 2.3 will deliver some background
information. We start in Section 2.1 by giving an overview of the socio-
technical framework employed. Section 2.2 gives some background on
explanation in intelligent systems. The final section of the background
material is covered in Section 2.3 where we look at context.
The following Sections 2.4 through 2.7 will describe our own research
contributions. Section 2.4 will investigate the relation between context
and explanation. We then turn to modelling issues, beginning in Section
2.5 with work on context and following up in Section 2.6 with modelling
explanations. Section 2.7 concludes this chapter by considering explana-
tions and context combined.
2.1 Socio-Technical Framework
In this section, we describe the socio-technical theories that have formed
the basis of this work. When an intelligent system is considered not as
a replacement of, but a supplement to human work, the question of an
adequate form of interaction arises. Such systems are to a certain de-
gree trespassing the boundary of the computer system being a tool, and
increasingly, are acting as pro-active partners in a work environment.
In the light of these changes, the human computer interaction should
be revisited. Traditional interface engineering methods focusing on the
computer as a tool do not seem to be appropriate in the design of intelli-
gent systems. Furthermore, the integration of these kinds of systems into
work processes is dynamic, and is thus likely to vary in the future.
At first sight, this has the consequence that the whole work situation
must be taken into account when developing AI systems. It is more than
likely that Traditional software engineering techniques, mainly focusing
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Figure 2.1.: Overview: Different views on the work context.
on the artefact itself, would not give adequate results. Therefore, in order
to produce better results, the software production process must integrate
work analysis methodologies.
In order to understand how the system fits into a work place situation,
we have in Papers A and D proposed a theoretical framework that focuses
on three different perspectives (see Figure 2.1):
• Work process view: Actor Network Theory,
• HCI interface view: Semiotics,
• HCI system view: Activity Theory.
This theoretical framework, it is argued, is helpful for understanding how
AI systems in general and case-based reasoning (CBR) systems in partic-
ular fit into a work process, including the way in which they interact with
the user.
2.1.1 Activity Theory
In this subsection, we will begin by giving a short summary of aspects of
activity theory (AT) that are important for the present work. The theoret-
ical foundations of AT in general can be found in the works of Vygotsky
[1978, 1985] amd Leont’ev [1978]. For the relation between AT and com-
puter science see Nardi [2003] for a short introduction and Bødker [1991]
or Nardi [1996a] for deeper coverage.
Activity theory is a descriptive tool to help understand the unity of
consciousness and activity. Its focus lies on individual and collective work
practise. One of its strengths, and the primary reason for its value in AI
development, is the ability to identify the role of material artefacts in the
work process. An activity (Figure 2.2) is composed of a subject, an object,
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Artefact
Subject Object
Figure 2.2.: Activity Theory: The basic triangle of Mediation
and a mediating artefact or tool. A subject is a person or a group engaged
in an activity. An object is held by the subject, and the subject has a goal
directed towards the object he wants to achieve, motivating the activity
and giving it a specific direction.
Some basic properties of activity theory are:
• Hierarchical structure of activity: Activities (the topmost category)
are composed of goal-directed actions. These actions are performed
consciously. Actions, in turn, consist of non-conscious operations.
• Object-orientedness: Activity theory takes account of objective and
socially or culturally defined properties. Our way of doing work is
grounded in a praxis which is shared by our co-workers and deter-
mined by tradition. The division of labour and the way an artefact
is used influences the design. Hence, artefacts pass on the specific
praxis they are designed for.
• Mediation: Human activity is mediated by tools, such as for ex-
ample language. The artefacts as such are not the object of our
activities, but appear already as socio-cultural entities.
• Continuous Development: Both the tools used and the activity it-
self are constantly reshaped. Tools reflect accumulated social knowl-
edge, hence they transport social history back into the activity and
to the user.
• Distinction between internal and external activities: Traditional
cognitive psychology focuses on what is denoted internal activities
in activity theory, but it is emphasised that these mental processes
cannot be properly understood when separated from external activ-
ities, that is the interaction with the outside world.
Taking a closer look on the hierarchical structure of activity, we can find
the following levels:
• Activity: An individual activity is for example to check into a hotel,
or to travel to another city to participate in a conference. Individ-
ual activities can be part of collective activities, e.g. when someone
organises a workshop with some co-workers.
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Artefact
Subject Object
Rules Community Division of Labour
Figure 2.3.: Cultural Historical Activity Theory: Expanded triangle, incor-
porating the community and other mediators.
• Actions: Activities consist of collections of actions. An action is
performed consciously, the hotel check-in, for example, consists of
actions like presenting the reservation, confirmation of room types,
and handover of keys.
• Operations: Actions consist themselves of collections of non-con-
scious operations. To stay with our hotel example, writing your
name on a sheet of paper or taking the keys are operations. That
operations happen non-consciously does not mean that they are not
accessible.
It is important to note that this hierarchical composition is not fixed over
time. If an action fails, the operations comprising the action can get con-
ceptualised, they become conscious operations and might become actions
in the next attempt to reach the overall goal. This is referred to as a break-
down situation. In the same manner, actions can become automated when
done many times and thus become operations. In this way, we gain the
ability to model a change over time.
An expanded model of activity theory, the cultural historical activ-
ity theory (CHAT), covers the fact that human work is done in a social
and cultural context (compare e.g. Kutti [1996]; Mwanza [2000]). The ex-
panded model (depicted in Figure 2.3) takes this socio-cultural aspect into
account by adding a community component and other mediators, espe-
cially rules (an accumulation of knowledge about how to do something)
and the division of labour.
In order to be able to model the fact that several subjects can share
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the same object, we add the community to represent a subject as being
embedded in a social context. We now have relationships between subject
and community and between object and community, respectively. These
relationships are themselves mediated, with rules relating to the subject
and the division of labour relating to the object.
2.1.2 Semiotics
Human work processes take place with and through sign systems. Un-
derstanding these sign systems is crucial for making intelligent artefacts.
Semiotics can be described as the study of sign systems and their historic-
ity. For an introduction to semiotics we refer to Peirce [1904] and Halliday
and Matthiessen [2004]. For a comprehensive account of semiotics as it is
applied to computing we recommend the works of Gudwin and Queiroz
[2006], in particular Andersen and Brynskov [2006]; Clarke et al. [2006], as
well as de Souza [2005]. The current state of knowledge is never divorced
from the past that has affected it. Thus, the positive contributions of semi-
oticians such as Saussure, Pierce and Voloshinov to the social semiotics of
Halliday and those working in this tradition are briefly outlined below.
Saussure [1966] was central to the development of linguistics and semi-
otics as fields of study. A major contribution was the focus on the rela-
tional nature of signs. For Saussure, the meaning of a sign was not simply
understood as an intrinsic property of the sign itself, that is, by its sub-
stance, but its relation to other signs within a whole system of signs. The
differentiating or contrastive nature of signs was an outstanding concept
in Saussurian semiotics, and he strengthened the view that relationships
between signs were important when trying to understand their meaning.
Peirce [1904] and his triadic representation of the sign process has had a
major impact on semiotics. The semiotic triangle in its different variations
(see Figure 2.4) is probably the most used concept of semiotics in com-
puter science. Pierce emphasises that it is not possible to isolate signs and
strip them of their relations. Being a sign is a way of being in relation to
something, not some abstract property of being in itself. Pierce is also well
known for the explicit distinction of different sign types, distinguishing
between indexical, iconic, and symbolic. He was also particularly focused
on strengthening the role of the interpreting entity. Social aspects of the
material setting are coded through the (indexical) nature of signs.
One of the main contributions to semiotics of Voloshinov [1973] is the
emphasis he placed on the fact that social processes cannot be taken out
of any analysis. It is not fruitful to look at the sign decoupled from the
social process in which it occurs. Voloshinov externalises the sign pro-
cess and makes its roots in the social process explicit. This acknowledges
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Figure 2.4.: The semiotic triangle.
the importance of contextualising the sign process. Because he treated
the sign process as inherently a social phenomenon, he was able to see
that “. . . the form of signs is conditioned above all by the social organi-
sation of the participants and also by the immediate conditions of their
interaction. . . ” [Voloshinov, 1973, p. 21].
In this research, the social semiotics outlined by Halliday (see for exam-
ple Halliday and Matthiessen [2004]) has been used. Halliday combines
the strengths of the approaches of Saussure, Pierce, and Voloshinov. He
brings together the tradition of relational thinking from Saussure, the un-
derstanding that different modalities have consequences for the structure
of meanings from Pierce and, from Voloshinov, the insistence that the sign
is social and can never be divorced from the social process.
Halliday’s systemic functional theory of language (SFL) is a social semi-
otic theory that sets out from the assumption that humans are social be-
ings that are inclined to interact and that this interaction is inherently
multimodal [Halliday, 1978]. We interact not just with each other, but
with our own constructions and with our natural world. These are all
different forms of interaction, but they are all sign processes.
2.1.3 Actor Network Theory
Actor network theory, ANT, is an integrated model that maps relations
between entities that are at the same time material (between artefacts
or natural things) and non-material or semiotic (between concepts). The
main assumption is that many relations are at the same time material and
semiotic, involving both ideas and motivations of actors involved and
their expression in material artefacts or technologies. All these aspects,
being material or not, are captured in the same network. We recommend
Latour [1991] for a general introduction to the underlying ideas and Mon-
teiro [2000] for a computer science point of view.
The underlying concept of ANT might be said to be reasonably uncom-
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plicated: whenever you do something, many influences on how you do it
exist. For instance, if you attend a conference, it is likely that you will stay
in a hotel. How you behave at that hotel is influenced by your previous
experience with hotels, regulations for check-in and check-out, and the
facilites the hotel offers you (breakfast room, elevators, etc.).
Actions are not performed anew each time, but are influenced by a wide
range of factors. The aim of ANT is to provide a unified view on these
factors and your own action. An actor network in this notion is “. . . the act
linked together with all of its influencing factors (which again are linked),
producing a network” (see Monteiro [2000, p. 4]).
In this network, you find both technical and non-technical elements. By
this, ANT avoids the trap of either overstating the role of technological
artefacts in a socio-technological system or underestimating their norma-
tive power by applying the same framework to both human actors and
technological artefacts. This makes it possible for us to understand how
technological artefacts influence the doings of human actors in much the
same way as other human actors.
Some key concepts of the theory are (compare e.g. Monteiro [2000]):
• Actors: Humans and technological artefacts,
• Actor-network: The totality of actors, interests, organisations, rules,
standards, and their interaction,
• Translation: Actors interests translated into technical or social ar-
rangements,
• Inscription: Result of the translation of one’s interest into material
form,
• Subscription: Acceptance of the inscribed interests by other actors.
In actor network theory, technological artefacts can stand for human goals
and praxis. Hotel keys, for example, are often not very conveniently de-
signed, because the hotel owner has inscribed his intention (that the keys
do not leave the hotel) into metal tags (which is why the guests subscribe to
the owner’s intention: they do not want to carry this weight). A software
system for workflow management is a representation of organisational
standards in the company where it is used (and makes human users fol-
low these standards).
One advantage of ANT in the setting of intelligent systems is that it al-
ready comprises technical artefacts and humans in the same model. Hu-
mans and artefacts are exchangeable and can play the same role in the
network. But, in contrast to traditional artefacts, which are merely pas-
sive (black boxes in which human interests are subscribed) or whose ac-
tive role is restricted to translating intentions of the designer into changes
of the praxis of the user, AI systems play a more active role: they have to
act -as-if they had human capabilities.
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This has for example been utilised by Pieters [2001], who has argued
that intelligent systems have to show certain capabilities usually ascribed
to humans in order to interact with the user in a meaningful way. On the
other hand, since at least some of these capabilities rely on transcendental
concepts, it is not possible to design machines that display them.
ANT opens up the potential to abstract away this problem. Since arte-
factual and human actors can play the same role in a network, we use the
notion of as-if in our approach: in roughly the same way as humans can
never be sure that human counterparts have the capabilities they expect
them to have, but ascribe it to them, our goal is to design intelligent sys-
tems which act in a way that makes humans ascribe human characteristics
to them. Pieters [2001] further argues that some properties of knowledge-
intensive case-based reasoning systems make them well suited for expos-
ing this as-if capability.
2.2 Explanations
Explanations are an important vehicle to convey information between
communicating people in everyday human to human interaction. Expla-
nations enhance the knowledge of the participants in such a way that they
accept certain statements and gain a better understanding of the actions of
the other persons involved and their motivations. They understand more,
allowing them to make better informed decisions themselves. Accord-
ing to Schank [1986], explanations are the most common method used by
humans to support their decision making.
This is supported by Spieker [1991] and his investigation into natural
language explanations in expert systems. We identify some typical reac-
tions of humans as soon as we cannot follow a conversation:
• we ask our conversation partner about concepts that we did not
understand,
• we request justifications for some fact or we ask for the cause of an
event,
• we want to know about functions of concepts,
• we want to know about purposes of concepts, and
• we ask questions about his or her behaviour and how he or she
reached a conclusion.
All those questions and answers are used to understand what has been
said and meant during a simple conversation. An important effect of
explanations is that the process of explaining certainly has some effect
on one’s trust in the competence of a person or machine: We keep our
trust, we increase or decrease it. At least, providing explanations makes
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decisions more transparent, and motivates users to further use the system.
The need for explanations provided by intelligent systems to its users
is well-known and was well addressed in expert systems research. For
knowledge-based systems, explanations and knowledge acquisition are
the only two communications channels through which they interact with
their environment.
The more complex intelligent systems get, the more explanation capa-
bilities the users expect when using such systems. This requirement was
recognised early on in expert systems research and development, for ex-
ample by Swartout [1983]; Buchanan and Shortliffe [1984]; Swartout and
Smoliar [1987]. Considerable results were produced, but research activity
decreased together with the general decline of expert systems research in
the 1990s. The major problems in connection with classical expert systems
seemed to be solved.
In the mid 1990’s, we can see an increasing interest in this topic in case-
based reasoning, in particular by Leake [1996] and Schank et al. [1994]. At
the turn of the century, we find the issue discussed again in the context
of knowledge-based systems as seen by Gregor and Benbasat [1999] or
Swartout and Moore [1993]. Recently, we have seen a renewed focus in
CBR on this track of research. The European Conference on Case-Based
Reasoning (ECCBR) 2004 featured, for example, a workshop on Explana-
tion in case-based reasoning [Gervás and Gupta, 2004] as well as a couple
of papers on explanation at the main conference [Funk and Calero, 2004],
and the journal Artificial Intelligence Review had a special issue on ex-
planation in case-based reasoning [Leake and McSherry, 2005].
It is important to note that the term explanation can be used in dif-
ferent ways. Leake [2004] identifies three different facets of explanations
within the context of case-based reasoning which can be generalized for
all intelligent systems:
• Using explanations to support the case-based reasoning process
• Generating explanations by case-based reasoning
• Using cases for explaining system results to an external user
If we consider this from a functional perspective, it is possible to sub-
sume the last two facets under the heading of user oriented aspects, since
both are targeted towards the user of the system. In our understanding,
showing the case to the user is a special case of “generating explana-
tions by case-based reasoning”, making use of the case-based reasoning
assumption that similar problems have similar solutions. Provided that
the user has some knowledge about the similarity function and that the
case structure is understandable by the user, the displayed case acts as
an explanation to the user [Cunningham et al., 2003]. We are left with
two functions of an explanation, as described by Aamodt [1991]: first, en-
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hancing and promoting the reasoning process. Second, delivering some
knowledge about the reasoning process, its results, or implication to the
user. We call the first aspect the system centric view on explanation and the
second one the user centric view on explanation:
• Explanation as part of the reasoning process itself.
Example: a knowledge intensive case-based reasoning system can
use its domain knowledge to explain the absence/variation of fea-
ture values.
• Giving explanations of the found solution, its application, or the
reasoning process to the user.
Example: in an engine failure diagnosis system, the user gets an
explanation on why a particular case was matched.
The work presented in this thesis generally focuses on the user centric
aspects of explanations. For explanations to be suited to the user they
need to be contextually appropriate.
2.3 Context
We have so far introduced the idea that for an artefact to be considered in-
telligent it must exhibit intelligent behaviour. What we generally refer to
when we say this is behaviour that is contextually appropriate. An ability
to accurately read context is important for any animal if it is to survive,
but it is especially important to social animals and of these perhaps hu-
mans have made the most out of being able to read context, where such an
ability is tightly linked to reasoning and cognition [Cohnitz, 2000; Leake,
1995].
In understanding human cognition and reasoning, disciplines such as
neuroscience, psychology, sociology, linguistics, and philosophy have had
to take a stance on context as a concept. Setting aside the more mechanis-
tic views taken on reasoning, which typically need not consider context
at all, positions on context tend to fall into two broad domains: those
who see context as vast and unable to be coded and those who see it as
vast but able to be coded. This divides roughly along the same lines as
the relativism debate: those who believe in an ultimate reality and those
who believe reality is relative. For most this debate can remain a largely
theoretical debate impinging little on day to day research, for the field
of artificial intelligence however, this debate has very real consequences.
Because of the need to study reasoning in the real world, AI has, like
fields such as anthropology, been forced to work with context however
underelaborated the models.
For social and practical reasons, historically, AI has drawn heavily from
28
2.3. Context
formal logic. For example, one of the benefits of such models was that
they were comparably easy to implement. Formal logic is concerned with
the explicit representation of knowledge and places great emphasis on
the need to codify all facts that could be of importance. This focus on
knowledge as an objective truth can be traced back to e.g. the logic of
Aristotle [1998] who believed that at least a particular subset of knowledge
had an objective existence (Episteme). This view contrasts with that of, for
example, Polanyi [1964], who argues that no such objective truth exists
and all knowledge is at some point personal and hidden (tacit).
The total denial of the existence of an objective truth is problematic,
since consequently there can exist no criterion to value any representation
of knowledge. We can contrast this with the view of Kant, who regards
the accordance of the cognition with its object as being presupposed in
the definition of truth [Kant, 1787, p. 52]. Going further, he makes clear
that a purely formal and universal criterion of truth cannot exist. He fore-
grounds the dialectic relation between the formal logic and the objects to
which this logic may be applied and which are given through intuition.
Such a dialectic approach overcomes the conceptual difficulties outlined
above, but the consequences for computational models are not easily ac-
counted for.
The denial of objective truth can be seen as one core component in many
approaches often referred to as postmodern or deconstructivist. Sokal
and Bricmont [2001] eloquently present a discussion of many postmodern
theoreticians with regard to modern scientific knowledge. Of particular
interest for the topic at hand is an intermezzo on epistemic relativism in
philosophy of science. The authors acknowledge that we never have direct
access to the world, but only through our senses. In contrast to Kant who
argues for a dialectical process of apperception, Sokal and Bricmont take
a pragmaticist approach and reject a relativist epistemology.
Context does not fit very well with the strict logical view on how to
model the world. However, an extremely personal and unique account
of context serves little purpose in attempting generality. Context is, after
all, a shared and very elusive type of knowledge. Despite the fact that
humans can quite easily read context, context is hard to quantify in any
formal way, and it is difficult to establish the type of knowledge that is
useful in any given situation. Ekbia and Maguitman [2001] argue that
this has led to context being largely ignored by the AI community. Nei-
ther the relativist nor the formal logic approach to context has been very
useful at producing accounts of context which resonate with the AI com-
munity, and, except for some earlier work on context and AI, like Doug
Lenat [1998] and the others that we discuss later in this section, Ekbia and
Maguitman’s observation still holds.
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Like many who write about context, Ekbia and Maguitman’s paper is
not a recipe on how to incorporate contextual reasoning into logistic sys-
tems, but rather an attempt to point out the deficiencies and suggest pos-
sible directions AI could take to include context. Their work builds on
the work by the American philosopher John Dewey. According to Ek-
bia and Maguitman, Dewey distinguishes between two main categories
of context: background context (spatial and temporal context); and se-
lective interest. The spatial context covers all contemporary parameters.
The temporal context consists of both intellectual and existential context.
The intellectual context is what we would normally label as background
knowledge, such as tradition, mental habits, and science. The notion of
situation comes out of a combination of Existential context with selective
interest. A situation in Dewey’s account, is a confused, obscure, and con-
flicting thing, that a human reasoner attempts to make sense of through
the use of context. The pragmatist approach, as exposed by Dewey, leads
to the following statements about context [Ekbia and Maguitman, 2001, p.
5]:
1. Context, most often, is not explicitly identifiable.
2. There are no sharp boundaries among contexts.
3. The logical aspects of thinking cannot be isolated from material con-
siderations.
4. Behaviour and context are jointly recognisable.
Although it is by no means unique to him, Dewey’s work foregrounds
the absolute inseparability of mind and nature. Ekbia and Maguitman
suggest that AI, by focussing on the the logical approach to (artificial)
reasoning, has not dealt with context in any consistent way. This has led
to many of the problems associated with the use of context because it
works with a separation between mind and nature.
By considering the weaknesses of different logic-based AI methods and
systems, Ekbia and Maguitman argue that, where context is concerned,
AI has not yet parted company with the limitations of logic driven ap-
proaches. Furthermore, they stress, based on the notion of situations de-
scribed above, intelligence should be seen as being action-oriented.
The conception of intelligence as action-oriented, an approach which
makes context a tool for selecting the correct action, is shared by many
within the computer science community. Most notably the works by Strat
[1993], where context is applied to select the most suitable algorithm for
recognition in computer vision, and by Öztürk and Aamodt [1998] who
utilised context to improve the quality and efficiency of case-based rea-
soning.
Strat [1993] reports on the work done in computer vision to use contex-
tual information in guiding the selection of algorithms in image under-
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standing. When humans observe a scene they utilise a large amount of
information (context) not captured in the particular image. At the same
time, all image understanding algorithms use some assumptions in order
to function, creating an epistemic bias. Examples are algorithms that only
work on binary images, or that are not able to handle occlusions.
Strat defines three main categories of context: physical, being general
information about the visual world independent of the conditions under
which the image was taken; photogrammetric, which is the information
related the acquisition of the image; and computational, being information
about the internal state of the processing. The main idea in this work is
to use context to guide the selection of the image-processing algorithms
to use on particular images. This is very much in line with the ideas
proposed by Ekbia and Maguitman, where intelligence is action-oriented,
and context can be used to bring order to diffuse and unclear situations.
This action-orientated view on reasoning and use of context is also ad-
vocated by Öztürk and Aamodt [1998]. They argue that the essential as-
pects of context are the notions of relevance and focus. To facilitate im-
provements to case-based reasoning a context model is constructed. This
model builds on the work by Hewitt, where the notions of intrinsic and ex-
trinsic context types are central. Tiberghien [1986] states that according to
Hewitt, intrinsic context is information related to the target item in a rea-
soning process, and extrinsic is the information not directly related to the
target item. This distinction is closely related to the concepts of selective
interest and background context as described by Dewey. The authors refine
this view by focusing on the intertwined relationship between the agent
doing the reasoning, and the characteristics of the problem to be solved.
This is exactly the approach recognised as being missing in AI by Ekbia
and Maguitman.
Öztürk and Aamodt build a taxonomy of context categories based on
this merger of the two different worlds of information (internal vs. exter-
nal). Beside this categorisation, the authors impose the action, or task,
oriented view on knowledge in general, and contextual knowledge in
particular. The goal of an agent focuses the attention, and thereby the
knowledge needed to execute tasks associated with the goal. The exam-
ple domain in their paper is from medical diagnostics, where a physician
attempts to diagnose a patient by the hypothesise-and-test strategy. The
particular method of diagnostics in this case-based reasoning system is
related to the strategy used by Strat. They differ insofar as Strat used con-
textual information to select the algorithms to be used, whereas Öztürk
and Aamodt have, prior to run-time, defined the main structure of a di-
agnostic situation, and only use context to guide the sub-tasks in this
process.
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Zibetti et al. [2001] focus on the problem of how agents understand sit-
uations based on the information they can perceive. To our knowledge,
this work is the only one that does not attempt to build an explicit on-
tology on contextual information prior to run-time. The idea is to build
a (subjective) taxonomy of ever-more-complex situations solely based on
what a particular agent gathers from the environment in general, and the
behaviour of other agents in particular.
The implementation used to exemplify this approach contains a number
of agents “living” in a two-dimensional world, where they try to make
sense of the world by assessing the spatial changes to the environment.
Obviously the acquisition of knowledge starting with a tabula rasa is a
long and tedious task for any entity. To speed up the process the authors
predefined some categories with which the system is instantiated.
Research and development in intelligent systems taking context into
account is often labelled as ambient intelligence. Following the account of
Ducatel et al. [2001], we would like to remind that this means that ambi-
ent intelligent systems should have the ability to appreciate the system’s
environment, be aware of persons in this environment, and respond intel-
ligently to their needs. To realise the abilities of an ambient intelligent sys-
tem, three main areas of responsibility can be identified [Kofod-Petersen
and Aamodt, 2006]: first, the initial responsibility of perceiving the world
that the system inhabits; second, the responsibility of being aware of
the environment and reason about ongoing situations, which tradition-
ally has been labelled as context awareness; and third, exhibit appropriate
behaviour in ongoing situations by being context sensitive [Kofod-Petersen
and Aamodt, 2006; Yau et al., 2002].
In Kofod-Petersen and Aamodt’s architecture, context serves two pur-
poses. Initially it is used as a focussing lens on the part of the world that
can be perceived. Here the context limits the parts of the knowledge that
the system uses to classify the situation. The second use of context is in
the context sensitivity layer, where context is viewed as a lens that focuses
the part of the system’s knowledge that is to be used to satisfy the goal of
the situation.
For the purpose of this work we will disregard the perception layer of
the architecture as the perception layer demonstrates no reasoning capa-
bilities, and only structures perceived data syntactically. Following ar-
guments earlier introduced by Kofod-Petersen and Aamodt [2006], we
identify these two aspects as two distinct steps in the reasoning process:
• Context Awareness: Trying to detect the situation the system is in.
Example: An ambient intelligent system for supporting health per-
sonnel figures out that the user is on a ward-round because of the
time of the day, the location, and the other persons present.
32
2.4. Explanations and Context
Table 2.1.: Explanation and context
Context Awareness Context Sensitivity
System Centric Generate an
explanation to
recognise the situation
Identify the behaviour
the system should
expose
User Centric Elucidate why the
system identifies a
particular situation
Explicate why a certain
behaviour was chosen
• Context Sensitivity: Acting according to the situation the system
thinks it is in.
Example: the same system fetches the newest versions of electronic
patient records of all patients in the room from the hospital sys-
tems. When the user stands close to the bed of a patient, the system
automatically displays them.
2.4 Explanations and Context
The adequacy of explanations and justifications is dependent on pragmat-
ically given background knowledge. What counts as a good explanation
in a certain situation is determined by context dependent criteria [Cohnitz,
2000; Leake, 1995]. So how are context and explanations related? We fol-
low the distinctions introduced earlier in this chapter. This means we look
at 1. explanation as part of the reasoning process itself or 2. at giving explana-
tions of the found solution, its application, or the reasoning process to the
user. At the same time, we have the distinction of 1. context awareness, try-
ing to figure out which situation the system is in, and 2. context sensitivity,
acting according to the situation the system thinks it is in. Combing these
views on explanation and on context, we end up with two dimensions of
inquiry as depicted in Table 2.1.
We will further investigate the relationship between context and expla-
nations by examining an example from a hospital (cardiology) ward do-
main. A case-based reasoning system is used to identify the different sit-
uations. The system’s main purpose is to identify ongoing situations and
proactively acquire digital information required by the persons present.
2.4.1 Recognise
In this step, we are using explanations to recognise the current ongoing sit-
uation. The system uses all available resources in its reasoning process.
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Let us assume that the ongoing situation is a ward round. Normally ward
rounds take place in a patient room, however the current situation is oc-
curring in the hallway. This discrepancy can be explained away by the
system generalising that both locations can indeed contain patient beds.
When our case-based systems retrieves a matching case, the system has
no explicit knowledge stating that a hallway can contain hospital beds.
The initial match is of a syntactical nature only. However, it can use its
general knowledge and the reasoning mechanism of plausible inheritance
to generate an explanation supporting the hypothesis that beds can be
located in the hallway, for example because they are both some kind of
room, and beds are some kind of object that have a room as a location.
Therefore, as all other parameters are consistent with a ward round, the
system assumes that it is indeed a ward round situation.
The explanation used by the system in this example states that a hallway
is a room and can therefore contain a hospital bed.
2.4.2 Elucidate
We now want to generate an explanation for the user that tells the user why the
system assumes a certain situation. The system will make use of all avail-
able sources of knowledge in order to gain the user’s confidence in its
capabilities. It will also have to consider the user’s goals when choosing
a specific explanation. It has been shown that simply presenting the rea-
soning trace is not always sufficient (it can even be counter productive)
[Majchrzak and Gasser, 1991; Gregor and Benbasat, 1999]. The system
might therefore generate an after-the-fact explanation, which for example
justifies its assumption. Since the ward round situation is occurring in an
unusual place, the system will point out the time of the day, the availabil-
ity of the other expected participants, and the fact that hallways might
contain beds, as the reason for its assumption instead of only displaying
its generalisation of the location.
The explanation shown to the user is a justification of the system’s belief
that it is on a ward round.
2.4.3 Identify
After the system has successfully identified the context, it is using explana-
tions to generate a plan for a reasonable course of action. Now, it is using only
the knowledge sources important for the situation at hand (the context
is acting as a focus lense [Kofod-Petersen and Aamodt, 2006]). When we
now assume that the system has recognised that we are on a ward round,
discussing medical conditions and treatments with several patients, it will
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try to prepare all the relevant information to be presented to the user. This
includes all test results. The system can now ask other available artefacts
for test results on the user, and the medical images database can offer a
MR image whereas the patient record offers a textual description of the
MRI. Because of limitations of handheld devices, the system will for ex-
ample not be able to display high resolution MR images. When choosing
which of the artefacts to query, the system will reject the medical image
database and only query the electronic patient record database.
The explanation used by the system is based on the knowledge that a
high resolution image displaying device is not available on a ward round.
2.4.4 Explicate
Looking at the user centric part again, we are now in need of generating
an explanation for why the systems takes a specific action. The system will
take into account which situation it assumes it is in and the possible goals
the user might have for an explanation. In executing its plan, the system
proposes its user visit the isolation room with patients who should be
kept separate. The user is surprised since he is not aware that any of the
patients he should see on the ward round are in the isolation room, and no
information on this was exchanged in the morning briefing. The system
can then generate an explanation that shows the relevance of the proposal
by pointing out that one particular patient had to be moved to the isolation
room for medical reasons since the time of the morning meeting, and
this information was available via the patient information system. This
explanation would not be useful if it had not been established already
that we are on a ward round and the aim was to visit the patients. Vice
versa, if the system generates a justification for its assumption of being
on a ward round, this would still not satisfy the need of the user to know
why he should go to the isolation room.
The explanation shown to the user is pointing out the relevance of per-
forming a particular action, namely visiting the isolation room.
2.5 Modelling Context
In this section, we describe the research results in terms of context mod-
elling. We will look at an activity theory inspired context model and see
how it integrates with existing approaches in the fields of context aware
and pervasive computing. The last subsection will outline how an ethno-
graphic study of work place situations can be used to populate such a
context model with situation and domain specific data.
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2.5.1 Activity Theory
Our aim is now to identify which aspects of an activity theory based anal-
ysis can help us to capture a knowledge level view of contextual knowl-
edge that should be incorporated into an ambient intelligent system. This
contextual knowledge should include knowledge about the acting sub-
jects, the objects towards which activities are directed and the community
as well as knowledge about the mediating components, like rules or tools.
Traditional Context Model
The context model used in this work draws on a subjective view of situa-
tions. That is, even though the model is general, any instance of the model
belongs to one user only. Thus, as in Zibetti et al. [2001], any situation will
be described from the personal perspective, leading to the possibility of
many instances describing the “same” situation. This is in contrast to the
leading perspective, where a system will describe objective situations.
In the extreme consequence the model used by any subject could also
be subjective and unique. However, to avoid the problem of a tabula rasa
and based on our acceptance of objective descriptions of at least some
aspects, we have chosen a pragmatic view on how to model context. The
model is based on the definition of context given by Dey [2001], applying
the following definition:
Context is the set of suitable environmental states and settings
concerning a user, which are relevant for a situation sensitive
application in the process of adapting the services and infor-
mation offered to the user.
This definition from Dey does not explicitly state that context is viewed as
knowledge. However, we believe that the knowledge intensive approach
is required if we wish a system to display many of the characteristics men-
tioned in the introduction. At the same time we also adhere to the view
advocated by Brézillon and Pomerol [1999] that context is not a special
kind of knowledge. They argue that context is in the eye of the beholder:
“. . . knowledge that can be qualified as ‘contextual’ depends on the con-
text!” [Brézillon and Pomerol, 1999, p.7]
Even though we argue for a context model where context is not a spe-
cial type of information, we also believe that only a pragmatical view on
context will enable us to construct actually working systems. Following
this pragmatic view we impose a meronomy on the context model in the
design phase (see Figure 2.5). This meronomy is inherited from the con-
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text aware tradition and adapted to make use of the general concepts we
find in activity theory.
The context is divided into five sub-categories (a more thorough discus-
sion can be found in Göker and Myrhaug [2002] or Kofod-Petersen and
Mikalsen [2005]):
1. Environmental context: This part captures the users surroundings,
such as things, services, people, and information accessed by the
user.
2. Personal context: This part describes the mental and physical infor-
mation about the user, such as mood, expertise and disabilities.
3. Social context: This describes the social aspects of the user, such as
information about the different roles a user can assume.
4. Task context: the task context describe what the user is doing, it can
describe the user’s goals, tasks and activities.
5. Spatio-temporal context: This type of context is concerned with
attributes like: time, location and the community present.
The model depicted in Figure 2.5 shows the top-level ontology. To enable
the reasoning in the system this top-level structure is integrated with a
more general domain ontology, which describes concepts of the domain
(e.g., Operating Theatre, Ward, Nurse, Journal) as well as more generic
concepts (Task, Goal, Action, Physical Object) in a multi-relational seman-
tic network. The model enables the system to infer relationships between
concepts by constructing context dependent paths between them. We are
approaching the situation assessment by applying knowledge-intensive
case-based reasoning [Aamodt, 2004]. One of the important aspects of
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Figure 2.6.: Populated context structure
knowledge-intensive case-based reasoning is the ability to match two case
features that are syntactically different, by explaining why they are similar
[Aamodt, 1994; Jære et al., 2002].
Activity Theory for the Identification of Context Components
The generic concepts are partly gathered through the use of activity theo-
retic analysis. These concepts include the six aspects shown in Figure 2.7.
The top-level meronomy including the concepts acquired from AT is de-
picted in Figure 2.6. The context model is now primed to model situations
and the activities occurring within them.
If we look at the model we can see how each of the AT aspects is mod-
elled. The artefact exists within the environmental context, where it can
offer services that can perform actions, which assist the subject (described
in the personal context) in achieving the goals of the role (in the social context)
played by the subject. Other persons, being part of the situation through
the environmental context, can also affect the outcome (goal) of the situa-
tion. They are cast in different roles that are part of the community existing
in the spatio-temporal context. The roles also implicitly define the division of
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Table 2.2.: Basic aspects of an activity and their relation to a meronomy of
contextual knowledge
CHAT aspect Category
Subject Personal Context
Object Task Context
Community Spatio-Temporal Context
Mediating Artefact Environmental Context
Mediating Rules Task Context
Mediating Division of Labour Social Context
labour in the community. The rules governing the subject are found in the
task context.
As an example, we want the contextual knowledge to contain both in-
formation about the acting subject itself (like the weight or size) and the
tools (like a particular software used in a software development process).
To this end, we propose a mapping from the basic structure of an activity
into the meronomy of contextual knowledge as depicted in Table 2.2. We
can see that the personal context contains information we would associate
with the acting subject itself.
We would like to point out that we do not think that a strict one to one
mapping exists or is desirable at all. Our view on contextual knowledge
is contextualised itself in the sense that different interpretations exist, and
what is to be considered contextual information in one setting is part of
the general knowledge model in another one. Likewise, the same piece of
knowledge can be part of different categories based on the task at hand.
The same holds for the AT based analysis itself: the same thing can
be an object and a mediating artefact from different perspectives and in
different task settings. The mapping suggested here should lead the de-
velopment process and allow the designer to focus on knowledge-level
aspects instead of being lost in the modelling of details without being
able to see the relationship between different aspects on a socio-technical
system level.
As an example, let us consider a software development setting where a
team is programming a piece of software for a client. The members of the
team are all subjects in the development process. They form a community
together with representatives of the client and other stake-holders. Each
member of the team and personnel from other divisions of the software
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Figure 2.7.: Mapping from activity theory to context model
company work together in a division of labour. The object at hand is the
unfinished prototype, which has to be transformed into something that
can be handed over to the client. The task is governed by a set of rules,
some explicit, like coding standards, some implicit, like what is often
referred to as a working culture. The programmers use a set of mediating
artefacts (tools), like methods for analysis and design, programming tools,
and documentation.
When we design a context aware system for the support of this task, we
include information about the user of the system (subject) in the personal
context and about the other teammembers in the environmental context. As-
pects regarding the special application a developer is working on (objects)
are part of the task context, it will change when the same user engages
in a different task (lets say he is looking for a restaurant). The rules are
part of the task context since they are closely related to the task at hand
– coding standards will not be helpful when trying to find a restaurant.
We find the tool aspects (artefacts) in the environmental context since access
to the different tools is important for the ability of the user to use them.
Knowledge about his co-workers and other stake-holders (community) are
modelled in the spatio-temporal context. Finally, his interaction with other
team members (division of labour) is described as part of the social context.
In the design process, we can also make use of the hierarchical structure
of activities. On the topmost level, we can identify the activities the context
aware system should support. By this, we can restrict the world view of
the system and make the task of developing a context model manageable.
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Furthermore, we can make use of the notion of actions to identify the
different situations the system can encounter. This helps us to asses the
different knowledge sources and artefacts involved in different contexts,
thereby guiding the knowledge acquisition task. Finally, since operations
are performed subconsciously, we get hints on which processes should be
supported by automatic and proactive behaviour of the system.
Let us consider our example again. We know that the activity we want
to support is the development of an IT system. Therefore, we can restrict
ourselves to facets of the world which are related to the design process,
and we do not (necessarily) have to take care of supporting e.g. meetings
some of the teammembers have as players at the company’s football team.
On the other hand, the system has to be concerned with meetings with the
customer. Furthermore, different actionswhich are also part of the activity
should be supported, like e.g. team meetings or programming sessions,
and the different actions involved can lead to the definition of different
situations or contexts.
A context aware application therefore should know at all times in which
action the user is engaged. This is, in fact, the main aspect of our under-
standing of the term context awareness. At last, to support the operations of
the user, it might be necessary to proactively query different knowledge
sources or request other resources the user might need without being ex-
plicitly told to do so by the user. This is at the core of what we refer to
as context sensitivity in order to distinguish between these two different
aspects of context.
It is important to keep in mind that the hierarchical structure of ac-
tivities is in a constant state of flux. Activity theory is also capable of
capturing changing contexts in break-down situations. Lets consider that
a tool used in the development process, such as a compiler, stops work-
ing. The operation of evoking the compiler now becomes a conscious
action for the debugging process. The focus of the developer shifts away
from the client software to the compiler. He will now be involved in a
different task where he probably will have to work together with the sys-
tem administrators of his work-station. In this sense other aspects of the
activity, such as the community, change as well. It is clear that the con-
textual model should reflect these changes. The ability of activity theory
to identify possible break-down situations makes it possible for the sys-
tem designer to identify these possible shifts in situation and model the
anticipated behaviour of the system.
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Populating the context model
We now have a well defined semantic network serving as a knowledge
model that is sound both from an activity theory viewpoint and from the
tradition of context aware computing. The next step is to populate the
model with data from real world situations.
To gather data about work processes, we have designed forms for a
study which allow us to focus on different parts of an activity theoretic
analysis of the work process. The forms had to meet certain requirements:
• It should be possible to clearly identify the different activities the
users were involved in. Furthermore, the goal for each situation
should be identified, even if the users did not explicitly state these
goals. This would enable us to identify the different outcomes an-
ticipated by the users, and eventually could help us in building a
model capturing the hierarchical structure of activities.
• The artefacts used should be identified, and different forms of use
for these artefacts should be recorded. This would give us hints
about the mediating role of artefacts. Special interest should be
given to the use of infomation sources.
• The different entities involved in the activity as depicted in the basic
triangle (see Figure 2.3) should, if observable, be described in order
to be able to directly connect the data collected to the knowledge
level model.
• By observing the praxis of using artefacts, deeper insight on exter-
nalisation of cognitive processes can be gained. Although this is not
in the scope of our current work, a study design which takes this as-
pect into consideration could help us in evaluating the capabilities
an intelligent system would have to provide to its users in order to
be seen as an intelligent partner.
• Although a truly intelligent system would be able to adapt itself
to completely new situations, we consider the usage situation, e.g.
with regard to the governing rules and the capabilities of the tools
used, as being relatively constant. Therefore, our study design did
not particularly deal with issues of continuous development.
At the same time, the resulting form could not be too extensive since it
should be able to be filled in by a single person observing the activities.
The end result was a form which captured essentially the following as-
pects:
• Location: The room where the situation occurred
• User: The user of the system
• Role: The role of the user
• Present: Other persons present
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• Role: The role of each of the persons present
• Patient: The ID of the patient in question
• Time: The time of day
• Source: Information sources and targets
• I/O: The direction of the information flow
• Information: Type of information
An empirical study which allowed us to collect both domain specific and
situation specific data was performed and is described in more detail in
Paper G. This serves as a proof of concept that activity theory is not only
fruitful for developing a context model, but can also aid in populating the
model with specific data.
2.5.2 Semiotics
In this section, we will give our basic understanding of how semiotics can
be used to understand the peculiarities of user interaction with ambient
intelligent systems. The basic concept of the chosen interpretion of semi-
otics is the sign, a triadic relation of a signifier, a signified, and object. We
look at the process of sense-making, where a representation (signifier) and
its mental image (signified) refer to an entity (object) (the meaning of a sign
is not contained within a symbol, it needs its interpretation).
On the background of semiotics, meaningful human communication is
a sign process. It is a process of exchanging and interpreting symbols
referring to objects. The user of a computer systems sees his interaction
with this system on this background. When typing a letter, he does not
send mere symbols, but signs to the computer, and the feedback from the
machine, the pixels on the screen, are interpreted as signs: to the user, the
computer is a “semiotic machine”. The question that arises is whether a
computer is actually itself taking part in the sense making process.
On one hand, following for example Kant, human understanding has
as a necessary constituent the ability to conceptualise perceived phenom-
ena through an active, discursive process of making sense of the intuitive
perception [Kant, 1787, p. 58]. Following this understanding, computer
systems are only processing signals, lacking the necessary interpreting
capabilities humans have. They only manipulate symbols without con-
ceptualising them. However, intelligence is in the eye of the beholder, and
it can be argued that even mere signal processing units can appear as sign
processors to the human if they sufficiently mimic human behaviour.
On the other hand, we can take a pragmaticist approach, following for
example Peirce and Dewey, and focus not on whether the machine is itself
a sense maker, but on how its use changes the ongoing socio-technical
process, and whether it can mediate the sense making process. From this
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point of view, the computer can be a sense making agent if its actions are
appropriate in terms of the user’s expectations.
Both approaches lead to a change in the issues we deal with when
constructing an ambient intelligent system. The problem is transformed
from one where the issue is to build a machine which itself realises a
sense making process to one in which the issue is to build a computer
thats actions are appropriate for the situation it is in and which exhibits
sufficient sign processing behaviour.
We argue that, in order to make a pervasive, ambient intelligent system
that behaves intelligently in a situation, it must be able to execute actions
that make a difference to the overall sense making process in a given con-
text. This differs from the interaction with traditional systems in which
case the sense-making falls wholly on the side of the human user: You do
not expect a text processor to understand your letter, but you expect an
ambient intelligent system to display behaviour suggesting that it under-
stands relevant parts of the situation you are in. When interacting with
ambient intelligent systems, the user should be facilitated to subscribe to
the sense making abilities of the artefacts.
One important challenge here is the features that allow the system to
show its capabilities. This can be described as a communication problem:
the system has to interpret the actions of the user and information per-
ceived about the context in a meaningful way and itself present results
that make sense for the user. This process of sense-making is highly inter-
active: an intelligent partner in a communication process asks (meaning-
ful) questions if an unclear situation occurs and is able to explain its own
actions. Therefore, it is desirable that the artefacts mimic some abilities
usually ascribed to humans, like this explanatory capacity. The semiotic
approach is useful to analyse this sense-making process with the help of
transferring knowledge about similar processes from other semiotic do-
mains.
In Paper K, we have outlined how semiotics can be put to use when
dealing with problems of abstract concepts when dealing with ambient in-
telligent systems.
2.6 Modelling Explanations
In this section, we first highlight how explanation goals focus on user needs
and expectations towards explanations and help to understand what the
system has to be able to explain and when to explain something. In the
second step, we introduce some patterns which can help to model ex-
planatory needs in the requirements engineering process for an intelligent
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system.
2.6.1 User Goals
We suggest several explanation goals for case-based reasoning systems
which are valid for knowledge-based systems, in general (see Paper E).
The user of an intelligent system has certain expectations towards expla-
nations, he has an interest depending on his own historicity and the state
of the socio-technical system. Different explanations are of different util-
ity for the user. The task the system is faced with is to decide which
explanations will be most useful for the user, and then to decide upon
the amount of information which has to be presented. We argue that the
goals we present are indeed reachable because the systems we consider
are mostly designed to perform limited tasks for a limited audience, thus
making it possible to make reasonable assumptions about the user’s goals
and the explanation context. The identified explanation goals are:
Transparency:
Explain how the system reached the answer
“I had the same problem with my car yesterday, and charging the battery fixed
it.”
The goal of an explanation of this kind is to impart an understanding of
how the system found an answer. This allows the users to check the sys-
tem by examining the way it reasons and to look for explanations for why
the system has reached a surprising or anomalous result. If transparency
is the primary goal, the system should not try to oversell a conclusion it is
uncertain of. In other words, fidelity is the primary criterion even though
such explanations may place a heavy cognitive load on the user. The orig-
inal how and why explanations of the MYCIN system [Clancey, 1983] are
good examples.
This goal is most important with knowledge engineers seeking to debug
the system and possibly domain experts seeking to verify the reasoning
process [Gregor and Benbasat, 1999]. It is also reasonable to expect that
in domains with a high cost of failure it can be supposed that the user
wishes to examine the reasoning process more thoroughly.
Justification:
Explain why the answer is a good answer
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“You should eat more fish - your heart needs it!”
“My predictions have been 80% correct up until now.”
This has the goal of increasing confidence in the advice or solution of-
fered by the system by giving some kind of support for the conclusion
suggested by the system. This goal allows for a simplification of the ex-
planation compared to the actual process the system goes through to find
a solution. Potentially, this kind of explanation can be completely decou-
pled from the reasoning process, but it may also be achieved by using
additional background knowledge or reformulation and simplification of
knowledge that is used in the reasoning process.
Empirical research suggests that this goal is most prevalent in systems
with novice users [Mao and Benbasat, 2000], in domains where the cost
of failure is relatively low, and in domains where the system represents a
party that has an interest in the user accepting the solution.
Relevance:
Explain why a question asked is relevant
“I ask about the more common failures first, and many users do forget to con-
nect the power cable.”
An explanation of this type would have to justify the strategy pursued
by the system. This is in contrast to the previous two goals that focus on
the solution. The reasoning trace type of explanations may display the
strategy of the system implicitly, but it does not argue why it is a good
strategy. In conversational systems, the user may wish to know why a
question asked by the system is relevant to the task at hand. It can also be
relevant in other kinds of systems where a user would like to verify that
the approach used by the system is valid. In expert systems, this kind of
explanation was introduced by NEOMYCIN [Clancey, 1983].
Conceptualisation:
Clarify the Meaning of Concepts
“By ‘conceptualisation’ we mean the process of forming concepts and rela-
tions between concepts.”
One of the lessons learned after the first wave of expert systems had been
analysed was that the users did not always understand the terms used by
a system. This may be because the user is a novice in the domain, but also
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because different people can use terms differently or organise the knowl-
edge in different ways. It may not be clear, even to an expert, what the
system means when using a specific term, and he may want to get an ex-
planation of what the system means when using it. This requirement for
providing explanations for the vocabulary was first identified by Swartout
and Smoliar [1987].
Learning:
Teach the user about the domain
“When the headlights won’t work, the battery may be flat as it is supposed to
deliver power to the lights.”
All the previous explanation goals involve learning – about the problem
domain, about the system, about the reasoning process or the vocabu-
lary of the system. Educational systems, however, have learning as the
primary goal of the whole system. In these systems, we cannot assume
that the user will understand even definitions of terms, and may need to
provide different explanations for people at different levels of expertise.
The goal of the system is typically not only to find a good solution to a
problem, but to explain the solution process to the user in a way that will
increase his understanding of the domain. The goal can be to teach more
general domain theory or to train the user in solving problems similar
to those solved by the system. This means that the explanation is often
more important than the answer itself. Systems that fulfil the relevance
and transparency goals may have some capabilities in this area, but a true
tutoring system must take into account how humans solve problems. It
cannot attempt to teach the user a problem solving strategy that works
well in a computer but that is very hard to reproduce for people.
2.6.2 Problem Frames
The use of patterns [Alexander et al., 1977] is common for different soft-
ware engineering approaches. Patterns can be used in different software
development phases and they can have different foci. We can also identify
knowledge engineering approaches making use of patterns.
In the initial phases of the requirements engineering process, the use
of problem frames as proposed by Jackson [2001] is a method to classify
software development problems. Problem frames are focus on the world
and attempt to describe the problem and its solution in the real world.
Problem frames introduce concepts like ‘Information Display’ and ‘Com-
manded Behaviour’.
47
2. Research Description
Jackson’s set of basic problem frames can be extended to be better able
to model domain specific aspects. For example, Hatebur and Heisel [2005]
introduce new problem frames for security problems. Their proposal in-
cludes problem frames for issues like ‘Accept Authentication’ and ‘Secure
Data Transmission’. They also provide architectural patterns connected to
these problem frames.
The main purpose of any problem frame is to propose a machine that
improves the combined performance of itself and its environment by de-
scribing the machine’s behaviour in a specification. To explain ones be-
haviour a problem frame must be constructed that relates the behaviour
the system shows to different parts of knowledge used by the system to
support the chosen course of action in a specification.
Jackson [2001] originally described five different basic frames, each
of which comes in different flavours and variants: ‘required behaviour’,
‘commanded behaviour’, ‘information display’, ‘simple workpieces’ and
‘transformation’. Each basic frame has its own requirements, domain
characteristics, domain involvement, and frame concern.
In general, a problem frame assumes a user driven perspective. Ex-
cept for the ‘required behaviour’ basic frame, each frame assumes that
the user is in control and dictates the behaviour of the machine. Since
intelligent systems (ideally) take a much more proactive approach and
mixed-initiative issues become relevant, new problem frames addressing
these topics have to be developed. For the purposes of this work, we will
focus exclusively on frames targeting explanatory aspects and will not
discuss other types of problem frames.
Problem frames have a standardised form of representation that are
known as problem frame diagrams. Diagramatic representation takes the
form of dashed ovals, representing the requirements, plain rectangles, de-
noting application domains, and a rectangle with a double vertical stripe,
standing for the machine (or software machine) domain to be developed.
These entities become the nodes of the frame diagram. They are con-
nected by edges, representing shared phenomena and denoting an in-
terface. Dashed edges refer to requirement references. Dashed arrows
designate constraining requirement references.
The domains can be of different types, indicated by a letter in the lower
right corner. Here, a ‘C’ stands for a causal domain whose properties
include predictable causal relationships among its phenomena. A ‘B’ de-
notes a biddable domain that lacks positive predictable internal behaviour.
Biddable domains are usually associated with user actions. Finally, an
‘X’ marks a lexical domain. Such a domain is a physical representation of
data and combines causal and symbolic phenomena.
In the software development process, problem frames are used in the
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Figure 2.8.: Transparency Explanation. An explanation supporting this
goal gives the user some insight into the inner working of
the system. To this end, the system inspects its own reasoning
trace when formulating the explanation.
following way. First, we start with a context diagram, which consists of
domain nodes and their relations, but without the requirements. After-
wards, the context diagram is divided into subproblems. The resulting
subproblems should, whenever possible, relate to existing generic problem
frames. These generic problem frames are hereby instantiated to describe
the particular subproblem at hand.
In the remainder of this subsection, we propose a set of new generic
problem frames to capture aspects of explanations connected to the afore-
mentioned different user goals identified in the previous subsection.
Transparency Explanation
The goal of an explanation of this kind is to impart an understanding of
how the system found an answer, allowing the user to test the system
by querying the reasoning and when unusual conclusions are reached to
search for explanations.
The frame diagram depicted in Figure 2.8 highlights that in order to
support the transparency goal, the software system has to inspect its rea-
soning trace and represent the relevant facts of its reasoning process to
the user. We expect a transparency explanation usually to be given after
the reasoning process has terminated.
Justification Explanation
This is primarily a confidence raising goal, aimed at increasing the confi-
dence of the user in the advice or solution offered by the system. It allows
for a simplification of the explanation.
An explanation supporting the justification goal, as shown in Figure 2.9,
has not only to take the reasoning of the machine into account, but it will
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Figure 2.9.: Justification Explanation. In contrast to the transparency ex-
planation, in justification explanations, the user is not as inter-
ested in why the system exposes a particular behaviour, but
is more interested in having evidence supporting the veracity
of this behaviour. Therefore, other knowledge has to be taken
into account besides the reasoning trace.
also make use of other parts of the system’s knowledge in order to gen-
erate after the fact explanations supporting its actions or decisions. Since
justification explanations complement transparency explanations, we ex-
pect it to typically be given after the reasoning process has terminated.
Relevance Explanation
In contrast to the previous two goals that focus on the solution, a relevance
explanation justifies the strategy pursued by the system.
Since this goal, depicted by the frame diagram in Figure 2.10, is of par-
ticular interest for mixed-initiative systems, the explaining machine has
to relate its explanation both to its own dialogue with the user (and here
in particular the questions asked by the system or the actions performed),
the reasoning trace (in oder to relate to the situation the system assumes
it is in) and the system knowledge relevant. In contrast to the first two
goals, an explanation supporting this goal is important to be given during
the reasoning process of the system.
Conceptualisation Explanation
The goal of conceptualization explanations is to ensure that there is a
sigular understanding of terminology.
This explanation machine, represented with the frame diagram de-
picted in Figure 2.11, builds on its own system knowledge. This high-
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Figure 2.10.: Relevance Explanation. An explanation supporting this goal
should instil confidence by indicating that the system’s be-
haviour is connected to the task at hand. Consequently, the
reasoning and dialogue traces should be taken into account
as well as other (domain) knowledge.
Figure 2.11.: Conceptualisation Explanation. By giving a conceptualisa-
tion explanation, the system explicates its own conceptuali-
sation of the domain or the task at hand to the user. Hence, it
will connect the concept to be explained with its own knowl-
edge components.
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Figure 2.12.: Learning Explanation. This goal is special, since it focuses on
the user’s interest in the application domain (hence the real
world), and not on some particular behaviour of the system.
lights the fact that explanations supporting this goal should set unknown
concepts in the context of the other knowledge the system has, and which
is expected to be shared with the user already. Conceptualisation expla-
nations are important both during the reasoning process (e.g. in addition
to a relevance explanation) and after the reasoning process has terminated
(e.g. in addition to a justification explanation).
Learning Explanation
This goal is of specific interest for educational applications, which have
learning as the primary goal of the whole system. Here, typically the
goal of the system is not only to find a good solution to a problem, but
to explain the solution process to the user in a way that will increase his
understanding of the domain.
The Figure 2.12 highlights this fact by pointing out that the explanatory
machine has to connect its own system knowledge with the real world
(representing the application domain) in order to generate explanations
supporting the user in gaining a better understanding of the application
domain. The explanation given should also relate to the system’s assump-
tions about its user, which is influenced by the dialogue trace. Because of
the nature of this goal, it will usually be important during the system’s
reasoning process.
This section has introduced explanation problem frames on a concep-
tual level. In Paper L, we show how these frames can be used to (re-)
52
2.7. Modelling Explanations in Context
design an explanation aware ambient intelligent system by using our ex-
isting hospital ward system described e.g. in Paper G as an example.
2.7 Modelling Explanations in Context
This section gives an overview about how the pieces outlined in the pre-
vious sections come together. It is shown how a socio-technical approach,
exemplified through the use of activity theory, is put to use to model ex-
planatory capabilities in context. It is further outlined how this can be
used in a workflow from an ethnoraphical analysis of existing workplace
situations down to a specification of the knowledge necessary in the dif-
ferent knowledge holding components of a case-based reasoning system.
2.7.1 Activity Theory for Explanations in Context
As described above, activity theory has been used to recognise contextual
facets of a work situation. By integrating the knowledge necessary for
supporting the different explanatory goals of the user with this contex-
tual information, the explanatory capabilities of the system are coupled
with the different contexts. Hence, the hypothesis is that this explanatory
knowledge will indeed primarily be used in the appropriate context.
We will now explore the relations between the basic properties of activ-
ity theory and explanation goals.
Hierarchical structure of activity: The fact that activities are hierarchi-
cally structured, and that changes in these structures occur, facilitates cer-
tain explanation goals. Actions that are performed often will be trans-
formed into operations. Vice versa, if an anticipated outcome of an op-
eration does not occur, non-conscious operation will become conscious
actions. This is called a breakdown situation. The explanatory capabili-
ties of a system should support this. In fact two goals are relevant in these
situations:
• Transparency: If parts of the non-conscious operations are carried
out by artefacts, the system might need sufficient knowledge to ex-
plain the artefacts inner working in case of a breakdown.
• Relevance: If an artefact involved in an action can behave differ-
ently than expected, it should be made clear why the unexpected
behaviour occurred.
Object-orientedness: In the activity theoretical sense of the term object-
oriented, the meaning of this term is twofold. On one hand, it highlights
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that all human activities have an objective, a goal, and therefore points to-
wards the mental part of an activity. On the other hand, it refers to the fact
that this mental objectives are directed towards the physical world. This
holds for automated processes insofar as the automation already assumes
a goal, and is supposed to support this goal:
• Transparency: It should be possible for a system to explain its rela-
tion to the physical processes.
• Justification: An intelligent system should be able to explain its
goals to the user.
Mediation: Every activity will incorporate some tools, be it physical (like
machinery) or psychological artefacts (like language). If parts of the ac-
tivity are carried out by an intelligent artefact, this artefact both acts as
a mediator in the physical world and as a mediator of the psychological
processes of the user:
• Justification: The system should be able to explain the connection
between its actions and the reasoning process.
Continuous development: The aspect of continuous development deals
with the continuous change in the way we interact with the world. Both
the user’s activities and the artefacts used are changing. It should be
noted that this includes the necessity for an intelligent system to adopt to
changes over time:
• Learning: The system should be able to support the user’s learn-
ing processes. If the system is extended, or new capabilities are
included, the system should be able to act as teacher. It should
therefore incorporate knowledge about how the new component fa-
cilitates the problem solving process.
Distinction between internal and external activities: Activity theory
tries to overcome the dichotomy of mental processes and the outside
world by focussing on the relation between internal and external activ-
ities. It is therefore crucial that the system supports the user in building
an understanding of the artefacts used.
• Conceptualisation: The system should support the user’s under-
standing of it by providing means of explaining its own world model
to him.
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Not all explanation goals can be satisfied by an activity theoretical per-
spective alone. Some goals can only be satisfied by inspecting other parts
of the knowledge model, either in all cases or for certain situations. As an
example, when recognising a situation the transparency goal can be satis-
fied by supplying a trace of the reasoning process used for classification.
The different sources of knowledge required to satisfy the different goals
will be further discussed in the following section.
2.7.2 Goals, Kinds, and Knowledge Containers
Roth-Berghofer [2004] has explored some fundamental issues with dif-
ferent useful kinds of explanations and their connections to the different
knowledge containers of a case-based reasoning system. Based on earlier
findings from natural language explanations in expert systems, five dif-
ferent kinds of explanation are identified: conceptual explanations, which
map unknown new concepts to known ones, why-explanations describing
causes or justifications, how-explanations depicting causal chains for an
event, purpose-explanations describing the purpose or use of something,
and cognitive explanations predicting the behaviour of intelligent systems.
Roth-Berghofer, further on, ties these different kinds of explanation to the
different knowledge containers of case-based reasoning systems [Richter,
1995], namely case base, similarity measure, adaptation knowledge, and
vocabulary.
Building on these two works, we are investigating a combined frame-
work of user goals and explanation kinds, see Paper C. The goal of this
work is to outline a design methodology that starts from an analysis of
usage scenarios in order to be able to identify possible expectations a user
might have towards the explanatory capabilities of an intelligent system.
The requirements recognised can further on be used to identify which
kind of knowledge has to be represented in the system, and which knowl-
edge containers are best suited for this task.
In Paper I, we have revisited this mapping from goals to kinds and
further on to knowledge containers in the light of our work on expla-
nations in context. We now have a workflow which allows us to start
with a socio-technical analysis of workplace environments and end up
with specific requirements on the knowledge to be contained in the dif-
ferent components of a case-based reasoning system and which can be
generalised to other types of intelligent systems. We can 1. start from
an ethnographic analysis of workplace situations, 2. identify both contex-
tual and explanation related aspects, 3. model these in the requirements
engineering process with the help of problem frames, 4. break down the
outward looking user goals into system specific kinds of explanation, and
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finally 5. describe what knowledge has to be represented in the different
knowledge containers of case-based reasoning systems.
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3Conclusions
In this chapter, we will highlight the main contributions of our research as
well as address some limitations. A short evaluation will be given, before
we conclude with an outlook on further work.
3.1 Contributions
The main research contributions of this thesis are:
• Adding a socio-technical perspective to the theoretical foundations
of ambient intelligent and explanation aware systems, therewith
broadening the scope of the theoretical foundations of artificial in-
telligence which traditionally focuses on individual aspects of intel-
ligence.
• Improving the requirements engineering process of intelligent sys-
tems by introducing patterns for modelling requirements for expla-
nations as a means of communication with the user and coupling
these patterns with 1. a socio-technical analysis, 2. traditions in ex-
pert systems research, and 3. knowledge level system specification
models.
In the following section, we will revisit the research questions we have
identified in the introductory chapter and see how this thesis has dealt
with them.
1. What are some of the socio-technical issues that have to be addressed
when embedding intelligent systems into workplace environments and
to what extent do they differ from the problems that traditional, non
intelligent systems face?
In the construction of intelligent artefacts, problems that are hard to tackle
with traditional computer systems are made solvable or more tractable
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through the implementation of abilities traditionally ascribed to humans.
Systems which use heuristic problem solving strategies can deal with
problems that have a large search space. Intelligent systems can han-
dle problem areas that are ill defined. At the same time, humans should
be able to interact with intelligent systems in a more intuitive and natural
way.
The challenge when trying to achieve the goal of better interaction is to
design the artefact in ways that make it easier for the human to subscribe
to the intelligent capabilities of the artefact. We have focused on social
aspects of human cognition and behaviour and have identified the ability
to act and think contextually together with the ability to give explanations
about ones reasoning and actions as core attributes of human cognition
and reasoning.
When it comes to contextualisation, the definition of ambient intelli-
gence highlights the fact that the artefacts should be aware of the environ-
ment [Ducatel et al., 2001]. The use of the word awareness is motivated.
By using this word, it is stressed that something more than pure reactive-
ness is required. Awareness implies the ability to reason about the state as
a necessary precondition. Within the notion of awareness is the implicit
precondition of reasoning about the state. A simple stimulus-response
system, while suitable in many cases, would not qualify as being ambient
intelligent.
While the exact type of model and mechanism can be disputed, the
symbolic AI community agrees that some kind of knowledge model and
symbolic reasoning mechanism is required for achieving such awareness.
Such a knowledge model must be structurally defined and populated
with knowledge about the world. This is not a matter with which non-
intelligent artefacts are faced.
Intelligent artefacts are also distinguished by the need and ability to
give contextually appropriate explanations. While it is also possible to
integrate information about the functioning of an artefact in traditional
computer systems, for example by means of help texts or user manuals,
such explanations lack dynamism and it remains largely up to the user to
make use of this information, for example by looking through structured
frequently asked questions, and no real machine processing takes place.
This static, highly structured and generally ad hoc approach is insufficient
for the demands of AI systems.
Intelligence, and hence artificial intelligence, must be understood as en-
semble effects. The general “problem” is that “intelligence” is not some-
thing which can be understood or modelled as an individual, solitary
property. It has to be understood in its social setting. If it is to mimic
human intelligence in any way, artificial intelligence has to take aspects
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of sociability into account, side by side with results from the cognitive
sciences or philosophy which form a large part of the backdrop for AI.
This will have consequences for the design of artefacts as well, since, as
McCarthy [2007] has put it, AI “is the science and engineering of making
intelligent machines”.
2. Can theories from the social sciences, psychology, or linguistics be use-
ful in tackling some of these problems, particularly those with a special
focus on intelligent systems?
While there is a plethora of theories for modelling social aspects of human
behaviour and reasoning, to date, artificial intelligence has made little use
of this research. The reasons for this shortfall can be manifold. It may be
that these theories or frameworks are not suited to the tasks at hand in
AI. It may also be that the general problem of making a posteriori theories
of analysis work for a priori design tasks has proved too challenging. In
response to the latter suggestion, however, general AI research as well as
the application of socio-technical theories in other subfields of computer
science has shown that this is possible.
Saying that socio-technical theories and models have not attracted wide
spread attention does not mean they have been totally neglected. Besides
the examples discussed in Chapter 2 (see for example, work on activity
theory and context by Kaenampornpan and O’Neill [2004] or research on
semiotics and smart appliances by Andersen and Brynskov [2006]), we
have the recently reported results from Walton [2007] on speech act the-
ory and explanations, the work of Potter [2007] on integrating discourse
theory and knowledge representation, and work on contextual graphs by
Brézillon [2007].
Thus, we would dispute the suggestion posited above that such theories
cannot be put to work in AI research.
Within the current work, in addition to having identified explanation
awareness and ambient intelligence as examples for issues to be tackled,
we have also developed a stratified view of the problems faced when in-
troducing AI systems into pre existing socio-technical situations, includ-
ing the suggestion of potentially beneficial theories. Contextuality and
explainability play a crucial role, from socio-technical systems at large
down to the individual interaction. We have exemplified the usefulness
of this layered approach by pointing to some theories that work at the
different levels.
While our results also give us evidence for the claim that such theories
are indeed useful, we will defer examination of our own findings until the
discussion of the next few research questions since it cannot be meaning-
ful substantiated without looking at the specific theories we have used.
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3. If so, what particular theories can help us in understanding the socio-
technical settings?
We initially argued for taking several socio-technical theories into account,
each taking a different perspective on the problem domain. The choice
made after a preliminary literature survey was to take a closer look at
actor network theory, activity theory, and semiotics. During the course
of the research, however, we have focused primarily on one such theory,
namely activity theory. This model has shown its usefulness in several
areas described below.
We have also gained some additional insights which were not clear on
the outset. First, activity theory has proven its value on more questions
than what we had initially envisioned. In fact, we have effectively ceased
the use of actor network theory beyond the most general tool set, since
we could already handle many of the same topics through activity theory.
Second, the problem domain is not only layered as we originally modeled,
but there are other dimensions as well. This ties in with other results,
for example with Bødker and Andersen [2005] who make a distinction
between instrumental and semiotic processes.
One of the strongest results to emerge from this research is the val-
idation that socio-technical theories in general, and activity theory and
semiotics in particular, can be used to tackle problems specific to AI sys-
tems. While we do not dismiss the potential that other theories may well
be equally suited, we have indications that activity theory is particularly
useful for a large array of problems. Our initial research on semiotic the-
ories has yielded similar results, and we are convinced that it will prove
fruitful to combine aspects of semiotics and activity theory in both the
theoretic and engineering part of AI research.
4. How can theoretical results from answering the questions above be
made useful for the problem of designing such systems, in particular
how can the design process of intelligent systems be improved?
Our work with activity theory resulted in several improvements for deal-
ing with the problem of embedding intelligent artefacts into socio-tech-
nical settings: 1. The theoretical concepts of human activities in AT re-
sulted in an improved general context model that is both in line with
best practices in engineering and is psychologically plausible. 2. The the-
ory allowed us to design an ethnographic study that assessed both static,
domain specific components that have to be integrated into such a knowl-
edge model and dynamic, situation specific information that became the
basis for our initial case base. 3. AT allowed us to theoretically define
possible situation candidates where need for explanation arose, and 4. the
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ethnographic study delivered situation specific knowledge about such in-
cidents. 5. Finally, it was possible to tie activity theory to the different user
goals towards an explanation, thereby tying it in with both the tradition
of knowledge based or expert system research and a design methodology
which covers the design process from requirements engineering down to
the specification of the contents of the different knowledge containers.
Although our research on semiotics has not been as extensive as our
work with activity theory, we have seen promising results 1. for the mod-
elling of abstract concepts in context aware applications and 2. for inte-
grating a concept of multimodality that is of special importance for work-
ing with behavioural interfaces as found in ambient intelligent systems.
Additionally, although not discussed in any depth in this thesis, we have
found strong connections between our cultural historical approach to ac-
tivity theory and social-semiotics of systemic functional linguistics (SFL).
On initial research, it seems likely that the main concepts of SFL can be
mapped onto basic properties of knowledge intensive case-based reason-
ing applications.
3.2 Limitations
Every transformation of theory from one domain to another has numer-
ous potential pitfalls. When theories of human cognition and acting are
utilised in artificial intelligence, the boundaries of our understanding of
natural and cultural processes are accentuated by the limits of comput-
erised implementations. Every such transformation has the further prob-
lem of potential misunderstanding or misrepresentation due to the diver-
sity of cultural backgrounds within the various disciplines involved. It is
quite possible that we have fallen into such traps in this instance, how-
ever errors such as this are intrinsic to interdisciplinary research, and the
benefits of interdisciplinarity outweigh the costs in this respect.
There are further limitations resulting from the constraints of the re-
search situation, either conscious choices to limit analysis, or limitations
resulting from time constraints. Certainly, we did not have time to explore
all the interesting aspects (yet). For example, we make use of cultural his-
torical activity theory, yet we have a very restricted view on the historical
dimension that every artefact carries. We have two reasons for this: firstly,
while we find the concept of considering the cultural dimension of every
single artefact compelling, trying to take this into account could lead to
overdetermination [Althusser, 1962]. Secondly, it is simply a question of
resource – how deep need the questioning of this historic dimension go
when our ultimate goal is “only” the production of a working artefact?
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A typical example of a concept we are interested in but did not have the
time to investigate yet is the notion of functional organs and the limited
plane of actions [Kaptelinin, 1996].
Finally, it should be remembered that our work here is focusing on
making socio-technical theories useful in the field of artificial intelligence,
and not on further development of these theories themselves. The process
of putting a theory to use can expose weaknesses or deficits in the theory
that are beneficial for the development of the theory, but it is the task
of the theoreticians themselves to transfer these findings back into the
original domain of research.
3.3 Evaluation
This thesis is primarily focused on a theoretical discussion. So the argu-
ments given must be evaluated on their own merits. But we also claim
to advance the engineering part of artificial intelligence, that is we aim to
improve the design of intelligent systems. There is no consensus on how
to evaluate this, however, Cohen and Howe [1988] have described a set of
criteria for evaluating, amongst others things, models, research problems,
and implementations.
In Cohen [1989], another set of six questions is given that should be
considered during the evaluation of intelligent systems:
1. What are the metrics for evaluating the method?
2. How is the method an improvement, an alternative, or a comple-
ment to existing technologies?
3. What are the underlying architectural assumptions?
4. What is the scope of the method?
5. Why does the method work (or not work)?
6. What is the relationship between the class of tasks, of which the
current task is an example, and the method?
Let us take a look at theses questions one by one.
1. What are the metrics for evaluating the method?
Results from psychology, cognitive sciences, and philosophy are com-
monly used in artificial intelligence. From a theoretical point of view,
the cognitive plausibility of AI theories and implementations with regard
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to such theories is an appropriate measure. By cognitive plausibility, we
mean an assessment of the extent to which the model or method reflects
a psychological model, and whether an implementation of the model or
method retains its characteristics. We extend the theoretical backdrop
towards social aspects of cognition and behaviour, so the question of cog-
nitive plausibility is a measure of choice.
When looking at the design process, one of the primary goals of our
approach is to ensure that social aspects of intelligence can be modeled.
It is not within the scope of this thesis to address the question of whether
the theory itself has merit. We do however draw attention to the fact that
all theories considered in our work have an established tradition in fields
like pedagogy, human-computer interaction, or software engineering.
2. How is the method an improvement, an alternative, or a complement
to existing technologies?
Our approach adds the ability to take social aspects of intelligence into
account when developing intelligent systems. In that sense, it is an im-
provement on existing technologies. Moreover, the explanation problem
frames tie in with existing requirements engineering methods, thereby
complementing the existing toolset and extending it towards a different
class of requirements, namely the modelling of explanatory capabilities.
As a final point, we complement existing approaches in the specification
of aspects of explanations in intelligent systems by connecting the socio-
technical theories to traditions in expert systems design on one hand and
(via the notion of explanation types) to the knowledge container metaphor
for case-based reasoning systems on the other hand.
3. What are the underlying architectural assumptions?
Typical concepts we deal with are situations, artefacts, persons, and roles.
The methods developed help to incorporate such concepts into a struc-
tural knowledge model and populate the model with episodical knowl-
edge. With such a strong focus on a knowledge level perspective, the
methods outlined do not cater to sub-symbolic approaches to intelligent
systems. In addition, some aspects of our work target (knowledge in-
tensive) case-based reasoning methods specifically, but most parts of the
work can be generalised to other symbolic reasoning and modelling pa-
radigms.
4. What is the scope of the method?
The methods developed are suited for any problem domain where socio-
technical analysis, for example in the form of ethnographic studies, can
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be performed, and where enough information is available to extract re-
quirements for context and/or explanations.
5. Why does the method work (or not work)?
This question and the following only make sense when related to specific
instances of application of the methods, and not the socio-technical ap-
proach in general. When we look at the design of a context model for
an ambient intelligent hospital ward information system, which we have
developed, then we can state that the explicit focus on a psychologically
plausible knowledge model combined with the relatively structured prob-
lem domain were the main reasons for succeeding.
6. What is the relationship between the class of tasks, of which the current
task is an example, and the method?
We also address this question with regard to the hospital ward informa-
tion system design. Two main tasks can be identified: first, the design of
a context model that was both related to best practices in ambient intelli-
gence and cognitive plausible, and second the population of this context
model. The first task can be seen as the instantiation of a general model
for human activities with regard to a specific problem domain. For the
second task, we have used some aspects of the socio-technical theory as a
template for an ethnographic study design.
3.4 Future Work
Starting our research outlook with activity theory, there are still blind
spots in our framework which we would like to address. The most bla-
tant of these is perhaps the lack of integration of the concept of functional
organs discussed by Kaptelinin [1996] and mentioned in the previous sec-
tion. Kaptelinin states that one of the discriminating features of computer
tools is that they do not have one fixed function and can easily be used as
an extension of the internal plane of actions, that is the ability to perform
manipulations with an internal representation before acting on external
objects, see e.g. Marx [1867, p. 193]. We expect intelligent systems to sig-
nificantly enhance this abilities compared to non-intelligent tools.
On the semiotics front, we would like to do further research into sense
making processes as negotiated processes. It is not simply one meaner
that has to be considered. In any exchange there are always at least two
meaners, and more typically more than two. Multiparticipant communi-
cation represents a challenge to modelling. We have to keep in mind that
others may share our conceptualisations and meanings only to a certain
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extent. When intelligent systems link different people this is an impor-
tant thing to remember. The closer a person is in our social network the
more likely they are to share our meanings, while the further out in our
social network the less likely they are to share meanings. In the hospital
environment, ambient intelligent devices can belong to different groups
of users. Should we model them in a way that the assistant of a nurse is
more likely to share concepts with the assistant of another nurse than that
of a physician?
Another issue we would like to explore further is the extent to which it
is possible to relate a semiotic approach to intelligent systems design to
our work on activity theory. Bødker and Andersen [2005] have outlined
some properties of a socio-technical approach taking advantage of ideas
from both theoretical frameworks, and we would like to extend this to
cover specific aspects of SFL and cultural-historical activity theory. This
will potentially extend the number of projects from which findings may
be borrowed, meaning the potential for a richer description of the hospital
environment.
An additional point we have not yet fully explored is the relation of
concepts from SFL with specific methods from the field of artificial intel-
ligence. For example, the notion of genres in SFL seems to be a likely
candidate for knowledge poor lazy learning mechanisms, while the de-
scriptive power of the register might be exploitable in knowledge inten-
sive or ontology based approaches. A promising candidate to combine
these aspects is knowledge-intensive case-based reasoning.
Looking at the requirements engineering processes, we have to deepen
our understanding of the relation between the design documents and the
actual implementation. Our results show that problem frames are benefi-
cial in identifying which explanatory knowledge and mechanisms should
be provided, but the methods for identifying the missing “knowledge
containers” and suggesting remedies have to be extended beyond the ex-
isting work on the relation between explanation goals, explanation kinds,
and knowledge containers. We are considering the potential of coupling
problem frames with design patterns to give system designers informa-
tion about the implementation issues.
Another interesting aspect that needs further exploration is the extent
to which (explanation) problem frames can be useful in the requirements
elicitation phase. Our current approach of using observational ethno-
graphic studies focuses primarily on a socio-technical analysis of work-
place environments, but it is possible that problem frames be used to com-
municate requirements in focus groups or workshop settings that could
append these empirical studies.
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The issue of mixed-initiative intelligent systems has gained increasing in-
terest in recent years. In particular, much attention has been paid on
sharing the initiative between the user and the system on the tool level. In
this paper, we are focusing on the problem of embedding the system into
a workplace. We are proposing a framework for the analysis of how intel-
ligent systems fit into a work context. We outline an approach with three
different perspectives, focusing on the work process as a whole as well as
human computer interaction on the interface and system level. The theo-
retical background consists of the Actor Network Theory, Semiotics, and
the Activity Theory. We describe some challenges for the design of mixed
initiative intelligent systems and outline how our framework might help
to deal with these challenges.
Main Result:
This paper introduces three views on intelligent systems in workplace
environments; 1. Work process view (using actor network theory), 2. HCI
interface view (using semiotics), and 3. HCI system view (using activity
theory). It is exemplified how these theories can help tackle different
issues in mixed-initiative intelligent systems, namely 1. the control issue,
2. the communication issue, and 3. the evolvement issue.
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A.1. Introduction
A.1 Introduction
Case Based Reasoning (CBR) is a research area in the field of AI. Its aim is
to understand and build systems which are able to use former experience
in order to solve new problems. A CBR system is able to learn by taking
care of experience in the form of so called cases, which describe problems
and their solutions. When a new problem arises, one sufficiently similar
previous problem has to be identified and the former solution has to be
adapted to the new problem. The new solution might also be based on
more than one previous case.
Being capable of learning during its use, CBR systems are one way to
overcome the knowledge acquisition bottleneck. But it might be useful
not to build the whole knowledge abductive, but to include given domain
knowledge. The Division of Intelligent Systems in Trondheim is focusing
on CBR systems which do not only learn from experience, but also incor-
porate given general domain knowledge to solve the problems (see e.g.
Aamodt [1995]). This is referred to as knowledge-intensive CBR.
The group is aiming towards building a framework for such CBR sys-
tems. This involves identifying usable knowledge and reasoning struc-
tures as well as questioning how to embed the system in user tasks.
When an AI system is considered not as a replacement of, but a sup-
plement to human work, the question of an adequate form of interaction
arises. An AI system is to a certain degree trespassing the boundary of
viewing the computer system as a tool, and extending this to as to act as
a partner in a work flow.
The notion of mixed initiative takes these role change into account. It
is made explicit that both the human user and the machine can take the
initiative in the interaction. The system might proactively request infor-
mation from the user which is needed to solve a given problem. The
control might either lie in the hands of the user when entering data, or
the system can guide her through a dialogue.
In the light of this changes also the human computer interaction should
be revisited. Traditional interface engineering methods focusing on the
computer as a tool seem not to be appropriate to design intelligent sys-
tems. Further on, the integration of this kind of systems into work pro-
cesses is likely to change.
This has in first sight the consequence that an AI systems must defi-
nitely be developed by taking the whole work situation into account. Tra-
ditional software engineering techniques, mainly focusing on the artifact
itself, might possibly not give adequate results. Therefore, the software
production process must integrate methodologies of work analysis.
In order to understand how the system fits into a work place situation,
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Figure A.1.: Overview: Different views on the work context.
we propose a theoretical framework which is focussing on three different
perspectives (see figure A.1):
• Work process view: Actor Network Theory,
• HCI interface view: Semiotics,
• HCI system view: Activity Theory.
We are arguing that this theoretical framework is helpful for under-
standing how AI systems in general and especially CBR systems fit into a
work process, and how they interact with the user.
A.1.1 Challenges
Mixed initiative intelligent systems face a couple of interesting challenges.
We will shortly mention some of them:
• The control issue: How can we deal with the shift of initiative and
control between different actors, both human and non-human?
• The communication issue: How can we facilitate the exchange of
knowledge and information between actors involved?
• The evolvement issue: It is unlikely that the form of interaction
remains unchanged over time. How can we assure a sufficient flexi-
bility in communication abilities?
In order to illustrate how the different views in our framework can
be used to cope with these challenges, we will now introduce a short
example. We will later on look at some aspects of this system from our
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different viewpoints. The example is a diagnostic system in the oil drilling
industries. It is used to monitor the drilling process in order to identify
situations where the oil drill can get stuck. To this end, it collaborates
with human users. The system is a a knowledge-intensive CBR system.
A.2 Work Process View: Actor Network Theory
We model the context in which the system is implemented with the help
of the Actor Network Theory, ANT (see e.g. Latour [1991] and Monteiro
[2000]). The basic idea here is fairly simple: whenever you do something,
many influences on how you do it exist. For instance, if you visit this
conference, it is likely that you stay at a hotel. How you behave at the hotel
is influenced by your own previous experience with hotels, regulations
for check-in and check-out, the capabilities the hotel offers you (breakfast
room, elevators).
So, you are not performing from scratch, but are influenced by a wide
range of factors. The aim of the ANT is to provide an unified view on
these factors and your own acting. An actor network in this notion is
‘the act linked together with all of its influencing factors (which again are
linked), producing a network’ (see [Monteiro, 2000, p. 4]).
In this network, you find both technical and non-technical elements. By
this, the ANT avoids the trap of either overstating the role of technological
artifacts in a socio-technological system or underestimating their norma-
tive power by applying the same framework to both human actors and
technological artifacts. This makes it possible for us to understand how
technological artifacts influence the doing of human actors in much the
same way as other human actors.
Some key concepts of the theory are (compare e.g. Monteiro [2000]):
• Actors: Humans and technological artifacts,
• Actor-network: The totality of actors, interests, organizations, rules,
standards, and their interaction,
• Translation: Actors interests translated into technical or social ar-
rangements,
• Inscription: Result of the translation of one’s interest into material
form,
• Subscription: Acceptance of the inscribed interests by other actors.
In the ANT, technological artifacts can stand for human goals and praxis.
Hotel keys, for example, are often not very handy, because the hotel owner
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has inscribed his intention (that the keys do not leave the hotel) into metal
tags (which is why the guest subscribe to the owners intention: they do not
want to carry this weight). A software system for workflow management
is a representation of organizational standards in the company where it is
used (and makes human users follow these standards).
One advantage of the ANT in the setting of intelligent systems is that
it already comprises technical artifacts and humans in the same model.
Humans and artifacts are exchangeable and can play the same role in the
network. But in contrast to traditional artifacts, which are merely passive
(black boxes in which human interests are subscribed) or which active
role is restricted to translating intentions of the designer into changes of
the praxis of the user, AI systems play a more active role: they have to
act-if they had human capabilities.
In previous work in our group (see Pieters [2001]), we have argued that
intelligent systems have to show certain capabilities usually ascribed to
humans in order to interact with the user in a meaningfull way. On the
other hand, since at least some of these capabilities rely on transcendental
concepts, it is not possible to design machines which expose them.
In contrast to e.g. Edmonds [2000], who proposes a system which opens
for the evolvement of certain properties, we use the notion of as-if in our
approach: in roughly the same way as humans can never be sure that
human counterparts have the capabilities they expect them to have, but
ascribe it to them, our goal is to design intelligent systems which act in a
way that makes humans ascribe human characteristics also to them. Also
in Pieters [2001], it is argued that some properties of knowledge-intensive
Case-Based Reasoning systems make them well suited for exposing this
as-if capability. We will not focus on this.
A.2.1 Example
For the design of mixed-initiative systems, it is important to notice that
the border between human and artifical actors is weakened in the Actor
Network Theory. This makes it for example easier to include the notion
of alternating the control between human and machine actors, thereby
making the control issue explicit. By understanding how the initiative for
a task is shared between different human actors, we get hints for how a
technical artifact should behave in the same situation.
In our drilling problem example, we can with the help of the Actor Net-
work Theory describe the organizational standards for dealing with criti-
cal conditions and identify situations where the diagnostic system should
intervene.
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A.3 HCI Interface View: Semiotics
As seen in discussions between Ben Shneiderman, long time proponent
of direct manipulation interfaces, and Pattie Maes, proponent of an agent
oriented view of user interaction, at IUI-97 and CHI-971, the underlying
metaphors for both views make a combination rather difficult.
Whereas Shneiderman strengthens the ‘[. . . ] goal to create environ-
ments where users comprehend the display, where the system is pre-
dictable, and where they are willing to take responsibility for their ac-
tions’ [Alty et al., 1997, p. 44], Maes clarifies that giving up some control
is very common in every day tasks, but that this does not mean that the
overall process is not controlled at all [Alty et al., 1997, p. 54].
It is very important to notice basic differences between direct manip-
ulation and agent based interfaces as illustrated by this control example,
which can be generalized for the whole interaction process of human and
AI actors.
When focusing on the interaction of a particular user with the system,
we use the semiotics approach (see e.g. Nake [1994] and Andersen [2001])
to understand the peculiarities of interaction with intelligent systems. The
basic concept of the chosen interpretion of semiotics is the sign, a triadic
relation of a signifier, a signified, and object (see figure A.2). It is the
process of sense-making, where a representation (signifier) and its mental
image (signified) refer to an entity (object) (the meaning of a sign is not
contained within a symbol, it needs its interpretation).
On the background of semiotics, meaningfull human communication is
a sign process. It is a process of exchanging and interpreting symbols re-
ferring to objects. The user of an informatics systems sees her interaction
with this system on this background. When typing a letter, she does not
send mere symbols, but signs to the computer, and the feedback from the
1As documented in Alty et al. [1997]
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Figure A.3.: Semiotics: The human user sees the system as-if it was a
partner in communication; the interaction appears to be a
sign process.
 !"#
$%&’*+,-
.+-,
/#%0"!!
.+-,1*
/#%0"!!
234.5!6"7
Figure A.4.: Semiotics: In human computer interaction, a sign and a sig-
nal process have to be coupled. The human sign process is
reduced to an algorithmic signal process, which in turn is
interpreted by the human user.
machine, the pixels on the screen, are interpreted as signs: to the user, the
computer is a ‘semiotic machine’ (Wolfgang Coy), see figure A.3.
In contrast, computer systems are only processing signals, lacking the
necessary interpreting capabilities humans have. They only manipulate
symbols without making-sense out of them. The human sign process and
the machine signal process have to be coupled (see figure A.4). This holds
both for traditional informatics systems and AI systems.
We argue that, in order to make intelligent systems work not merely
as a tool or a media, but as actants to whose (decision) abilities a human
user can subscribe, the system must appear as-if it was capable of a mean-
ingfull interaction.2 We use again the as-if notion: an intelligent systems
behaves in such a way that the user ascribes to the system the ability of
participation in a sign process. The upper-level analysis of the work pro-
cess helps in defining the aspects of user interaction where this ascription
has to succeed in order to make the user believe in the system capabilities.
2Which differs from the interaction with traditional systems in which case the sense-
making falls wholly on the side of the human user: You do not expect a text processor
to understand your letter, but you expect a decision support system to understand the
information you deliver.
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On important challenge here is the ability of the system to show off its
abilities. This can be described as a communication problem: the system
has to interpret the actions of the user in a meaningfull way and itself
present results that make sense for the user. This process of sense-making
is highly interactive: an intelligent partner in a communication process
asks (meaningfull) questions if an unclear situation occurs and is able
to explain its own actions. The semiotic approach is useful to analyse
this sense-making process with the help of transferring knowledge about
similar processes from other semiotic domains.
A.3.1 Example
In our drilling problem example, it is due to time constraints important
that new knowledge can easily be incorporated both into the system and
presented to human users. For a knowledge-intensive CBR system, this
can either be done in the form of cases or by enhancing the domain knowl-
edge of the system. Given the latter, the system can monitor its reasoning
processes and identify areas where it has insufficient knowledge to find
causal relations. By means of plausible inheritance (compare e.g. Sørmo
[2000]), it can find probable candidates for new causal explanations.
The semiotic approach can be used to model how the system could rep-
resent this probably new knowledge to the user in a way that strengthens
the users believe in the sign-processing capabilities of the system. There-
fore, semiotics can be helpfull to find solutions for the communication issue.
A.4 HCI System View: Activity Theory
The semiotics perspective is helpful to understand medial aspects of Hu-
man Computer Interaction, e.g. how knowledge is communicated. It is,
however, not as helpful to analyze their use as instruments for achieving a
predefined (by the human) goal in the work process and especially to un-
derstand the transformation of the artifact itself or the the socio-technical
system during this process.
In our research, we found the Activity Theory (AT, see e.g. Bødker
[1991], Nardi [2003]) suitable to cover this aspects in our framework. Its
focus lies on individual and collective work practice. One of its strength
is the ability to identify the role of material artifacts in the work process.
An activity (see figure A.5) is composed of a subject, an object, and a me-
diating artifact or tool. A subject is a person or a group engaged in an
activity. An object is held by the subject and motivates activity, giving it a
specific direction.
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Figure A.5.: Activity Theory: The basic triangle of Mediation.
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Figure A.6.: Activity Theory: Expanded triangle, incorporating the com-
munity and other mediators.
Later, the Activity Theory was extended to cover the fact that human
work is done in a social and cultural context (compare e.g. Mwanza [2000]).
The expanded model takes this aspect into account by adding a commu-
nity component and other mediators, especially rules (an accumulation of
knowledge about how to do something) and the division of labour (see
figure A.6).
Some basic properties of the AT are:
• Hierarchical structure of activity: Activities (the topmost category)
are composed of goal-directed actions. These actions are performed
consciously. Activities, in turn, consist of non-conscious operations.
• Object-orientedness: Objective and socially or culturally defined
properties. Our way of doing work is grounded in a praxis which
is shared by our co-workers and determined by tradition. Praxis
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forms the look of artifacts, and by these the artifacts are passing on
a specific praxis.
• Mediation: Human activity is mediated by tools, language, etc. The
artifacts as such are not the object of our activities, but appear al-
ready as socio-cultural entities.
Taking a closer look on the hierarchical structure of activity, we can find
the following levels:
• Activity: This is the topmost level. An individual activity is for
example to check into a hotel, or to travel to the conference city.
Individual activities can be part of collective activities, e.g. when
you organize a workshop with some co-workers.
• Actions: Activities consists of a collections of actions. An action is
performed consciously, the hotel check-in, for example, consists of
actions like presenting the reservation, confirmation of roomtypes,
and handover of keys.
• Operations: Actions consist themselves of collections of non-con-
scious operations. To stay with our hotel example, writing your
name on a sheet of paper or taking the keys are operations. That
operations happen non-consciously does not mean that they are not
accessable.
It is important to note that this hierarchical composition is not fixed
over time. If an action fails, the operations comprising the action can
get conceptualized, they become conscious operations and might become
actions in the next try to reach the overall goal. This is referred to as
a breakdown situation. In the same manner, actions can get automated
when done many times and thus become operations. By this, we gain the
ability to model a change over time.
Since an AI system is more a partner in a work process than a tool,
its role in the user interaction changes. Whereas a classical informatics
system is a passive translator and memory of praxis, the intelligent system
is constantly re-shaping the praxis through its use. The usage of a tool
might change, but the tool itself will not change. If you look at an decision
support system, so is the decision making process itself transformed by
the ability of the system to react differently, e.g. through accumulated
experience and usage context.
But since the AT itself models artifacts as being preformed as socio-
cultural entities, we can describe the artifacts in a way which takes this
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modification into account. Again, our upper-level model helps us to iden-
tify the mediation process and the role of both human and non-human
actors in the usage process.
As described before is the ability of an intelligent system to adapt to
the user very important. In the process of re-shaping the praxis, a user
expects from an (as-if) intelligent system that it is adopting to the changed
praxis.
A.4.1 Example
Whereas in the beginning of the use of our example Case-Based diagnostic
system, it will be important to explain the user in detail why a particular
case (former stuck pipe situation) was matched to a new problem, the user
expects from an intelligent partner that the same match will be explained
in less detail when occurring very frequently (since the artifact should be
changed by the changed praxis, that is here the accumulated knowledge
on both sides).
This change of interaction over time is related to the evolvement issue: the
shift between different modi operandi. The AT is suitable for capturing
this kind of change over time (transforming of actions into operations and
vice versa) and can therefore be helpfull in modeling a change of behavior
over time.
A.5 Related Work
Our group is developing the Creek3 framework for knowledge-intensive
CBR. Creekmakes extensive use of general domain knowledge and knowl-
edge of the reasoning process itself. This knowledge has to be acquired
and engineered at least partly before the system starts learning from cases.
In Tecuci et al. [1999], a mixed-initiative approach for the development of
a knowledge base is proposed and evaluated. The type of the acquired
knowledge differs from the semantic net structure of Creek. The concept
of having a concept of competence in the building process of a knowledge
base and the use of different knowledge acquisition strategies is neverthe-
less intersting for the Creek toolchain, but lies for the time being outside
of the scope of our tools. This work is located at the Work Process View
since it deals with the competence of the newly defined system.
Compared to our own views, a very different approach to design issues
on the User Interaction System View is pursued by Hartrum and DeLoach
[1999]. In their multi-agent approach, they unify the interaction view
3Case-Based Reasoning through Extensive Explicit Knowledge.
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between different types of actants, being it humans or intelligent agents.
They use Z specifications for formally defining the the agents, including
structural and behavioral aspects. This approach is complementary to our
use of the Activity Theory.
Langley [1999] deals with adaptive interfaces. The importance of per-
sonalized presentation of information is pointed out. This is not restricted
to the form of the presentation, but also the contents. This is a very im-
portant point. The challenge of giving a transparent impression of the
systems capabilities is directly dependant on the users own knowledge,
and on the ability of the system to change its behavior towards a learning
user over time. In our framework, this issue is addressed by the ability of
the Activity Theory to reflect changes of the involved artifacts over time.
Also looking at personalization issues, Blanzieri [2002] proposes a four
level analysis of situated intelligent systems. He focuses on the need of a
particular user instead of the social stance taking by the Activity Theory.
In this sense, his approach is complementary to our framework.
On the User Interaction Interface Level, Eggleston [1999] describes a
cognitive engineering approach to the modeling of user interface agents.
A unified view on human-human and human-agent network communica-
tions is taken and design principles from the cognitive engineering stance
are stated. Whilst our focus lies on different aspects (the communication
aspect of the semiotic theory), his statement on the importance of coupling
human thinking and automated reasoning so that joint cognitive work is
enhanced can also be found in our notion of a Case-Based Reasoner as
enhancing the human capabilities.
In McSherry [2002], a taxonomy for mixed initiative dialogue is given.
The focus lies on the Interface Level and deals mainly with tool aspects
and differs in that sense from our communication oriented approach. Fea-
tures like the need for the explanation of reasoning and the control issue
are nevertheless challenges we have to deal with as well.
An example of a theoretical and empirical validation of the usefullness
of an mixed initiative approach to Conversational CBR can be found in
Gupta et al. [2002]. This differs from the Creek framework we use as we
do not focus on text conversation. On the other hand, it might be very
interesting to apply the semiotic framework to this approach, since the
semitics of written language is a well researched subject.
A.6 Conclusion
We have proposed a theoretical framework for a consistent model of in-
telligent systems in work process. Our model includes an upper-level
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analysis of the work process as a whole as well as means to understand
the interaction between user and system.
We have further on outlined that the proposed framework supplies the-
oretical tools for the analysis of mixed initiative system with different
perspectives. We have shown that the different theories in our framework
can deal with important issues of mixed initiative intelligent systems.
Equally important, but not topic of this paper, is a translation of this a
posteriori analysis into an a priori design methodologies.
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B.1 Introduction
Customized IT Systems are usually designed for specific purposes and
tasks which the system has to support and in settings where comparable
work was done also before the system was introduced. It is used by peo-
ple with specific needs and qualifications, and it should preferably adapt
to changes in these needs over time [McSherry, 2002; Totterdell and Raut-
enbach, 1990]. Althoff andWilke [1997] have introduced an organizational
view of the CBR cycle for the purpose of business process modeling. For
the purpose of this paper, we are looking at CBR systems embedded in
such a work context, but on a more general level.
B.2 Problems with Explanations in CBR
The term explanation can be interpreted in two different ways in AI [Aa-
modt, 1991, p. 59]. One interpretation deals with explanations as part of
the reasoning process itself, for example used in the search for a diag-
nostic result in order to support certain hypotheses. The other interpre-
tation deals with usage aspects: making the reasoning process, its results,
or the usage of the result transparent to the user. Both interpretations
can be found in CBR research. The ability to explain its results is often
considered as one of the main advantages of CBR systems [Leake, 1996;
McSherry, 2001; Cunningham et al., 2003]. A knowledge-intensive CBR
system may use explanations to guide the CBR process itself [Aamodt,
1993, 1994].
One problem is that the question of what makes up a good explana-
tion depends on the goals of the user [Leake, 1995]. This also means
that we cannot be sure that we will match the user’s needs by presenting
the case alone as it is [Sørmo and Cassens, 2004]. So it might not be as
straightforward as it sounds to provide the user with an adequate expla-
nation. Where explanations are used to support the CBR process, this
problem reappears when the explanation is used to asses the users needs
or wishes, e.g. in an adaptive CBR system.
Another important point is that it might not suffice to purely present
the best matched case(s) to the user to give an explanation even when his
goals are matched. McSherry [2003] points out that the presented case(s)
might contain both features supporting the given results and features op-
posing it. Smyth and McClave [2001] strengthen the importance of giv-
ing a set of results with sufficient diversity for certain types of problems.
McGinty and Smyth [2003]; Smyth and McGinty [2003] propose an adap-
tive way of presenting a set of cases adapted to the user’s changing needs
for diversity. All these works deal with the shortcomings of presenting a
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single (or to narrow set of) case(s).
Using only cases as explanations means further on to rely on the im-
plicit assumption that by presenting the case to the user he will be able
to do a similarity comparison himself. This may often be true, but is by
no means guaranteed, especially when the case structure is complex or
the similarity measure more convoluted. The problem increases when we
start incorporating other AI technologies into the CBR process (as sug-
gested by Watson [1999]), e.g. when using a neural network in similarity
assessment.
B.3 Activity Theory
In this paper, we propose the use of Activity Theory (AT) to support the
design of CBR systems which take these problems into account. We can
use AT to analyze the use of intelligent systems as instruments for achiev-
ing a predefined (by the human) goal in the work process and especially
to understand the transformation of the artifact itself or the socio-technical
system during this process. This could help us understand which types
of explanations are expected. On the other hand, our knowledge about
the work process can help us understand problems showing up in the use
of the CBR system, supporting our (implicit or explicit) user model.
B.3.1 Basic Properties of AT
In this section, we give a short summary of aspects of AT that are impor-
tant for this work. See Nardi [2003] for a short introduction to AT and
Bødker [1991]; Nardi [1996] for deeper coverage. The theoretical founda-
tions of AT in general can be found in the works of Vygotsky [1978, 1985];
Leont’ev [1978].
Activity Theory is a descriptive tool to help understand the unity of
consciousness and activity. Its focus lies on individual and collective work
practice. One of its strengths is the ability to identify the role of material
artifacts in the work process. An activity (Fig. B.1) is composed of a
subject, an object, and a mediating artifact or tool. A subject is a person
or a group engaged in an activity. An object is held by the subject and
motivates activity, giving it a specific direction.
Some basic properties of the AT are:
• Hierarchical structure of activity: Activities (the topmost category)
are composed of goal-directed actions. These actions are performed
consciously. Activities, in turn, consist of non-conscious operations.
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Figure B.1.: Activity Theory: The basic triangle of Mediation.
• Object-orientedness: Objective and socially or culturally defined
properties. Our way of doing work is grounded in a praxis which
is shared by our co-workers and determined by tradition. Praxis
forms the look of artifacts, and by these the artifacts are passing on
a specific praxis.
• Mediation: Human activity is mediated by tools, language, etc. The
artifacts as such are not the object of our activities, but appear al-
ready as socio-cultural entities.
Taking a closer look on the hierarchical structure of activity, we can find
the following levels:
• Activity: This is the topmost level. An individual activity is for
example to check into a hotel, or to travel to another city to partic-
ipate at a conference. Individual activities can be part of collective
activities, e.g. when someone organizes a workshop with some co-
workers.
• Actions: Activities consist of a collections of actions. An action is
performed consciously, the hotel check-in, for example, consists of
actions like presenting the reservation, confirmation of roomtypes,
and handover of keys.
• Operations: Actions consist themselves of collections of non-con-
scious operations. To stay with our hotel example, writing your
name on a sheet of paper or taking the keys are operations. That
operations happen non-consciously does not mean that they are not
accessable.
It is important to note that this hierarchical composition is not fixed
over time. If an action fails, the operations comprising the action can
get conceptualized, they become conscious operations and might become
96
B.3. Activity Theory
Figure B.2.: The Action Cycle (according to Fjeld et al. [2002]).
actions in the next attempt to reach the overall goal. This is referred to as a
breakdown situation. In the same manner, actions can become automated
when done many times and thus become operations. In this way, we gain
the ability to model a change over time.
B.3.2 Action Cycle
Fjeld et al. [2002] describe the notion of an action cycle for goal-directed
pragmatic action. Their model is based on Hacker’s work on Activity
Theory and occupational psychology [Hacker, 1998]. An action cycle (Fig.
B.2) consists of:
1. Goal setting: The initial goal for performing a task is set.
2. Planning: Plan how to achieve the goal set, including the selection
of tools and choice of actions required.
3. Action: Consciously performed mental or physical actions.
4. Feedback: Controlling whether the anticipated goal was achieved,
and if not, identifying the reasons for failure.
The starting point for this cycle is the activity, here identified as a task
to perform.
We have a twofold interest in the notion of an action cycle when de-
signing CBR systems. First, it is useful for identifying and modeling parts
of the workplace activity where the CBR system is performing a task “on
its own” with basically no human interaction. Here we try to translate
the human activity as a whole into the artifact. Second, the CBR system
can act as a supportive agent for the human performing the task. This is
of special importance in situations where both the CBR system acquires
knowledge and the human user gains an insight into the working of the
artifact. For example, when the CBR system is introduced into a new
workplace situation and has to acquire case knowledge at the same time
as the user is gaining confidence in using it.
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This second aspect is important for the issue at hand: identifying differ-
ent explanatory needs. Given enough data, an analysis of the workplace
situation based on the notion of an action cycle will explicitely model the
goal settings (thereby identifying different user goals) as well as typical
problems in the execution of the cycle (thereby identifying different needs
for explanation in breakdown situations).
B.4 Using AT in Knowledge-Intensive CBR
We are considering knowledge-intensive CBR systems which incorporate
both case knowledge, task knowledge, and domain knowledge in one
single system. Later in this section we will show how AT helps us in
defining what to include in the design of the system’s various knowledge
containers [Leake et al., 1997; Richter, 1995].
B.4.1 Choosing a Helpful Explanation
As pointed out before, the presentation of a single case may not suffice
to give the user an explanation of the solution found. What constitutes a
good explanation is to a large degree dependent on the goals of the user
[Sørmo and Cassens, 2004]. We therefore have to identify the possible
goals of the user to the largest extent possible. This might be based on
stereotypes of users, [Rich, 1979], for example in recommender systems,
or on a survey of the concrete work situation the system is going to be
embedded into [Tautz et al., 2000], for example for experience manage-
ment.
When using Activity Theory to model the work process, [Korpela et al.,
2002; Fjeld et al., 2002], we can identify different types of activities the
users are involved in. This helps us to understand the goals the user has
when accessing the system, thereby also identifying the type of explana-
tions necessary. We can use this analysis to guide us when defining the
knowledge model of the system. This makes sure that a useful expla-
nation can be given when requested by the user. For example, if in an
AT based analysis of a learning situation we see that students tend to re-
late the knowledge to be acquired to a different domain, then the system
should be capable of using these analogies as a basis for the explanation
given.
B.4.2 Example Application
As mentioned in the introduction, an Intelligent System should adapt to
its usage over time. Lets consider a CBR system for decision support.
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The user gets filled-out applications for credit cards and has to rate the
creditability of the applicants. In the beginning, the user is likely to be
interested in a detailed description of the results found. This is both due
to the fact that the user has to learn to trust the system’s capabilities, and
that working with the system is quite new. In the language of Activity
Theory, the user will perform mostly conscious actions and has not yet
operationalized parts of the work process and/or the interaction with the
system.
Over time, when the system offers correct or useful solutions, the user
will both trust the system more, thereby eliminating his need to assess
the reasoning process, and operationalize the work with the system. A
lengthy presentation of the results by our CBR system will disrupt this
process of operationalization. A mixed-initiative system will probably
decrease its own activity: it no longer has to remind the user to do certain
actions since they have become part of automated operations.
Let us now consider what happens when a breakdown situation occurs.
For example, the user is now involved with free-form applications, e.g. by
telephone. The problem viewed from the CBR system remains the same at
first, but the work-flow of the user is disturbed so that he conceptualizes
the operations he performs again. The CBR system must recognize this
problem and change its behavior.
If we include relevant parts of the AT dealing with breakdown situa-
tions explicitly in our (general) user model, we can discover that such a
situation has occurred (e.g. because the user is increasingly requesting
explanations in situations where he has not done so before). The system
can now adapt itself to give more detailed explanations and be more pro-
active again. Likewise, the breakdown situation is a hint that the system’s
knowledge may no longer be adequate, and the search for solutions might
have to be broadened until enough new (case) knowledge is acquired.
B.5 Ongoing and Future Work
The integration of an a posteriori method of analysis with design method-
ologies is always challenging. One advantage AT has is that it is process
oriented, which fits nicely to a view on systems design where the de-
ployed system itself is not static and where the system is able to incor-
porate new knowledge over time [Aamodt, 1995]. Activity Theory has
its blind spots, and our goal is therefore to combine AT with other theo-
ries into a framework of different methods supporting the systems design
process [Cassens, 2003].
Focussing on AT, the relationship between the action cycle and the CBR
99
Bibliography
process has to be examined further. Likewise, a methodological approach
to integrate the findings of a work process analysis into the different
knowledge containers of a CBR system has to be developed. Further on,
a real world application of the outlined approach is necessary to asses
its practicability. The method of choice is a qualitative study where the
methodology has to be co-evolved with the ongoing project.
B.6 Conclusion
We have pointed out the importance of modeling the user’s potential goals
when defining which types of explanation an intelligent system can give.
We have further introduced Activity Theory as a means of achieving this
objective. Likewise we have suggested that the hierarchichal model of
activity can be modeled in such systems to enable it to adapt to changes
in usage over time. The action cycle as a model for goal directed pragmatic
action can help identifying possible breakdown situations and resulting
needs for specific types of explanation from the supporting intelligent
system.
In our opinion, CBR system design methodologies will in the long run
benefit from the integration of theories from occupational psychology and
information systems design. They offer a supplement to cognitive science
based approaches and integrate an understanding of organizational issues
into the CBR process itself. What is and what is not a good explanation
is dependent both on the individual user and her capabilities and on the
organizational context. Therefore, we think it is necessary to achieve an
understanding of the workplace situation the CBR system is going to be
embedded into to deliver explanations of results which satisfy the user’s
needs.
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C. Mapping Goals and Kinds of Explanations
My main contributions to the paper:
• Motivation for socio-technical point of view
• The user goals for explanations were contributed from previous joint
work with other authors
• The overall process model was proposed
• Development of the example
The following aspects were jointly developed by the authors:
• Motivation for explanations
• Relations between goals and kinds
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C.1 Why Bother to Explain?
In everyday human-human interactions explanations are an important ve-
hicle to convey information in order to understand one another. Expla-
nations enhance the knowledge of the communication partners in such a
way that they accept certain statements. They understand more, allowing
them to make informed decisions. According to Schank [1986] expla-
nations are the most common method used by humans to support their
decision making.
This is supported by Spieker’s investigation into natural language ex-
planations in expert systems [Spieker, 1991]. We identify some typical
reactions of humans as soon as we cannot follow a conversation:
• we ask our conversation partner about concepts that we did not
understand,
• we request justifications for some fact or we ask for the cause of an
event,
• we want to know about functions of concepts,
• we want to know about purposes of concepts, and
• we ask questions about his or her behavior and how he or she
reached a conclusion.
All those questions and answers are used to understand what has been
said and meant during a simple conversation. An important effect of ex-
planations is that the process of explaining certainly has some effect on
one’s trust in the competence of a person or machine: We keep our trust,
we increase or decrease it. At least, providing explanations makes deci-
sions more transparent, and motivates the use to further use the system.
The need for explanations provided by knowledge-based systems is
well-known and was addressed by such fields as expert systems. For
knowledge-based systems, explanations and knowledge acquisition are
the only two communications channels with which they interact with their
environment.
The adequacy of explanations as well as of justifications is dependent
on pragmatically given background knowledge. What counts as a good
explanation in a certain situation is determined by context-dependent cri-
teria [Cohnitz, 2000; Leake, 1995].
The more complex knowledge-based systems get, the more explana-
tion capabilities the users expect when using such systems. This require-
ment was recognized early on in expert systems research and develop-
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ment [Swartout, 1983; Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984; Swartout and Smo-
liar, 1987]. Considerable results were produced, but research activity de-
creased together with the general decline of expert systems research in
the 1990s. The major problems in connection with classical expert sys-
tems seemed to be solved.
At the same time there was an increasing interest on this topic in Case-
Based Reasoning (CBR) [Leake, 1996; Schank et al., 1994]. At the turn of
the century, we find the issue discussed again in the context of knowledge-
based systems [Gregor and Benbasat, 1999; Swartout and Moore, 1993].
Recently, we can see a renewed focus in CBR on this track of research.
ECCBR 2004 featured, for example, a workshop on Explanation in Case-
Based Reasoning as well as a couple of papers on explanation at the main
conference [Gervás and Gupta, 2004; Funk and Calero, 2004].
Research on explanation is of interest today because it can be argued
that the whole scenario on research on knowledge-based systems has
changed [Richter, 2005]: knowledge-based systems are no longer consid-
ered as boxes that provide a full solution to a problem. Problem solving
is seen as an interactive process (a socio-technical process). Problem de-
scription as well as the special input can be incomplete and changing. As
a consequence, there has to be communication between human and soft-
ware agents. Communication requires mutual understanding that can be
essentially supported by explanations. Such explanations can improve the
problem solving process to a large degree.
It is important to note here that the term explanation can be interpreted
in two different ways. One interpretation deals with explanations as part
of the reasoning process itself. The other interpretation deals with usage
aspects: making the reasoning process, its results, or the usage of the
result transparent to the user. In this paper, we will focus on the second
interpretation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next sec-
tion, we describe the setting for explanation-aware CBR systems as be-
ing a component of socio-technical systems. In section C.3, we present
two perspectives on explanation that can help understand and organize
what to explain and when. The subsequent section focusses on knowl-
edge containers and their contribution to the explanation capabilities of
CBR systems. In Section C.5, we propose a system design process achitec-
ture. We explore further on the relations of explanation goals, explanation
kinds, and knowledge containers in a simplified example. We conclude
our paper with an outlook on further research.
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C.2 Explanation in Socio-Technical Systems
Whenever one talks about a ‘system’ one has to clarify what is meant by
that term. In decision- support scenarios, the human and the computer
are the decision system. Such socio-technical systems can for example be
modelled with the help of the Actor Network Theory, ANT [Latour, 1991;
Monteiro, 2000]. The basic idea here is fairly simple: whenever you do
something, many influences on how you do it exist. For instance, if you
visit a conference, it is likely that you stay at a hotel. How you behave
at the hotel is influenced by your own previous experience with hotels,
regulations for check-in and check-out, the capabilities the hotel offers
you (breakfast room, elevators).
So, you are not performing from scratch, but are influenced by a wide
range of factors. The aim of the ANT is to provide a unified view on
these factors and your own acting. An actor network in this notion is the
act linked together with all of its influencing factors (which again are linked),
producing a network [see Monteiro, 2000, p. 4].
In this network, you find both technical and non-technical elements.
In the ANT, technological artifacts can stand for human goals and praxis.
Hotel keys, for example, are often not very handy, because the hotel owner
has inscribed his intention (that the keys do not leave the hotel) into metal
tags (which is why the guests subscribe to the owners intention: they do
not want to carry this weight). A software system for workflow man-
agement is a representation of organizational standards in the company
where it is used (and makes human users follow these standards).
One advantage of the ANT in the setting of intelligent systems is that
it already comprises technical artifacts and humans in the same model.
Humans and artifacts are to a certain degree exchangeable and can play
the same role in the network. But in contrast to traditional artifacts, which
are merely passive (black boxes in which human interests are subscribed)
or which active role is restricted to translating intentions of the designer
into changes of the praxis of the user, AI systems play a more active role.
It has also been argued that intelligent systems have to show certain capa-
bilities usually ascribed to humans in order to interact with the user in a
meaningful way [Pieters, 2001], and we would include the ability to give
good explanations.
Moreover, the issue of ‘trust’ is generally important for socio-technical
systems. ‘Trust’ can be defined in different ways, for the purpose of this
paper it is sufficient to describe the problem as to whether and to which
degree a human is willing to accept proposals from technical components,
and to which degree he is willing to give up control. For a detailed sur-
vey on different definitions of trust in the context of automation systems,
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see e.g. [Lee and See, 2004]. In the context of expert systems, it has been
shown that explanation capabilities have a large effect on the user’s ac-
ceptance of advices given by the system [Ye and Johnson, 1995].
To summarize, the ability of an IT system to give good explanations is
important for the functioning of a socio-technical system. Good explana-
tions depend on the context, it would therefore be helpful to be able to
include an analysis into the system design process.
C.3 Views on Explanations
In this section, we outline two perspectives on explanation: The Explana-
tion Goals focus on user needs and expectations towards explanations and
help to understand what the system has to be able to explain and when to
explain something. The Kinds of Explanations focus on different types of ex-
planations, their usefulness for the user, and how they can be represented
in the different knowledge-containers [Richter, 1995].
Any kind of interactivity implies that one has some kind of user model
that provides answers based on what the user knows and what he or she
does not know [Richter, 1992]. The user (probably) knows about the used
vocabulary, about general strategies, policies, or procedures to follow, and
about (most of) the standard situations in the given problem domain. But
he or she may not know all the details and data, about rare cases and ex-
ceptions, and about consequences of combinatorial number of interactions
of different alternatives. Then, a basic approach to explanation would be
to not comment on routine measures (without being asked), to empha-
size on exceptional cases (e.g., exceptions from defaults and standards,
exceptions from plausible hypotheses), and to allow for further questions.
It is hard to anticipate user needs due to two main reasons [Richter,
1992]: First, not all of the needs must be met, but those important to the
user. Second, all deficits and their estimated importance depend on the
specific user. Thus, personalization is a basic requirement, not only some
added value.
C.3.1 Explanation Goals
Sørmo and Cassens [2004]; Sørmo et al. [2005] suggest several explanation
goals for Case-Based Reasoning systems (which are valid for knowledge-
based systems, in general). They also argue that those goals are indeed
reachable because case-based reasoners are mostly made to perform lim-
ited tasks for a limited audience, thus allowing to make reasonable as-
sumptions about the user’s goals and the explanation context. The iden-
tified explanation goals are:
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Transparency:
Explain how the system reached the answer
“I had the same problem with my car yesterday, and charging the battery fixed
it.”
The goal of an explanation of this kind is to impart an understanding
of how the system found an answer. This allows the users to check the
system by examining the way it reasons and allows them to look for expla-
nations for why the system has reached a surprising or anomalous result.
If transparency is the primary goal, the system should not try to oversell
a conclusion it is uncertain of. In other words, fidelity is the primary cri-
terion, even though such explanations may place a heavy cognitive load
on the user. The original how and why explanations of the MYCIN system
[Clancey, 1983] would be good examples.
This goal is most important with knowledge engineers seeking to debug
the system and possibly domain experts seeking to verify the reasoning
process [Gregor and Benbasat, 1999]. It is also reasonable to think that in
domains with a high cost of failure it can be expected that the user wishes
to examine the reasoning process more thoroughly.
Justification:
Explain why the answer is a good answer
“You should eat more fish - your heart needs it!”
“My predictions have been 80% correct up until now.”
This is the goal of increasing the confidence in the advice or solution of-
fered by the system by giving some kind of support for the conclusion
suggested by the system. This goal allows for a simplification of the ex-
planation compared to the actual process the system goes through to find
a solution. Potentially, this kind of explanation can be completely decou-
pled from the reasoning process, but it may also be achieved by using
additional background knowledge or reformulation and simplification of
knowledge that is used in the reasoning process.
Empirical research suggests that this goal is most prevalent in systems
with novice users [Mao and Benbasat, 2000], in domains where the cost
of failure is relatively low, and in domains where the system represents a
party that has an interest in the user accepting the solution.
Relevance:
Explain why a question asked is relevant
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“I ask about the more common failures first, and many users do forget to con-
nect the power cable.”
An explanation of this type would have to justify the strategy pursued
by the system. This is in contrast to the previous two goals that focus on
the solution. The reasoning trace type of explanations may display the
strategy of the system implicitly, but it does not argue why it is a good
strategy. In conversational systems, the user may wish to know why a
question asked by the system is relevant to the task at hand. It can also be
relevant in other kinds of systems where a user would like to verify that
the approach used by the system is valid. In expert systems, this kind of
explanations was introduced by NEOMYCIN [Clancey, 1983].
Conceptualization:
Clarify the Meaning of Concepts
“By ‘conceptualization’ we mean the process of forming concepts and rela-
tions between concepts.”
One of the lessons learned after the first wave of expert systems had been
analyzed was that the users did not always understand the terms used by
a system. This may be because the user is a novice in the domain, but also
because different people can use terms differently or organize the knowl-
edge in different ways. It may not be clear, even to an expert, what the
system means when using a specific term, and he may want to get an ex-
planation of what the system means when using it. This requirement for
providing explanations for the vocabulary was first identified by Swartout
and Smoliar [1987].
Learning:
Teach the user about the domain
“When the headlights won’t work, the battery may be flat as it is supposed to
deliver power to the lights.”
All the previous explanation goals involve learning – about the problem
domain, about the system, about the reasoning process or the vocabulary
of the system. Educational systems, however, have learning as the primary
goal of the whole system. In these systems, we cannot assume that the
user will understand even definitions of terms, and may need to provide
explanations at different levels of expertise. The goal of the system is
typically not only to find a good solution to a problem, but to explain the
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solution process to the user in a way that will increase his understanding
of the domain. The goal can be to teach more general domain theory or to
train the user in solving problems similar to those solved by the system.
In other words, the explanation is often more important than the answer
itself. Systems that fulfill the relevance and transparency goals may have
some capabilities in this area, but a true tutoring system must take into
account how humans solve problems. It cannot attempt to teach the user
a problem solving strategy that works well in a computer but that is very
hard to reproduce for people.
For the remainder of this paper we will not focus on the learning goal
since it is specifically targeted towards educational systems.
C.3.2 Kinds of Explanations
Roth-Berghofer [2004] looks at explanations from a knowledge-container
perspective. He addresses the issue of what can naturally be explained by
the four containers (see Section C.4).
One starting point is the work of Spieker [1991] on the usefulness of
explanations. According to Spieker, there are five useful kinds of expla-
nations he discusses in the context of expert systems:
Conceptual Explanations:
They are of the form ‘What is . . . ?’ or ‘What is the meaning of . . . ?’. The
goal of conceptual explanations is to build links between unknown and
known concepts. Conceptual explanations can take different forms:
• Definition: “What is a bicycle?” “A bicycle is a land vehicle with two
wheels in line. Pedal cycles are powered by a seated human rider. A
bicycle is a form of human powered vehicle.”
• Theoretical proposition: “What is force?” “Force is Mass times Accel-
eration.”
• Prototypical example: “What is a bicycle?” “The thing, the man there
crashed with.”
• Functional description: “What is a bicycle?” “A bicycle serves as a
means of transport.”
Conceptual explanations are answers to extensional or descriptional ques-
tions.
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Why-explanations:
Why-explanations provide causes or justifications for facts or the occur-
rence of events. Whereas the first concept is causal in nature and not
symmetrical, the latter only provides evidence for what has been asked
for. For example:
• Justification: “Why is it believed that the universe expands?” “Because
we can observe a red shift of the light emitted by other galaxies.”
• Cause: “Why is it believed that the universe expands?” “Because, ac-
cording to the Big Bang theory, the whole matter was concentrated at
one point of the universe and the whole matter moves away from each
other.”
Why-explanations explain single events or general laws and can con-
sist of single causes/justifications (among others) or a complete list of
causes/justifications.
How-explanations:
How-explanations are a special case of why-explanations, describing pro-
cesses that lead to an event by providing a causal chain. They are simi-
lar to action explanations (see below) that answer how-questions. How-
questions ask for an explanation of the function of a device, for example:
• “How does a combustion engine work?” “A combustion engine is an
engine that operates by burning its fuel.”
Purpose-explanations:
The goal of Purpose-explanations is to describe the purpose of a fact or
object. Typical questions are of the form ‘What is . . . for?’ or ‘What is the
purpose of . . . ?’, for example:
• “What is a valve for?” “The valve is used to seal the intake and exhaust
ports.”
Cognitive Explanations:
Cognitive Explanations explain or predict the behavior of ‘intelligent sys-
tems’ on the basis of known goals, beliefs, constraints, and rationality
assumptions. There are action and negative explanations:
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• Action explanation: “Why was this seat post selected?” “For the given
price, only one other seat post for this bicycle is currently available. But
that seat post is too short.”
• Negative explanation: “Why was no carrier chosen?” “A carrier is only
available for touring bikes. The user did not choose a touring bike.”
C.4 Knowledge Containers
Knowledge containers, according to Richter [1995]; Lenz et al. [1998], con-
tain and structure the knowledge of a knowledge-based system. A knowl-
edge container is a collection of knowledge that is relevant to many tasks.
For rule-based systems, for instance, one can easily identify facts and
rules as important knowledge containers. For CBR systems, Richter de-
scribes four knowledge containers: vocabulary, similarity measures, adapta-
tion knowledge, and case base. They are depicted in Fig. C.1.
Case base
Vocabulary
Similarity
measures
Adaptation
knowledge VocabularyVo
ca
bu
lar
y
Figure C.1.: The four knowledge containers of a CBR system
The vocabulary defines attributes, predicates, and the structure of the
domain schema. Thus the vocabulary forms the basis for all of the other
three containers. Hierarchies, if available, can be used to order domain
concepts.In object-oriented models, inheritance (is-a) and decomposition
(part-of ) induce hierarchical orderings quite naturally. Additional ontolog-
ical relations can further add hierarchical information. Those hierarchies
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can be exploited for conceptual and (partly) for purpose explanations (be-
cause the ordering often is inferred from specialization/generalization).
Other easily available information is information on the kind of attribute.
Input attributes may be used to infer information for retrieval attributes as
well as for filling output attributes of a query or a case. For example,
imagine a CBR system for PC configuration in an electronic commerce
scenario. The request for a multimedia PC triggers completion rules for
filling such retrieval attributes as processor and graphic card accord-
ingly. Not specified attributes of the query automatically become output
attributes. The CBR system now could use the information for cognitive
explanations based on why it filled the retrieval attributes etc.
Table C.1.: Knowledge containers and their contribution to explanations
[Roth-Berghofer, 2004]
Knowledge container contributes to
Vocabulary conceptual explanations,
why-explanations,
how-explanations, and
purpose explanations
Similarity measures why-explanations,
how-explanations,
purpose explanations, and
cognitive explanations
Adaptation knowledge why-explanations,
how-explanations, and
cognitive explanations
Case base why-explanations,
how-explanations, and
context
The knowledge that determines how the most useful case is retrieved
and by what means the similarity is calculated, is held by the similarity
measures container, which can be further divided into the sub-containers
for local similarity measures and amalgamation functions. Each local
measure compares values of one attribute of a case. It contains domain
knowledge, e.g., about different processor speeds or graphic cards. Amal-
gamation functions are task oriented and contain utility knowledge (rel-
evances for the task, e.g., the importance of the graphic card vs. the im-
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portance of the processor speed when selecting a multimedia PC). The
already mentioned completion rules provide knowledge about dependen-
cies between attributes.
The adaptation knowledge container covers the knowledge for translating
a prior solution to fit a given query and the case base stores the experience
of the CBR system, i.e., the cases. Knowledge about the types of cases
used by the case-based reasoner, such as homogeneous vs. heterogeneous
and episodic vs. prototypical cases [Watson, 1999] as well as cases of rule vs.
constraint type [Richter, 1997], structures this knowledge container further.
Table C.1 shows an overview of which knowledge container contributes
to which kind of explanation [see Roth-Berghofer, 2004, for details].
C.5 Exploring the Relations of Goals and Kinds
As we have outlined before, there is a need to take the context of ex-
planations as well as different goals with and types of explanation into
account. A methodology for the development of explanation-aware CBR
systems should therefore comprise components for the workplace analy-
sis (like ANT described in section C.2 or activity theory [Cassens, 2004])
as well as methods to translate the analytical findings into system syn-
thesis. Further on, this process has to be integrated with methods for the
continuous maintenance of the CBR system [Roth-Berghofer, 2003]. We
propose therefore a overall process architecture as depicted in figure C.2.
Figure C.2.: The overall process architecture.
During the remainder of this article, we will propose a 3-step process
to identify which explanations a CBR system should be able to give and
to understand how to make the necessary knowledge accessible in the
different knowledge containers (see the grey box in figure C.2):
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1. Use the Explanation Goals perspective to identify user needs for ex-
planations from a user model and system view which takes the us-
age situation into account.
2. Use the Explanation Kinds view to find useful prototypical explana-
tions and assess the requirements for contents that have to be mod-
eled into the system.
3. Use the different Knowledge Containers to store the necessary knowl-
edge to support the different kinds of explanation identified.
The mapping of goals to kinds and kinds to containers, respectively, is not
necessarily a one to one relation which can be followed mechanically. The
mapping proposed in this paper gives rather hints for the modeling task
by focusing the work of the system designer on probable solutions.
As a simplified example, we look at a case-based diagnostic system
for engine failures. We have a mixed initiative dialogue system where
the system can ask questions about the engine status and the user can
voluntarily provide information he deems important.1 The system can
give detailed explanations on possible causes for the problems as well as
advice on how to avoid future occurrences. It is supportive, e.g., the user
should be enabled to understand similar situations in the future without
having to rely on the system.
There is no adaptation of cases since we are purely interested in the pos-
sible cause of a failure and not a solution to solve this problem. Further
on, we assume the system to be capable of generating plausible and jus-
tified explanations itself without going into details about the underlying
mechanism.
Conceptualization goal fullfilled by a conceptual explanation (definition):
During the symptom assessment, the system asks the user to fill in the
specific gravity of the fuel. The user is not familiar with the term spe-
cific gravity so he asks the system to explain this. The system gives this
explanation in the form of a conceptual explanation, in our example as a
definition:
User: “What is the specific gravity?”
System: “It is a measure of the density of a liquid relative to the density of
water, with water having a specific gravity of 1.0.”
1Please, keep in mind that there are other possible human computer interfaces than natural
language dialogue systems as depicted here for exemplary reasons. For example, one
possibility is to provide the user with pre-formulated queries from which he or she can
choose the most appropriate one.
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Following our argument on the contribution of different Knowledge
Containers to explanation kinds, the necessary knowledge for this kind
of answers would come from the vocabulary of the system. Undoubtedly,
conceptual explanations need much more knowledge than provided in
most CBR systems, even in knowledge rich systems such as CREEK [Aa-
modt, 1994, 2004], where general (domain-dependent) knowledge is rep-
resented as semantic network.2
Relevance goal fullfilled by a causal why-explanation:
The user can further on ask to know why the system asked this specific
question. The system should give explanations which set the question
asked into context with the symptoms already known. This can be de-
scribed in terms of a causal why-explanation:
User: “Why is the density of the fuel interesting?”
System: “Air/Fuel ratio is based on pounds of AIR to pounds of FUEL. Chang-
ing the specific gravity of your fuel can have a profound affect on the A/F ratio
of your engine since carburetors are metered by volume.”
Again, the necessary knowledge to answer this question can be found
in the vocabulary. This causal why-explanation will typically rely on the
domain knowledge modelled in the vocabulary of the system.
Justification goal fullfilled by a theoretical conceptual explanation:
The system finally presents a solution to the user which requires him to
change the spark lead time. In this situation, the user might want to know
why this is a solution. This goal can be satisfied by presenting a theoretical
conceptual explanation:
User: “How is this adjustment related to the problem of too much CO2 in the
exhaust gases?”
System: “Different fuels and engine setups require different spark lead times.
When using a wrong timing, the combustion process is suboptimal, and this
will lead to high CO2 values.”
Also here, the necessary knowledge can best be stored in the vocabu-
lary container. In order to answer this question we need some explicitly
modeled domain knowledge. A knowledge poor CBR system could only
point to cases and its own similarity measure and leave it to the user to
find the explanation himself.
2In CREEK, explanations are generated to explain reasoning steps or to justify conclusions
to the user, but mainly for the internal use of the reasoner.
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Transparency goal fullfilled by a cognitive explanation:
The user might not be fully satisfied and tries to understand how the
system came up with this answer. The system can explain the reasoning
process using a how explanation:
User: “How did you come up with this answer?”
System: “Looking at my case base we can see that the most relevant cases
had problems with the spark lead time as well, with only the exception of
those cases where the problem can be explained by the wrong type of fuel.”
The explanatory knowledge for this question can be found in the simi-
larity measure of the system. The system needs to be able to explain why
it delivered a certain case in terms of its similarity assessment. The case
base container provides the context for the explanation by restricting the
problem space to the available cases. Please note that a knowledge rich
CBR system might be able to explain the absence of certain features in the
solution case by referring to its domain knowledge, stored in the vocabu-
lary.
C.6 Conclusions and Future Research Directions
We have outlined a unified view on explanations in Case-Based Reason-
ing, which takes both the goals of the user and the type of an explanation
into account. Both perspectives are to a certain degree independent from
each other.
The next step in our fellow work is to integrate an explanation goals
view with methods for the analysis of workplace situations like ANT
and activity theory (as proposed, e.g., by Cassens [2004]) and integrate
the explanation kind perspective with existing design and maintenance
methodologies (such as Inreca [Bergmann et al., 2003] and Siam [Roth-
Berghofer, 2003]).
We want to develop further our structural view on explanations and
supporting knowledge available in CBR systems, with the ultimate goal
of providing a methodology on how to develop explanation-aware CBR
systems in the future.
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D.1 Introduction
Explanations are an important vehicle to convey information in everyday
human-human interaction. They help us to understand one another and
enhance the knowledge of the communication partners in such a way that
they accept certain statements. The partners understand more, allowing
them to make informed decisions. The need for explanations provided by
knowledge-based systems is well documented [Swartout, 1983; Buchanan
and Shortliffe, 1984; Swartout and Smoliar, 1987]. The adequacy of ex-
planations is dependent on pragmatically given background knowledge.
What counts as a good explanation in a certain situation is determined by
context-dependent criteria [Leake, 1995].
Research on explanation is of interest today because it can be argued
that the whole scenario on research on Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS)
has changed: KBS are no longer considered as black boxes that provide
a full solution to a problem. Instead, problem solving is seen as an inter-
active process (a socio-technical process). Problem descriptions as well as
other input can be incomplete and changing. As a consequence, there has
to be communication between human and software agents. Communica-
tion requires mutual understanding that can be essentially supported by
explanations. Such explanations can improve the problem solving process
to a large degree.
Case-Based Reasoning (CBR, [Aamodt and Plaza, 1994]) is a research
area in the field of AI. Its aim is to understand and build systems which
are able to use previous experience in order to solve new problems. A
CBR system is able to learn by storing experience in the form of so called
cases, which describe problems and their solutions. When a new problem
arises, a sufficiently similar previous problem has to be identified and the
former solution has to be adapted to the new problem. The new solution
might also be based on more than one previous case.
We are suggesting a framework for the design of explanation-aware
CBR systems which takes the usage of the system into account. We are
therefore in need of methodologies which can describe the workplace
environment in which the system is going to be used on the human-
computer interaction level. This analysis is then integrated into the design
process as a whole, as described in Roth-Berghofer and Cassens [2005].
In order to understand how the system fits into a workplace situation,
we propose a theoretical framework which is focusing on three different
perspectives:
• Work process view: Actor Network Theory,
• HCI interface view: Semiotics, and
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• HCI system view: Activity Theory.
D.2 Work Process View: Actor Network Theory
Wemodel the context in which the system is implemented with the help of
the Actor Network Theory, ANT [Latour, 1991; Monteiro, 2000]. The basic
idea here is fairly simple: whenever you do something, many influences
on how you do it exist. For instance, if you visit a conference, it is likely
that you stay at a hotel. How you behave at the hotel is influenced by your
own previous experience with hotels, regulations for check-in and check-
out, the capabilities the hotel offers you (breakfast room, lifts), amongst
others.
In effect, you are not performing from scratch, but are influenced by
a wide range of factors. The aim of ANT is to provide an unified view
on these factors and your own acting. According to Monteiro, an actor
network in this notion is ‘the act linked together with all of its influenc-
ing factors (which again are linked), producing a network’ [see Monteiro,
2000, p. 4].
In this network, you find both technical and non-technical elements. By
this, the ANT avoids the trap of either overstating the role of technological
artifacts in a socio-technological system or underestimating their norma-
tive power by applying the same framework to both human actors and
technological artifacts.
This makes it possible for us to understand how technological artifacts
influence the doing of human actors in much the same way as other hu-
man actors.
D.3 HCI Interface View: Semiotics
When focusing on the interaction of a particular user with the system, we
use the semiotics approach [Nake, 1994; Andersen, 2001] to understand
the peculiarities of interaction with intelligent systems. In the terminol-
ogy of semiotics, human communication is a sign process. In contrast,
conventional computer systems are only processing signals, lacking the
necessary interpreting capabilities humans have.
We argue that in order to make intelligent systems work not merely as
tools or media, but as actors to whose decision making abilities a human
user can subscribe, the system must appear to the user as if it was capable
of a meaningful interaction. Since both processes, sign and signal, have
to be coupled, the goal is to make an intelligent system behave in such a
way that the user ascribes to the system the ability to participate in a sign
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process. The upper-level analysis of the work process helps in defining the
aspects of user interaction where this ascription has to succeed in order
to make the user believe in the system’s capabilities.
One important challenge here is the ability of the system to show its
capabilities. This can be described as a communication problem: the sys-
tem has to interpret the actions of the user in a meaningful way and itself
present results that make sense for the user. This process of sense-making
is highly interactive: an intelligent partner in a communication process
asks (meaningful) questions if an unclear situation occurs and is able to
explain its own actions. The semiotic approach is useful to analyse this
sense-making process with the help of transferring knowledge about sim-
ilar processes from other semiotic domains.
D.4 HCI System View: Activity Theory
In our framework, we use Activity Theory (AT, [Bødker, 1991]) to anal-
yse the use of artifacts as instruments for achieving a predefined goal in
the work process and especially to understand the transformation of the
artifact itself and the individual and collective work practice during this
process.
Since an AI system is more a partner in a work process than a tool,
its role in the user interaction changes. Whereas a classical informatics
system is a passive translator and memory of praxis, the intelligent sys-
tem is constantly re-shaping praxis through its use. Looking at a decision
support system, the decision making process itself is transformed by the
ability of the system to react differently, e.g. through accumulated experi-
ence and usage context.
But since AT itself models artifacts as being preformed as socio-cultural
entities, we can describe the artifacts in a way which takes this modifica-
tion into account. Again, our upper-level model helps us to identify the
mediation process and the role of both human and non-human actors in
the usage process.
The ability of an intelligent system to adapt to the user is very im-
portant. In the process of re-shaping praxis, a user expects from an (as-if)
intelligent system that it adapts to the changed situation. In the beginning
of the usage of a Case-Based diagnostic system, it will be important to ex-
plain to the user in detail why a particular case was matched to a new
problem, but the user expects from an intelligent partner that the same
match will be explained in less detail when occurring very frequently
(since the artifact should be changed by the changed praxis, that is here
the accumulated knowledge on both parts). On the other hand, in the
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event of a breakdown situation, the level of detail in explanations given
by the system should be increased again.
In addition, the notion of action cycles [Fjeld et al., 2002] is helpful for
mapping the CBR system model to existing work processes. For example,
identifying those situations where feedback to the system is both required
and fits into the existing work process helps in avoiding obtrusive system
behaviour.
D.5 Conclusions
The three perspectives presented allow system designers to analyse differ-
ent socio-technical aspects of the targeted workplace environment. They
can be used together to get a more complete model, but this is not always
possible or even necessary. For example, in recent work we have inves-
tigated how Activity Theory alone can be used to model the knowledge
needed in context-aware systems [Kofod-Petersen and Cassens, 2005].
On the other hand, combining these three approaches allows modelling
different aspects of human-computer interaction ranging from the socio-
technical network to the design of the user interface itself on the knowl-
edge level. Our goal is therefore to integrate these perspectives further
and combine them with other steps of the CBR system lifecycle [Roth-
Berghofer and Cassens, 2005].
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Abstract:
We present an overview of different theories of explanation from the phi-
losophy and cognitive science communities. Based on these theories, as
well as models of explanation from the knowledge-based systems area,
a framework for explanation in case-based reasoning (CBR) is presented,
based on explanation goals. We propose ways that the goals of the user
and system designer should be taken into account when deciding what
is a good explanation for a given CBR system. Some general types of
goals relevant to many CBR systems are identified, and used to survey
existing methods of explanation in CBR. Finally, we identify some future
challenges.
Main Result:
A systematic overview on explanation in philosophy and cognitive sci-
ences and a historic overview of the use of explanations in artificial in-
telligence are given. Five goals a user can have with explanations are
introduced, namely 1. Transparency (explain how the system reached the
answer), 2. Justification (explain why the answer is a good answer), 3. Rele-
vance (explain why a question asked is relevant), 4. Conceptualization (clar-
ify the meaning of concepts), and 5. Learning (teach the user about the
domain). The use of explanations in case-based reasoning is reviewed
and challenges are identified.
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My main contributions to the paper:
• Outline of explanations in expert systems
• Survey of explanations in CBR
The following aspects were jointly developed by the authors:
• Goals were defined in close collaboration between Frode Sørmo and
myself
• Identification of challenges
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E.1 Introduction
The term explanation can be interpreted in two different ways in AI [Aa-
modt, 1991, p. 59]. One interpretation deals with explanation as part of
the reasoning process itself, for example used in the search for a diagnostic
result in order to support a particular hypothesis. The other interpretation
deals with usage aspects: attempting to make the reasoning process, its
result, or the usage of the result understandable to the user. This paper
primarily deals with the latter interpretation, but explanation as part of
the reasoning process is also addressed where appropiate.
In our daily lives we experience explanations every day, and they seem
to exist in an unlimited number of forms. Everything from “I didn’t wash
the dishes because there was no more detergent”, to “I hate shopping”,
and even “Because I said so!” can serve as satisfactory explanations in
certain circumstances. Explanation is one of the concepts that everyone
has a good intuition of, but which are very hard to explicitly define.
In this paper, we will attempt to characterize important aspects of an
explanation, and relate them to explanations in and from CBR systems.
When reviewing the literature we find that many accounts of explana-
tion explicitly recognize that the context of an explanation situation, and
the goal of the user in that situation, influence what is and what is not a
good explanation. While goal situations may vary a lot among domains,
systems, and users, some goal situations are common. We will present
a framework of explanation based on important explanation goals, and
discuss how they place limitations on each other and how different kinds
of systems may be better suited to fulfill different goals.
We will begin by looking at foundational and theoretical issues of ex-
planation, as developed within philosophy and cognitive science (Section
2). This is followed, in Section 3, by views and models of explanation
from within the expert systems and intelligent tutoring communities. In
Section 4 we review current accounts of explanation in CBR and present
a set of explanation goals for CBR systems. A brief survey on explanation
in different CBR systems follows in Section 5. In Section 6 we highlight
some challenges for the future before concluding with Section 7.
E.2 Philosophical and Cognitive Accounts of Explanation
People tend to think of explanation as something identifying the cause
for a particular event or state, as for example in the sentence “the train is
late because of a faulty stop light”. This is also the case in many philo-
sophical theories of explanation [see for instance Salmon, 1984]. However,
in daily life we also use explanations that are functional (“there is rubber
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on the end of the pencil so you can erase mistakes”) and intentional (“I
turned off the light because I want to sleep” [Brewer et al., 1998]). This
is further complicated by the fact that both the sender and recipient of
an explanation have goals in the exchange, and their goals influence what
candidate explanations are and are not acceptable [Leake, 1995a]. Thus
it may be very hard to form a complete theory of explanation. We will
characterize some accounts of explanations discussed in the philosophical
and cognitive science communities.
E.2.1 Basic Philosophical Accounts
The nature of explanation has been studied extensively by philosophers,
particularly by researchers in the philosophy of science. Here the targets
for explanation are specific observations, predicted outcomes, or scien-
tific theories themselves. Explanations are sought based on observations
and existing knowledge. Two different approaches, or rather classes of
approaches, emerged throughout the 50’s and 60’s. The logical deductive
approach, suggested by Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim [1948; 1965]
was linked with a positivistic view on science. This approach was severely
criticized by several people, resulting in several suggestions of different,
and more pragmatic, approaches to explanation. Important early contri-
butions were given by Gilbert Harman [1965], Sylvain Bromberger [1965],
and Wesley Salmon [1971].
The positivist approach takes a scientific theory to be an axiomatic for-
malization of a set of sentences in a logic system. Hempel and Oppen-
heim refers to it as a “deductive-nomological” (deduction from laws) ex-
planation, also referred to as the “covering law model”, reflecting that the
theory subsumes or covers the things that are explained. This work was
subsequently extended with a formal model of probabilistic inference as
well, the “inductive-statistical” model [Hempel, 1965]. In order to analyze
explanations formally, an explanation structure in both these models is
defined to consist of two parts; the part that is to be explained, called the
explanandum, and the explanatory expression, called the explanans. For
example: The patient died (explanandum); The patient had cancer (ex-
planans); The patient died because he had cancer (explanation).
While the pragmatic aspects of explanation are acknowledged by all
philosophers of science (including Hempel), a characterization of the non-
positivist tradition is that the pragmatics of an explanation situation, in
terms of context, purpose, etc., is at the very basis of the nature of expla-
nation. Pragmatics becomes the starting point for the understanding of
explanation, rather than an additional challenge for axiomatic formaliza-
tion.
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Early advocates of pragmatic approaches criticized the deductive-no-
mological account for being too syntax-oriented, in that semantical inter-
pretations (i.e. the content of theories) started out from the interpretation
of the logical syntax of expressions, rather than from the needs of the
real world. Pragmatic approaches attempt to offer a semantic that starts
out from the real world, with the necessary or suitable syntax following
from pragmatic needs. While deductive inference certainly is an impor-
tant inference type, several philosophers have shown the importance of
abductive inference – and particularly the form referred to as “inference
to the best explanation” – as a frequently occurring inference type in hy-
pothesis formation and evaluation [Josephson and Josephson, 1994]. The
strict requirement of truth-preserving inference underlying logical deduc-
tion is relaxed here. Out of a set of hypotheses, the hypothesis that can
best explain the facts is chosen. Originating from Charles Sanders Peirce,
an early account in philosophy of science was suggested by Gilbert Har-
man [1965]. While other researchers have proposed abductive models of
scientific discovery, Harman’s model concentrated on justification. The
basic idea behind his model was to argue that an inference from some
data to the best explanation is a justified mode of inference and leads to
true hypotheses.
Case-based reasoning is concerned with problems that are open-ended,
and often changing, and uncertainty as well as incompleteness of theories
and input descriptions are typically assumed. Viewing explanations as
deductive proofs will be too severe a limitation for our purpose, and hence
less relevant for the type of explanations CBR systems need to generate.
A pragmatic view of explanation will therefore be accounted for in the
following, while the Hempel-Oppenheim account sometimes will be used
for comparison.
Philosophers who study linguistics and everyday speech have also made
significant contributions to the nature of explanations. An early influen-
tial example is Sylvain Bromberger [1965], who in particular criticized
two weaknesses of Hempel’s and Oppenheim’s theory. Through a series
of examples he showed that perfectly valid deductive-nomological expla-
nations can be made with true but irrelevant premises.
The second problem was related to the symmetrical properties of logical
inference, particularly when the explanatory law has a functional form.
The equations can be rewritten so that any of the variables becomes the
value to explain, i.e. the explanandum. One of his famous examples is
the flagpole example. When the line of sight of the sun across the top of
a flagpole is at a given angle with the ground, the height of the flagpole
and the length of the shadow it casts are related. Under the deductive-
nomological model, it can be explained why the length of the shadow
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takes a given value by citing this law and the height of the pole. So far so
good. But the equation and the length of the shadow can equally well be
used to explain the height of the flagpole, i.e. to explain why the flagpole
has the height it has, which seems entirely inappropriate in all but very
peculiar situations.
Bromberger analysed explanation triggering questions in the form of
why-questions, and suggested that an important type of question arises
“when one believes that the presupposition is true, views it as a departure
from a general rule, and thinks that the conditions under which depar-
tures from the general rule occur can be generalized” [Bromberger, 1966,
p. 100]. Asking this type of why-question would then imply that the
person asking it is in some way surprised about the fact implied in the
why-question (the presupposition) while still believing its truth.
An early and influential approach to the treatment of causality in expla-
nations was presented by Wesley Salmon [1971]. Salmon characterizes ex-
planation as the pursuit of understanding, and to explain as to attribute a
cause. As opposed to Hempel’s experimentalist position, Salmon worked
in the realist tradition. Salmon’s “causal realism” theory of explanation
started out from Bayesian probability, viewing an explanation basically
as a set of statistically relevant factors, but he later found that theory
inadequate in accounting for how explanations produce scientific under-
standing (see the following subsection).
E.2.2 Later Philosophical Accounts
Later accounts include continued work on scientific explanation by Bas
van Fraassen [1980], Wesley Salmon [1984], and Paul Thagard [1988], ex-
planation in natural language by Peter Achinstein [1983], as well as cog-
nitive models of explanation, by Roger Schank [1986], Robert Keil and
Frank Wilson [2000], and David Leake [1995b]. Some of these theories are
also applicable to everyday explanations.
One of these is formulated by Bas van Fraassen in his book The Scien-
tific Image [van Fraassen, 1980]. Van Fraassen takes a strictly empiricist
approach (often referred to as “constructive empiricism”), and claims that
an explanation is always an answer to an implicit or explicit contrastive
why-question. By ‘contrastive’, he means a question of the form “Why
S0 rather than S1 . . .Sn?” where one state or event is preferred over a set
of alternatives. For example, the explanation “The train is late because of
a faulty stop light” is an answer to the question “Why is the train some-
where else rather than here?” According to van Fraassen, an acceptable
explanation must favor the observed state S0 over the other states. By this,
he means that the answer or explanation must increase the probability of
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the observed state S0 relative to S1 . . .Sn. He suggests that this can be cal-
culated by applying Bayes’ Rule to each candidate answer. As long as each
candidate satisfies the previous criteria of favoring the observed state, van
Fraassen claims there are no objective criteria for preferring one over an-
other, but that the context of the question implicitly contains information
about which answer the receiver would prefer. Perhaps the most useful
feature of van Fraassen’s theory for application in knowledge based sys-
tems is that it suggests a minimum criterion an explanation must fulfill (it
must favor the observed state) as well as a framework for understanding
explanations (as answers to contrastive why-questions).
Salmon’s later account on causal explanation was triggered by prob-
lems of causal relevance and causal asymmetry in his early account, and
by the distinction between true causal processes and pseudoprocesses.
An example illustrating the latter difference is the beam of a torch as the
torch is moved by hand so the light describes an arc through the sky. The
movement of the beam is a pseudoprocess, since later stages of the beam
are not caused by earlier stages, while the hand movement of the torch it-
self is a true causal process - as is the electrical production of light within
the torch. A central idea in his “causal mechanical” model of explana-
tion is that a causal process is a physical process that is characterized by
being able to transmit a “mark” in a continuous manner. A mark is a
local modification to the physical structure involved, such as a scratch in
its surface. True causal processes have marks, pseudoprocesses not. A
second element in his theory is the notion of causal interaction, through
which marks are transmitted between causal processes. According to the
causal-mechanical model, an explanation of some phenomenon will trace
the causal processes – including interactions – which lead up to the phe-
nomenon, and describe the processes and interactions of the phenomenon
itself. If successful, the explanation will show how the phenomenon to be
explained fits into a causal structure. Salmon developed a detailed and
complex theory, resulting in a set of instructions for how to produce an
explanation by creating a causal model for a given phenomenon.
An influential follower of Bromberger in the philosophy of natural lan-
guage is Peter Achinstein [1983]. He follows the tradition that a request
for explanation is a request for understanding of something. He addresses
questions such as: Why have the standard models of scientific explanation
been unsuccessful? What is causal explanation, and must explanation in
the sciences be causal? What is a functional explanation? He emphasizes
the role of the explanation process – the explaining act in which someone
writes or utters something to someone else. What is written or uttered in
this process is called the explanation product. Achinstein’s view is that
an explanation (product) can not be understood or evaluated without ref-
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erence to the explaining act, which leads to his “illocutionary” theory of
explanation. The explaining act defines some aspect of the context and
purpose behind the explanation which is needed for a correct and mean-
ingful interpretation of the explanation product.
He believes this request can take many forms, not just the why-questions
of Bromberger and van Fraassen but any number of questions (why, what,
where, how, etc.). Achinstein says that an explanation is the intention
of giving someone the knowledge to understand some phenomena from
some frame of reference. Like van Fraassen, Achinstein suggests that
there is further preference for some explanations over others, and that this
preference is defined by the context of the conversation and ultimately in
the control of the individual requesting the explanation. For example, an
explanation that a train is full because it is the rush hour may be useful
for a passenger, but for the train scheduling department a more useful
explanation is that too few trains are scheduled at this time of the day.
This view of explanations suggests that a very wide variety of state-
ments can serve as explanations. An explanation need not, for example,
be a causal chain of events leading up to the matter to be explained. The
explanation may have as a goal facilitating the formation of such a causal
chain by the recipient, but it need not contain it explicitly. It is enough to
supply the recipient with the knowledge that he needs in order to infer
it. This is a case of observing one of the ‘rules of communication’ often
seen in human conversation: Only information that is not obvious should
be communicated. If someone asks “Why is Peter not here?” a perfectly
good explanation can be “Anne is sick” if the explainer is aware that the
recipient knows that Peter has a daughter called Anne and that he has to
stay at home and take care of her when she is sick.
On the one hand, this emphasizes the value of knowing the recipient
quite well and it suggests that to form efficient explanations, accurate user
models may be necessary. On the other hand, it alleviates the requirement
of the explainer to put forward a complete explanation if the system can
make reasonable assumptions about what the recipient knows and is ca-
pable of. For instance, an Artificial Neural Network that is trained to
compare two pictures of a certain type can give a similarity measure, e.g.
from 0 to 1, but it is difficult to explain how it came up with this score
in a way most people can understand. However, presenting the pictures
to the user so he can validate the similarity for himself can itself serve as
an explanation. For many types of pictures, it is a reasonable assump-
tion for the system to believe that the user is able to compare the pictures
quite well on his own. Note that this is only the case if the goal of the
receiver is to gain understanding of how good an answer the system has
supplied. If the goal is to gain understanding of how the system arrived
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at the conclusion, the above explanation is far from sufficient.
Like Achinstein [1983], Thagaard [1988] is concerned with the prag-
matics of an explanation. He developed what he calls a “computational
philosophy of science”, based on computational metaphors of epistemol-
ogy, and by implementing and testing his theories in computer programs.
Thagard also views explanation as a process of providing understand-
ing, and understanding is to a large extent achieved through locating and
matching. This is a view of reasoning based on retrieval and adapta-
tion of knowledge structures, functionally similar to the mops (memory
organization packages) in Schank’s [1983] theories, see Section E.2.3. In
Thagaard’s early model, called PI, the knowledge structures – based on
concrete or generalized situations or episodes – are supplemented with
more general knowledge in the form of rules. In order for an explanation
to be understood, it must activate this ‘mental model’ in a meaningful
way – that is in a way that enables the existing knowledge structure to
confirm the explanation without seriously contradicting other parts of the
knowledge structure. On this basis, Thagard developed a theory referred
to as “explanatory coherence”, based on the notion of a coherent body of
knowledge.
The notion of knowledge coherence – as a relaxation of the formal no-
tion of consistency – has been adopted by many people, including AI
researchers (e.g. Douglas Lenat [1987]). Paul Thagard [1989], however,
takes this further into a theory of explanation. Coherence, in this theory,
is basically a property over a set of propositions. It only makes sense to
talk about coherence of a single proposition if viewed with respect to an-
other set of propositions. The notion of acceptability is introduced to char-
acterize this property of single propositions. Starting out from a model
of abductive inference, in the sense of inference to the best explanation,
he identifies three important criteria for selecting the best explanation:
conscilience (favoring explanatory breadth), simplicity (favouring explana-
tions with few propositions), and analogy (favouring explanations based
on analogies). Thagard’s work not only presents an approach to scientific
explanation, but also defines the role of explanation within a wider the-
ory of coherence-seeking abductive inference. His research has focused on
analogy and case-based reasoning [Thagard and Holyok, 1989], as well as
other computational models, which include connectionist networks and
probabilistic network models.
Additional philosophical accounts of explanation include the “unifica-
tionist” accounts of Michael Friedman [1974] and Philip Kitcher [1976]
and the information theoretic model of Joseph Hanna [1982]. The ba-
sic idea of the former is that a scientific explanation should attempt to
unify a range of different phenomena. A successful unification may re-
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veal relationships between phenomena, previously unknown or unaware
of, which seems to be something that good explanations are expected
to do. Hanna proposed the notion of “transmitted information”, coming
from information theory, as the basis for evaluating the goodness of an ex-
planation. Hanna responds to a crucial problem with Hempel’s inductive-
statistical model in that it does not adequately take relevance into account.
Transmitted information, according to Hanna, reflects a relevance relation,
which in turn is linked with explanatory power.
E.2.3 Cognitive Science Accounts
Thagard’s research, as described above, also spans the philosophy of
mind, and hence is positioned within the field of cognitive science as
well as philosophy. Several other researchers in this community have also
addressed the issue of explanation related to cognition.
Roger Schank and colleagues further developed Schank’s “dynamic
memory” [Schank, 1983] theory of reminding, problem solving, and learn-
ing, into a theory of explanation generation and evaluation. As one of the
founders of CBR as we know it today, he proposed a case-based approach
to explanation, based on storing, indexing, and retrieval of “explanation
patterns” [Schank, 1986]. Explanation patterns are specific or generalized
cases of explanation events. A particular focus has been the exploration
of case-based reasoning as a platform for creativity [Schank and Leake,
1989]. In this model, creativity comes from retrieving explanations related
to a situation, but using them in new ways - referred to as “tweaking” of
explanations. Depending on the retrieval and adaptation processes used,
CBR has the potential to provide solutions to a range of creativity tasks,
from close to copying old solutions up to producing novel ideas. The
following has been a focusing problem for studying various types of ex-
planations:
In 1984, Swale was the best 3-year-old racehorse, and he was winning all the
most important races. A few days after a major victory, he returned from a light
morning gallop and collapsed outside his stable. The shocked racing community
tried to figure out why. Many hypotheses appeared, but the actual cause was
never determined.
The experimental system that implements several of the methods inves-
tigated, the SWALE system, attempts to explain the anomaly in Swale’s
premature death [Leake, 1992]. It generates explanations of why Swale
died by retrieving and tweaking remindings of explanation patterns for
other cases of death. The approach has demonstrated the generation of a
variety of interesting possible explanations of its death, including a heart
attack (the “Jim Fixx explanation pattern”), and a drug overdose (the “Ja-
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nis Joplin explanation pattern”).
Abductive inference also has a central position in cognitive accounts
of explanations (including Thagard’s work, see Section E.2.2). Extending
from his earlier research on explanation patterns, David Leake [1995b],
in his work about models for everyday abductive explanations, identifies
a set of issues related to comparing abductive reasoning methods. One
is the issue of when to explain something, which links to the central ability
of the reasoner itself to decide when an explanation is merited. Leake
considers both plausibility criteria and the role of goals. He divides tra-
ditional plausibility criteria into the three groups of structural minimality
criteria, motivated by the principle of Occam’s razor, proof-based approaches,
which are based on an evaluation of the generated proof-like explana-
tions, and probabilistic and cost-based criteria, that focus on the costs and
probabilities related to the generated explanations.
In contrast to these syntactic-oriented criteria, a set of goal-based crite-
ria are suggested [Leake, 1995a]. Explanations are assumed to have two
roles – either as a support of a claim or an argument against it. This work
follows the tradition of Lalljee and Abelsen [1983], who suggest that ex-
planations can be either ‘constructive’ or ‘contrastive’, and Schank [1983],
who specifies that an explanation is required first and foremost in anoma-
lous situations that do not fit a person’s internalized model of the world
(cf. the “surprises” assumed by Bromberger, Section E.2.1). Leake’s view
on explanation is related to the natural language philosophy view out-
lined before, in the sense that it takes the recipient’s frame of reference
into account. However, Leake has an operational view on explanations
and not a purely descriptive one. While Achinstein deals with general
communication issues, Leake focuses on the evaluation of given expla-
nations for the actor. In this sense, Leake’s theory can be seen as an
operationalization of certain aspects of a more general theory of commu-
nication.
In the book Explanation and Cognition, Keil and Wilson [2000] collect
recent research on explanations from a cognitive science point of view.
They set out to study a set of questions about explanation, such as: “Are
there different kinds of explanation?”, “Do explanations correspond to
domains of knowledge?”, and “How central are causes to explanation?”.
These questions are examined by studying for example whether there
are fundamental differences between explanations offered and requested
by children and those used by scientists [Brewer et al., 1998]. Keil and
Wilson describe three broad types of explanation; the scientific, the narra-
tive and the goal-based. The narrative explanation is what we use in daily
life to chain together events. An example of this would be to explain that
a window is broken because the children playing football in the back yard
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accidentally kicked the ball through the glass. This kind of explanation
contrasts with explanations that explain events from generalized princi-
ples, which Keil and Wilson call scientific explanations. The last type,
the goal-based explanation, are useful to explain actions in terms of the
actors’ goals. For instance, the workings of a car may well be described
by mechanical laws, but the reasons for building it are better explained in
terms of the goals of car manufacturers and consumers.
While the scientific explanation typically can be used to predict events
from a set of observations, the narrative explanation can be formed after
the fact and has little in the way of predictive power. Keil and Wilson
claim that narrative explanations are more intuitive to people. They sug-
gest that these explanations are useful in that they may narrow down the
inductive space or help us gather information in a more efficient fashion.
For instance, a spectator at a cricket match may ask questions about the
rules so that he is better able to understand and gather information about
the game in real time. In this scenario, prediction may not be very relevant
to the spectator – he is simply trying to understand the game.
From an AI perspective, the difference between the narrative and scien-
tific explanations is interesting. In expert systems, explanations initially
focused on how the system made the prediction by showing how it fol-
lowed from generalized rules. In essence, the system attempted to show
how the conclusion must follow from the knowledge contained in the sys-
tem. Although the process used to do this was not necessarily or typically
deductive (at least in expert systems), the explanations produced seem to
be closer to the scientific explanations than the narrative. Applying this
to case-based reasoning, it seems likely that using a similar case to jus-
tify a conclusion is closer to a narrative account than using a rule from
a rule-based system. However, the case will not typically contain a nar-
rative account of how a conclusion followed from the findings. Rather,
the way a case is used is that it represents a very local “rule” for draw-
ing the conclusion but if the case contains a causal account of how the
solution followed from the findings, it is not typically used by the system
for explanation. Keil and Wilson suggest that depending on the goals of
the users, they may not seek to know how the system found the case, but
rather how the case’s solution is a product of its findings.
We round off this Section with a final remark about the goodness of an
explanation. We have earlier shown that the truth, or correctness, of an ex-
planation is generally not sufficient to make it good. The flagpole height
explanation is one example. An overly general explanation is another.
What about necessity? Is correctness – or truth – a necessary criterion for
a good explanation? One of the counter-arguments is related to the no-
tion of truth. McDermott [1987] argues that an explanation may be good
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merely by making the observed facts probable, not necessarily proving
their truth. Another argument is related to pragmatics. Achinstein [1983,
p. 108] expresses it as follows: “The goodness or worth of an explanation
is multidimensional; correctness is only one dimension in an evaluation.
An explanation is evaluated by considering whether, or to what extent,
certain ends are served. The ends may be quite varied. They may con-
cern what are regarded as universal ideals to be achieved, particularly in
science, e.g. truth, simplicity, unification, precision. Other ends are more
‘pragmatic’.”
E.3 Explanations in Expert Systems
In early rule-based expert systems like MYCIN the user could ask how the
system reached the conclusion presented, and an explanation in the form
of a reasoning trace from the system would be presented. This would
offer the user a degree of transparency into how the system reached its
conclusions. The user could also choose a why explanation that would
provide a more local explanation that justified why a question was asked.
It was soon found that this capability was insufficient for answering
many of the explanation requests from users. For instance, the problem
solving strategy of a rule-based expert system is implicitly defined in the
system, but was not explicitly encoded in such a way that it was accessi-
ble or easily explained to an end user. NEOMYCIN extended MYCIN’s
capabilities in this respect by explicitly encoding strategic information
[Clancey, 1983].
Another notable extension was the XPLAIN system [Swartout, 1983].
This system would record additional domain knowledge associated with
each rule, so that the system could produce explanations that gave back-
ground information for the rule, and pointers to literature.
The focus of these early extensions was usually to extend the explana-
tion capabilities by adding the type of knowledge required by the user.
These explanations could be divided into four types [Swartout and Smo-
liar, 1987; Chandrasekaran et al., 1989; Gregor and Benbasat, 1999]:
• Reasoning Trace: Producing an explanation from the trace of the
reasoning process used by the system to find the solution. Examples
are MYCIN’s how and why explanations [Clancey, 1983].
• Justification: Providing justification for a reasoning step by referring
to deeper background knowledge. This type of explanation was first
offered by the XPLAIN system [Swartout, 1983].
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• Strategic: Explaining the reasoning strategy of the system. The
NEOMYCIN system first provided this kind of explanation [Clancey,
1983].
• Terminological: Defining and explaining terms and concepts in the
domain. This type of explanation was identified in [Swartout and
Smoliar, 1987].
Although it was found that expert system designers, and to some extent
domain experts, appreciated the reasoning trace explanations, many end
users did not understand or were not interested in the inner workings
of the expert system. Later analysis of failed expert systems suggested
that many of the attempts to provide explanations in early systems failed
because they were incomprehensible to the user or failed to address the
users’ goals in demanding an explanation [Majchrzak and Gasser, 1991].
In response to this, further research went into how explanations could
better be generated dynamically to fit the user’s needs and goals. In
Swartout and Moore [1993], five requirements for the explanation capa-
bility of expert systems were put forth. The fidelity requirement says that
the explanation given should mirror the knowledge used by the system in
its reasoning. The explanation should also have low construction overhead
or justify any increased resources spent on it. It must always remain effi-
cient and not degrade runtime capability. The explanation produced must
also be understandable to the user, and must be sufficient in that enough
knowledge must be represented in the system to answer the question the
user may have.
The fidelity criterion mentioned above appears more controversial than
the other four. Wick and Thompson [1992] argue that explanation should
be viewed as a problem-solving process separate from the process used
to determine the conclusion in the first place. They admit that while
expert system designers need explanations that accurately represent the
reasoning done by the system, this may be inappropriate for an end user.
They suggest three major explanation goals. Verification is the goal of the
knowledge engineer in verifying that the system works as it should. A
successful verification explanation would accurately and precisely convey
the knowledge of the system on the knowledge level. Duplication is to help
the domain expert examine the knowledge of the system. The system
should not only expose its own knowledge, but help the user learn the
methods and knowledge used in the problem solving process. Finally, the
goal of ratification is to increase the end user’s confidence in the system’s
conclusion.
Wick and Thompson suggest that each of these goals has different au-
dience and focus. As the goal moves away from verification toward rat-
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ification, the explanation process should increasingly be decoupled from
the reasoning process in order to provide explanations that focus on the
solution. This allows the system to convey tailored information about the
domain to the user. The higher degree of decoupling from the original
reasoning processes will decrease the fidelity of the explanation as de-
fined by Swartout and Moore above, but Wick and Thompson point out
that explanations provided by human experts also tend to lack fidelity,
although they are nevertheless perceived as useful.
As expert systems have been deployed in production environments,
empirical studies have been conducted to identify when different kinds
of users ask for explanations, and what they expect to get from them. Re-
sults from this research include the observation that novices tend to ask
for explanations to learn or clarify preferring justification and termino-
logical explanations [Mao and Benbasat, 2000]. Experts tend to require
explanations to verify the reasoning of the system and explain away sur-
prising results. As such, they tend to prefer strategic and reasoning trace
explanations. A full survey of the empirical studies on explanations is
beyond the scope of this paper, but we recommend Gregor and Benbasat
[1999] for a more in-depth review.
A number of educational systems have also been built as extensions of
expert systems. These systems have as their goal not only to help the
user solve a problem, but also teach the user about the domain. One
idea emerging from these systems is that it is often beneficial for learning
if the user participates in the formation of explanations. The Cognitive
Tutor [Aleven and Koedinger, 2002] system assists students in explaining
solutions to geometry problems. They find that this helps the students
learn the task better and helps them avoid bad generalization. Ford et al.
[1993] use Concept Maps to help the student navigate an expert model to
form explanations.
E.4 Explanation in CBR
We have reviewed several attempts to define criteria for explanations and
categorizations of different kinds of explanations. Philosophical accounts
focus on criteria for scientific explanations, while the cognitive accounts
describe how humans use explanations in a wide range of contexts. How-
ever, many explanations may be produced that are not perceived as useful
in a given context. This happens even if they fulfill criteria of what is con-
sidered a good explanation.
The research on explanation within expert systems provides a focus for
a situational context that is similar to what we find with most case-based
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reasoning systems. Although the technology for generating and present-
ing advice is different from traditional rule-based expert systems, most
CBR systems today are computer systems that give decision advice to hu-
man users. Because of this similarity in situational context, it is reasonable
to believe that the typology of explanations useful in expert systems will
be a good fit for CBR. In this section we introduce five explanation goals
that are strongly influenced by expert systems.
Below the abstraction level of the explanation goals, we need to look at
particular issues in applying these goals to CBR. For instance, traditional
rule-based systems paraphrased the rules to form explanations. While
CBR systems typically do not have rules, the basic unit of knowledge in
CBR – the case – can also be used to produce explanations. It has long
been an article of faith in the CBR community that displaying an earlier
solved case that represents a situation similar to the present problem sit-
uation can serve as a good explanation for adopting the solution of the
previous case. After presenting the explanation goals, we will examine
this approach further. In addition, we will discuss if cases are really the
only source of knowledge that should contribute to explanations in a CBR
system.
E.4.1 Explanation Goals
We will designate our explanation categories based on a set of explanation
goals. We do this in order to recognize that a single explanation technique
can serve many of these goals at once, and that not all of these goals
are of equal importance in all systems. The goals are based on the four
content categories from Gregor and Benbasat [1999] as presented in the
Section E.3. In addition, we have a category that focuses on the learning
perspective, similar to the Duplication goal of Wick and Thompson [1992].
Our aim is not to provide an exhaustive list of goals – the rationale for
introducing them is to discuss how some current explanation criteria, and
methods, hold up in the light of these goals which have proved quite
universal in expert systems.
Explain How the System Reached the Answer (Transparency)
“I had the same problem with my car yesterday, and charging the battery fixed
it.”
The goal of an explanation of this kind is to impart an understanding
of how the system found an answer. This allows the users to check the
system by examining the way it reasons and allows them to look for expla-
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nations for why the system has reached a surprising or anomalous result.
If transparency is the primary goal, the system should not try to oversell
a conclusion it is uncertain of. In other words, fidelity is the primary cri-
terion, even though such explanations may place a heavy cognitive load
on the user. The original how and why explanations of the MYCIN system
would be good examples.
This goal is adapted from the reasoning trace type of explanations from
Gregor and Benbasat [1999] and the verification goal of Wick and Thomp-
son [1992]. As they suggest, this goal is most important with knowledge
engineers seeking to debug the system and possibly domain experts seek-
ing to verify the reasoning process. It is also reasonable to think that in
domains with a high cost of failure it can be expected that the user wishes
to examine the reasoning process more thoroughly.
Explain Why the Answer is a Good Answer (Justification)
“You should eat more fish - your heart needs it!”
“My predictions have been 80% correct up until now.”
This is the goal of increasing the confidence in the advice or solution of-
fered by the system by giving some kind of support for the conclusion
suggested by the system. This goal allows for a simplification of the ex-
planation compared to the actual process the system goes through to find
a solution. Potentially, this kind of explanation can be completely decou-
pled from the reasoning process such as advocated by the ratification goal
of Wick and Thompson, but it may also be achieved by using additional
background knowledge (as in XPLAIN) or reformulation and simplifica-
tion of knowledge that is used in the reasoning process. As such, this
goal also contains the category of justification explanations from Gregor
and Benbasat [1999]. Empirical research suggests that this goal is most
prevalent in systems with novice users [Mao and Benbasat, 2000], in do-
mains where the cost of failure is relatively low, and in domains where
the system represents a party that has an interest in the user accepting
the solution. Some e-commerce recommender systems fall into this cate-
gory, although Herlocker et al. [2000] suggest that in high-cost domains
(such as expensive vacation packages compared to relatively cheap books
or music) users are unlikely to accept solutions without more in-depth
explanations.
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Explain Why a Question Asked is Relevant (Relevance)
“I ask about the more common failures first, and many users do forget to con-
nect the power cable.”
An explanation of this type would have to justify the strategy pursued
by the system. This is in contrast to the previous two goals that focus on
the solution. The reasoning trace type of explanations may display the
strategy of the system implicitly, but it does not argue why it is a good
strategy. In conversational systems, the user may wish to know why a
question asked by the system is relevant to the task at hand. It can also be
relevant in other kinds of systems where a user would like to verify that
the approach used by the system is valid. In expert systems, this kind of
explanation was introduced by NEOMYCIN (and was one of the types of
explanation discussed in the previous section).
Clarify the Meaning of Concepts (Conceptualization)
“By ‘conceptualization’ we mean the process of forming concepts and rela-
tions between concepts.”
One of the lessons learned after the first wave of expert systems had been
analyzed was that the users did not always understand the terms used by
a system. This may be because the user is a novice in the domain, but also
because different people can use terms differently or organize the knowl-
edge in different ways. It may not be clear, even to an expert, what the
system means when using a specific term, and he may want to get an ex-
planation of what the system means when using it. This requirement for
providing explanations for the vocabulary was first identified by Swartout
and Smoliar [1987].
Teach the User About the Domain (Learning)
“When the headlights won’t work, the battery may be flat as it is supposed to
deliver power to the lights.”
All the previous explanation goals involve learning – about the problem
domain, about the system, about the reasoning process or the vocabulary
of the system. Educational systems, however, have learning as the primary
goal of the whole system. In these systems, we cannot assume that the
user will understand even definitions of terms, and may need to provide
explanations at different levels of expertise. The goal of the system is
typically not only to find a good solution to a problem, but to explain the
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solution process to the user in a way that will increase his understanding
of the domain. The goal can be to teach more general domain theory or to
train the user in solving problems similar to those solved by the system.
In other words, the explanation is often more important than the answer
itself. Systems that fulfill the relevance and transparency goals may have
some capabilities in this area, but a true tutoring system must take into
account how humans solve problems. It should not attempt to teach the
user a problem solving strategy that works well in a computer but that is
very hard to reproduce for people.
This goal has similarities with the duplication goal of Wick and Thomp-
son [1992], where the system should be able to explain itself on the knowl-
edge level in order to transfer its knowledge to a user. Although Wick and
Thompson claim that this goal is primarily for the domain expert to gain
an understanding of the system’s capabilities, the name and description
suggest that the goal is to transfer the knowledge contents and compe-
tence of the system to the user. The participatory explanation techniques
[Ford et al., 1993; Aleven and Koedinger, 2002], where the system helps
students form explanations, are good examples of techniques for achiev-
ing this goal.
E.4.2 The Case as Explanation
The case-based reasoning methodology seems quite transparent. It is
fairly easy to understand the basic concept of searching for very similar,
concrete cases and base the decision-making on them. This understanding
has supported the basic approach to explanation in CBR – displaying the
case that is most similar to the problem case. In addition to the intuitive
feeling and ad hoc reports that this works, there has been research show-
ing that displaying cases along with the solution significantly improved
user confidence in the solution compared to only showing the solution,
or displaying a rule that was used in finding the solution [Cunningham
et al., 2003].
There is also theoretical support for the case-as-explanation method ful-
filling the justification goal by looking at it from the viewpoint of Achin-
stein’s theory. It is likely that a previous example with a high degree
of similarity would increase the relative probability of the solution from
this case compared to other solutions [Faltings, 1997]. However, the un-
derlying assumption of this approach seems to be caught better by van
Fraassen’s [1980] framework. Displaying the retrieved case to the user is a
kind of knowledge communication that allows the user to make his own
judgment about the similarity of the old situation compared to the current
one.
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Both of these views depend on the user’s ability to understand the case
and to confirm the similarity assessment. In general, for the retrieved case
to serve as an explanation to the user, the similarity between the retrieved
case and current problem must be obvious to him. The difficulty for the
user in comparing cases increases as the case structure becomes more
complex and the similarity measures more convoluted. It also increases
with the use of more complex adaptation techniques where the retrieved
case may not be the most similar but one that fits the adaptation process,
as suggested e.g. by Smyth and Keane [1998].
There is another problem. Displaying the case may serve as a win-
dow into the methodology of the reasoner. It does, however, not help the
user understanding how the symptoms connect with the solution. End
users may be less concerned about how the most similar case was found
than why the solution in the presented case works. Based on Keil and
Wilson’s [2000] work presented in Section E.2.2, we suggest that such an
account would be required for the case to serve as a narrative episode and
explanation for humans.
Schank’s research suggests that people do use single cases to explain
extraordinary situations where no more general theory covers the situ-
ation – they are a sort of index of situations where the general model
failed. However, his theory also suggests that these single exceptions are
perceived as very tentative in their predictive power compared to general
knowledge that has been confirmed again and again. As we will see in
Section E.5, some recent research in CBR attempts to address these short-
comings.
E.4.3 Knowledge Containers
The competence of a knowledge-based system depends on the knowledge
sources available to it. Richter describes the knowledge sources used in
problem solving as knowledge containers [Richter, 1995]. Rule-based sys-
tems typically have facts and rules as knowledge containers, while Richter
identifies four such containers for case-based reasoning systems – the case
base, the similarity measure, the adaptation knowledge and the vocabulary.
The vocabulary provides the basis for the other knowledge containers
by defining the terms and structure of the domain. The case base contains
the concrete or prototypical problems previously solved by the system or
otherwise provided to it. The similarity measure contains knowledge on
how to compare cases and compute a similarity ranking of cases relative
to a new problem, while the adaptation knowledge allows the reasoner to
change the solution of a previous case to better fit a new problem.
Richter points out that given a complete case coverage of the problem
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domain, the similarity measure and adaptation problems become trivial
since any problem can simply be looked up. Similarly, if we have perfect
adaptation knowledge so that any old solution can be adapted to a perfect
new solution, the process only requires a starting position for the adapta-
tion so that there is little need for cases or a similarity measure. Finally,
if the system is always able to order the cases so that the cases with the
correct solution are ranked highest, a classification system only needs a
case representing each solution class, and there is no need for adaptation
knowledge. This means that CBR systems may put different weights on
these containers depending on what is most convenient for the domain
and system.
Roth-Berghofer [2004] points out that this insight by Richter places in
doubt the idea that displaying the best case is a sufficient explanation –
at least if the system places any weight on the other knowledge contain-
ers. If much of the competence of the problem solving emerges through
adaptation, it will be hard to explain the reasoning of the system without
using the adaptation knowledge. This is certainly true if the goal of the
explanation is to provide transparency into the system, but it can also be-
come a problem in learning and justification if a solution is justified by
a case that is not obviously similar and has a slightly different solution
than that suggested by the system. In addition, conceptualization and rel-
evance explanations cannot be provided by the case base. The vocabulary
container seems perfect to provide explanations that serve to help con-
ceptualization, but it is not clear from where strategic explanations can
emerge. Possibly this requires a fifth knowledge container in CBR in the
same way that it required a different level of representation in rule-based
expert systems.
E.5 Survey of Explanation in CBR
In this section, we review explanation techniques in different case-based
reasoning systems, with an emphasis on the more recently developed
techniques. Many early CBR systems also had explanation capabilities,
extensive surveys of which have been published elsewhere, for instance
Kolodner [1993].
E.5.1 Displaying similar cases
The most common form of explanation in CBR systems amounts to dis-
playing the most similar case. This technique is used by many research
systems (e.g. CARES [Ong et al., 1997]) and in commercial CBR tools
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such as Orenge (developed by Empolis). In the previous Section, we dis-
cussed some limitations of this approach and recently some researchers
have attempted to address some of these.
Doyle et al. [2004] point out that the most similar case is not necessarily
the most convincing case. When trying to convince his parents to let him
see the latest ‘Harry Potter’ movie, a child knows that friends that are
younger than him are more convincing examples than his best friend even
if he is the closest match in terms of age. Doyle et al. suggest a method
for selecting cases of the same solution class as the problem case that is
closer to a class boundary than the problem case for explanation purposes.
This has the effect of increasing the awareness of class borders in the
user. However, it may also provide evidence that is atypical. Any parent
knows that a child will choose his examples very carefully, avoiding those
children that were not allowed to see the movie.
Recently, research on ensemble classifiers has shown that the aggre-
gated output of a set of classifiers can be more accurate than a single
classifier. Such an approach may make it harder to find a proper case
to display as an explanation to the user. Zenobi and Cunningham [2002]
have addressed this by introducing a meta-layer over the set of case-based
classifiers that perform the aggregation step. Since this technique is also
case-based, it also produces neighbor cases that can be used in explana-
tion.
We have argued that when emphasis is placed on different knowledge
sources than the cases, the nearest case may serve neither the justification
nor the transparency goal. One way of dealing with this problem is to
introduce explanations on multiple layers in the CBR process. The case
may serve as a type of top-level explanation, with more detailed levels
of explanations for each case feature. The feature weighting may be ex-
plained in probability terms and there may also be ways of illustrating the
coverage of cases. In the CREEK system [Aamodt, 2004], the user may ask
for explanations at the attribute level, and the generation of this explana-
tion depends on the similarity measure. A simple example is that when
the similarity of attributes on an interval scale is explained, the range of
all values for this attribute is shown to the user so he can more easily see
how similar they are in the context of known cases.
This method may even be used to provide explanations for non-CBR
systems, as demonstrated by Nugent and Cunningham [2005]. They use
this technique to justify solutions produced by black-box systems such as
neural networks and support vector machines. This is done by extracting
local feature weights for a given solution from the black-box system, and
using these, the most similar case from the training data is retrieved and
displayed to the user as a justification.
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E.5.2 Visualization
Visualization can make it easier for a user to see whether a solution is
correct. In one example, McArdle and Wilson [2003] suggest a technique
where the similarity of a set of cases is projected on a two-dimensional
surface in such a way that the distance between them roughly corresponds
to the similarity. While this is a simplification of the similarity measure, it
allows the user to get an overview of the case space.
Good visualization techniques may at the same time increase the un-
derstanding of the reasoning process and reduce the cognitive load for
the user. As such, visualization techniques may at the same time serve
the justification and transparency goals. One example of this is the way
the FormuCaseViz system [Massie et al., 2004] visualizes how a number
of cases differ on a number of attributes and how this leads to predictions.
This is done by drawing a two-dimensional graph, where each attribute
is represented by a vertical line and the values of the attributes are placed
at intervals along that line. A case is then represented as a line along the
horizontal axis that intersects the attribute lines at the points representing
the value this case has for that attribute. This technique allows at-a-glance
comparisons and makes it very easy for people to spot eventual attributes
where the values of a problem case do not match those of the cases it is
being compared to.
E.5.3 Explanation Models
Knowledge-intensive systems may contain more generalized knowledge
that can be of use to a human user in structuring his own internal model of
the domain. This should allow knowledge-intensive systems to produce
explanations that help in tying general domain knowledge and cases to-
gether. Examples of this are the IBP system [Brüninghaus and Ashley,
2003] and the CATO system [Aleven and Ashley, 1997] where model-
based reasoning is combined with CBR to predict the outcome of legal
cases. This is done by using both older cases and a weak domain model
to produce legal arguments. In these systems the explanation is the solu-
tion, and the explanation (or argument) must be complete (fulfilling the
transparency goal) in order to give justification to the prediction. This
can make the argument complex, but as it uses the same problem-solving
method as courts do in solving these cases, the target users (lawyers) are
able to make sense of them.
It is possible to use models that are built explicitly for explanation, e.g.
models that are not used in the reasoning process and used only to gen-
erate explanations. In CREEK [Aamodt, 1991], the model-based reasoner
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can use a causal model to produce explanations of why observations in
a case can cause or imply the solution suggested by the system. These
explanations are produced purely through backward chaining of causal
relations from a solution already given by the CBR component to find
how it may be connected to the observed features. As such, the explana-
tions produced tend to fulfill the justification goal. The downside is that
these explanations are produced after the fact and are not an accurate
representation of how the system found the solution. It also requires a
knowledge acquisition effort in building the causal model, but this model
can then be tailored to the typical user’s level of expertise.
The Colibri environment [Díaz-Agudo and González-Calero, 2000; Bello-
Thomás et al., 2004] assists the development of systems that utilize a
task/method ontology to make an explicit model of the system struc-
ture. The user can see how the CBR reasoning tasks and problem solving
methods are linked to the model of general domain knowledge. Hence a
transparency of the reasoning process is achieved.
Bergmann et al. [1994] make use of general domain knowledge for ex-
plaining similarity. The mechanism is based on an abstraction method,
involving the modeling of domain knowledge at several levels of abstrac-
tions. The explanation produced justifies the correctness of the solution,
rather than reproducing its trace, and is used both for retrieval and adap-
tation purposes.
E.5.4 Reasoning Trace
The reasoning trace method is feasible in systems that produce expla-
nations as part of the reasoning process. The LID (Lazy Induction of
Descriptions) system [Plaza et al., 2005] is an example of this. LID will
attempt to find the categories that are maximally general while still as
accurately as possible predicting the solution class of member cases. The
induction process is similar to techniques used to induce decision trees,
but is lazily applied at problem solving time. This process leaves a hier-
archy of general-to-specific categories that may serve as an explanation as
to the membership category of the problem case.
The relevance goal can also be fulfilled by offering explanations to the
user that increase the understanding of the reasoning process. The Top
Case mixed-initiative recommender system pursues a strategy where it
selects questions that potentially strengthen the match for its currently
selected best hypothesis case [McSherry, 2005]. This strategy is explained
to the user by showing how an answer to this question could affect the
recommendation. Top Case can for instance ask what region the user
would like to take a holiday in. If the user would like to know why this
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is relevant in recommending a trip, the system can offer an explanation
like “Because if the region = Tyrol this will increase the similarity of Case
510 from 0.28 to 0.44 and eliminate 866 cases, including Case 574”. Be-
cause Top Case always displays the best matching cases found so far, the
user can relate to these case labels and see how his answer affects the
recommendation process.
E.5.5 Case Space Awareness
In case-based reasoning it is important that the transparency goal is not
only applied to the reasoning process but also to the case base itself as
much of the competence of the system lies in its collection of cases. The
visualization techniques discussed above can help to achieve this, as can
displaying similar cases, both opposing and supporting the conclusion.
The Stamping Advisor [Leake et al., 2001a] is a system to support fea-
sibility analysis for the production of sheet metal parts in the automotive
industry. For the feasibility analysis, it is important to understand the
potential problems of a new design. The Stamping Advisor therefore dis-
plays two so called “bracketing cases”, one where an identified problem
exists and the most similar one without the problem. The user can so
more easily identify the limits of the design.
Reilly et al. [2005] suggest that their system’s compound critiques can
play a similar role in recommender systems. The compound critiques
generated by their system identify sets of attribute values that are cor-
related so that the user can see what kind of trade-offs he must make
when deciding on a product. An example is that “higher price” and “big-
ger screen” may correlate when browsing for a TV. While this may not
be an example of explanation in the usual sense, it illustrates that quite
a wide range of techniques may have explanatory properties as long as
they impart knowledge that increase the user’s awareness of the problem
domain.
E.5.6 Contrasting Evidence
The goal of transparency demands that the system does not try to hide
conflicting evidence to its recommendation. In CBR systems this can be
achieved by displaying the most similar case(s) that are not of the pro-
posed solution class to the user. The Stamping Advisor [Leake et al.,
2001a] mentioned in Section E.5.5 displays cases which are close to each
other but with different findings. Compound confidence measures can
also be calculated [as for instance in Cheetham and Price, 2004].
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McSherry’s ProCon system [McSherry, 2004] will identify which at-
tributes of the input case support the suggested solution and which at-
tributes oppose it. The attributes are identified as opposers or supporters
of a solution based on how the attributes affect the probability of the so-
lution. This allows the system to present justifications that are not only
simpler to understand than possibly complex case similarity measures,
but it also helps the user to identify what attributes are important to the
conclusion.
The AHEAD system [Murdock et al., 2003] is an interpretative CBR sys-
tem [Kolodner and Leake, 1996] designed to detect potential asymmetric
threat situations (such as a terrorist attack). A situational interpretation is
formed by constructing a trace of events, attempting to match it to pro-
totypical threat situations. When matching this trace, AHEAD attempts
to justify its conclusion by forming an argument that lists factors for and
against the hypothesis based on what matches and does not match the ex-
pected findings in the prototypical threat situation. This allows the user to
see evidence both for and against the conclusion. The difference between
how AHEAD and ProCon identify contrastive evidence is that AHEAD is
a knowledge-rich system where expectations about threat situations are
modeled in advance by an expert, while ProCon uses machine learning
techniques to generalize such knowledge from the case base.
E.5.7 Simplified Problem Solving Strategy
The conversational CBR community has developed methods that are par-
ticular to the relevance explanation goal. One such method is used by the
Strategist system [McSherry, 1998], a mixed-initiative conversational diag-
nosis system where the user may enter a dialog where he is asked a single
question at a time. The original Strategist induced a decision tree from a
set of instances with the explicit goal that for each question the user is
asked, the system would be able to give a good explanation for why this
question was important to answer. The extension of Strategist into a CBR
system [McSherry, 2001] does not form a decision tree in advance, but the
question selection method is the same. As an example, the system prefers
questions that could confirm or eliminate possible outcome classes in the
domain. This allows it to form simple explanations of the relevance of
questions the user is asked. In the computer fault domain, for example,
the relevance of the question “Can you hear the fan?” might be explained,
in the context of other reported evidence, by telling the user “Because if
the fan cannot be heard this will confirm faulty power cord as a possible
cause” [McSherry, 2001, Figure 7].
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E.5.8 Concept Maps
Semantic network representation of knowledge such as in the CREEK
system [Aamodt, 1991; Sørmo and Aamodt, 2002] may provide some ex-
planatory support showing the part of the network around the concept
the user is interested in. In particular this method may further the con-
ceptualization goal by showing how the system views concepts in rela-
tion to other concepts and thus helps the user understand the system’s
conceptualization. Methods for sharing conceptualizations through two-
dimensional visual-based representations are often referred to as topic or
concept maps. There has been some work using these in CBR [e.g. Leake
et al., 2001b], although the focus on this work has so far not been on its
use for explanation.
E.5.9 Machine Learning Induction
The learning goal seems to have a strong preference for knowledge-in-
tensive methods, but generalization may also be done lazily by a number
of machine-learning algorithms. The CBR Strategist [McSherry, 2001] and
ProCon [McSherry, 2003, 2004] systems mentioned earlier are examples of
this as they do induction when presenting an explanation to the user, but
they do so lazily. In the example in Section E.5.7, CBR Strategist observed
that all surviving cases with “fan cannot be heard” have the same solution
(“faulty power cord”) and can inform the user that this feature is enough
to confirm the solution. The CBR Strategist system may be fairly effective
in training users in the skill of identifying computer faults. A limitation of
this approach is that the system cannot introduce higher-order concepts
or relate to how generalized concepts are used in the environment outside
the system.
E.6 Challenges
Recently, there has been a renewed focus on explanation in case-based
reasoning. There are, however, still many challenges that remain to be
addressed. In this section we identify four such challenges for the future
of explanation research in CBR.
E.6.1 Maintaining Transparency in Complex Systems
Displaying the closest case is quite near the actual reasoning process in
simple case-based reasoning systems, but when more advanced methods
like feature weighting and complex similarity measures are introduced,
it will be necessary to provide additional information in order to fulfill
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the transparency goal. For example, in a k-nearest neighbor system, the
transparency goal is no longer fulfilled by only displaying the best case
if k > 1. The difficulty for the user in comparing cases increases as the
case structure becomes more complex and the similarity measures more
convoluted. It also increases with the use of more complex adaptation
techniques where the retrieved case may not be the most similar but one
which fits the adaptation process [e.g. Smyth and Keane, 1998].
In general, it can be argued that the use of other AI technologies in the
CBR cycle (as suggested e.g. by Ian Watson [1999]) increases the difficulty
for the user to see the explanative character of the case since it is neces-
sary to have an at least intuitive understanding of the different techniques
used in order to understand why the case presented offers a solution to
the problem. If we cannot expect such an understanding, the steps taken
by the different components also have to be explained. For example, con-
sider a system where the case contain image data, and the similarity of
two images is assessed by a neural network. Then the similarity mea-
sured through the neural network will have to be explained alongside the
presented case – at least if complete transparency is the goal.
One way of dealing with this problem, as suggested in Section E.5.1, is
to introduce explanations on multiple layers in the CBR process. The case
may serve as a type of top-level explanation, with more detailed levels
of explanations for each case feature. One problem with this approach is
that although it satisfies the transparency goal, the cognitive load of the
user increases as similarity measures increase in complexity. This has the
interesting effect that as case-based systems grow more complex and are
more able to help with exceedingly hard problems, the value of the case
as an explanation may go down.
E.6.2 Providing Justification to Novice Users
As we have mentioned before there is an implicit assumption in present-
ing the case to the user that he is able to do a similarity comparison
himself. Just as an explanation may not be required when the solution
offered by a system matches the beliefs of the user, an explanation may
not be necessary when the similarity between two cases is obvious. No
new knowledge is required from the system in these cases in order for the
conclusion to be accepted.
In complex domains with complex similarity measures, the similarity
may not be so clear, especially to novice users. This has been seen in other
kinds of knowledge-based systems, where explanation methods based on
showing in detail how the problem-solver found the answer was deemed
too complex to be useful by actual users [Majchrzak and Gasser, 1991]. For
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the novice users, a multi-level reasoning trace places a high cognitive load
on the user and may be too complex or too time consuming to understand.
In Section E.5, we have reviewed methods for simplifying this explanation
as a means to achieve the justification goal, but many of these come at a
cost to the fidelity of the explanation. While this may be acceptable in
some domains, it is usually a goal to find simplification methods that
preserve as much of the fidelity as possible. If a system uses justification
explanations to overstate its confidence in the conclusion, it is likely that
the user’s confidence in the system will decrease over time.
However, research in the cognitive science and expert systems com-
munities suggest that the goal of the user is not necessarily to gain an
understanding of how the system solved the problem. When presented
with a similar case, it may not be obvious to the user why the solution of
the retrieved case was good even for the retrieved case itself. For these
situations, providing justification explanations that do not stem from the
reasoning process is not misleading the user but is addressing a different
explanation goal.
E.6.3 Connecting Cases to General Knowledge in Tutoring
Cognitive theories of learning [e.g. Schank, 1983] assume that people start
learning in a new domain by looking at concrete cases, or episodes. At
some point, however, humans start to generalize the concrete episodes.
This is in contrast to those approaches to CBR that rely on pure just-
in-time induction. These lazy learners are well equipped to provide the
student with example cases, and although this can be useful, they are ill
equipped for assisting the learner in generalizing from these examples.
Today, most systems that attempt to tutor rely on generalized knowl-
edge in addition to cases. Janet Kolodner’s [1997] more recent work takes
this approach, as does our own [Sørmo and Aamodt, 2002; Sørmo, 2005].
As mentioned in the previous section, there are knowledge-light tech-
niques that do produce generalizations that may be useful for learning
in humans (e.g. CBR Strategist [McSherry, 2001] and ProCon [McSherry,
2004]), but these techniques are currently not applied to tutoring.
E.6.4 Scope of Explanation Efforts
In Section E.4, we noted that the case-as-explanation method uses only
one of the four knowledge containers Richter identified in CBR [Richter,
1995] – the case base. Competence arising from the three other containers
(similarity measure, adaptation knowledge and vocabulary) is not used
for explanation. We have surveyed several innovative methods (e.g. For-
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muCaseViz [Massie et al., 2004] and ProCon [McSherry, 2004]) that explain
and visualize the similarity measure, but after CASEY [Koton, 1988], we
have seen few efforts at explaining adaptation or vocabulary.
In our own research, we are working on combining different views on
explanation. The goal is to integrate them into the CBR system design
process in order to be able to make better use of the explanatory potential
of the different knowledge containers [Roth-Berghofer et al., 2005; Roth-
Berghofer and Cassens, 2005].
A parallel to the above is seen if we look at explanation efforts in the
light of the CBR Cycle [Aamodt and Plaza, 1994]. Explanation efforts seem
to focus on the retrieve step with little effort used to explain the other three
steps (revise, reuse and retain). This is perhaps a natural consequence of
the greater focus retrieve receives in problem-solving, but a CBR system
that does not, for instance, retain all cases should be able to explain why
a case is dropped or merged into another.
E.7 Conclusions
We have surveyed theories of explanation from the philosophy of science,
linguistic and cognitive science communities, and also attempted to draw
on the experiences with explanations from the expert-systems community
in AI. From these theories and experiences, we believe it is useful to ana-
lyze the explanation requirements in the form of explanation goals. The
goals that an explanation is required to achieve vary with the domain,
system, and user. It can be hard to model these dynamically for the sys-
tem itself, but the designer of the system can often make assumptions
about the goals and capabilities of prototypical users of the system. We
also believe that explicitly formulating such explanation goals facilitates
the discussion of possible conflicts between goals and makes clear how
different approaches tend to favor different types of goals. Although the
goals discussed in this paper are abstract goals made to fit a wide range
of CBR systems, they are not an attempt at completeness. There will be
some CBR systems that fall outside the situational context we have de-
fined for our explanation goals, and individual systems will also benefit
from formulating more specific explanation goals that are tailored to their
context.
In knowledge-intensive systems there has been continuous work on ex-
planation, but recently this topic has received wider interest as exem-
plified by many of the methods we survey in Section E.5 of this paper.
However, these have mainly been focused on the retrieve step in the CBR
cycle. Although we are starting to see explanation methods that address
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competence arising from the similarity-measure knowledge container in
addition to the case base, methods explaining vocabulary and adaptation
are still rare.
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The following aspects were jointly developed by the authors:
• Description of context in cognition
• The mapping between the meronomy and basic aspects of AT is the
result of many sessions in front of a whiteboard
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F.1 Introduction
The original vision of ubiquitous computing proposed by Weiser [1991]
envisioned a world of simple electronic artefacts, which could assist users
in their day to day activities. This vision has grown significantly. Today
the world of ubiquitous computing, pervasive computing or ambient in-
telligence uses visions and scenarios that are far more complex. Many of
the scenarios of today envision pro-active and intelligent environments,
which are capable of making assumptions and selections on their own
accord.
Several examples exist in the contemporary literature, such as the help
Fred receives from the omnipresent system Aura in Satyanarayanan [2001,
p. 3], and the automagic way that Maria gets help on her business trip in
Ducatel et al. [2001, p. 4]. More examples and comments can be found
in Lueg [2002a]. Common to many of these examples are the degree
of autonomy, common sense reasoning, and situation understanding the
systems involved exhibit.
To be truly pro-active and be able to display even a simple level of
common sense reasoning, an entity must be able to appreciate the en-
vironment which it inhabits; or to understand the situations that occur
around it. When humans interpret situations, the concept of context be-
comes important. Humans use an abundance of more or less subtle cues
as context and thereby understand, or at least assess, situations. The abil-
ity to acquire context and thereby fashion an understanding of situations,
is equally important for artefacts that wish to interact (intelligently) with
the real world. Systems displaying this ability to acquire and react to
context are known as context-aware systems.
A major shortfall of the research into context-aware systems is the lack
of a common understanding of what a context model is, and perhaps
more importantly, what it is not. This shortfall is very natural, since this
lack of an agreed definition of context also plagues the real world. No
common understanding of what context is and how it is used exists. So,
it is hardly surprising that it is hard to agree on the artificial world that
IT systems represent.
Most of the research today has been focused on the technical issues as-
sociated with context, and the syntactic relationships between different
concepts. Not so much attention has been given to context from a knowl-
edge level [Newell, 1982] perspective or an analysis of context on the level
of socio-technical systems [Lueg, 2002b].
This is the main reason for the approach chosen here. It should be fea-
sible to look at how we can use socio-technical theories to design context-
aware systems to supply better services to the user, in a flexible and man-
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ageable way. The approach should facilitate modelling at the knowledge
level as well and furthermore enable the integration of different knowl-
edge sources and the presentation of knowledge content to the user.
It can be stated that one of the most important context parameters avail-
able in many situations is the activity performed by an entity present in
the environment. We therefore believe that by focusing on activities we
will gain a better understanding of context and context awareness; thus
bringing us closer to realise truly ambient intelligent systems.
Several approaches to examine activity have been proposed, like e.g.
Actor-Network Theory [Latour, 1988], Situated Action [Suchman, 1987]
or the Locales Framework [Fitzpatrick, 1998]. One of the most intrigu-
ing theories, however, is Activity Theory based on the works of Vygotsky
[1978, 1985]; Leont’ev [1978]. This work proposes the use of Activity The-
ory to model context and to describe situations.
Although our approach is general, in the sense that it is applicable to
different domains, we are not trying to define a context model which will
empower the system to be universally context aware, meaning it will be
able to build its own context model on the fly. Although this would be a
prerequisite for truly intelligent systems, IT-systems are usually designed
for specific purposes and with specific tasks in mind where the system
has to support human users. They are used by people with specific needs
and qualifications, and should preferably adapt to changes in these needs
over time [McSherry, 2002; Totterdell and Rautenbach, 1990]. The aim of
the work presented in this article is to assist the design of such systems
which are tailored to support such kind of human work.
This article is organised as follows: first some background work on the
use of context in cognition is covered. Secondly, some important concepts
of Activity Theory are introduced. This is followed by an explanation
of how Activity Theory can be utilised to model contextual information,
including an illustrative example. In Section F.5, the knowledge model, in-
cluding context employed in this work, is described. Finally, some point-
ers for future work are presented.
F.2 Context in Cognition
The concept of context is closely related to reasoning and cognition in
humans. Even though context might be important for reasoning in other
animals, it is common knowledge that context is of huge importance in
human reasoning.
Beside the more mechanistic view on reasoning advocated by neuro-
science, psychology and philosophy play important roles in understand-
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ing human cognition. It might not be obvious how computer science is
related to knowledge about human cognition. However, many sub-fields
in computer science are influenced by our knowledge about humans; and
other animals.
The field of Artificial Intelligence has the most obvious relations to the
study of reasoning in the real world, most prominently psychology and
philosophy. Since AI and psychology are very closely related and con-
text is an important aspect of human reasoning, context also plays an
important role in the understanding and implementation of Artificial In-
telligence.
AI has historically been closely connected to formal logic. Formal logic
is concerned with explicit representation of knowledge. This leads to
the need to codify all facts that could be of importance. This strict view
on objective truth is also known in certain directions within philosophy,
where such a concept of knowledge as an objective truth exists. This can
be traced back to e.g. the logic of Aristotle who believed that some subset
of knowledge had that characteristic (Episteme). This view stands in stark
contrast to the views advocated by people such as Polanyi, who argues
that no such objective truth exists and all knowledge is at some point
personal and hidden (tacit) [Polanyi, 1964].
Since context is an elusive type of knowledge, where it is hard to quan-
tify what type of knowledge is useful in a certain situation, and possibly
why, it is obvious that it does not fit very well with the strict logical view
on how to model the world. Ekbia and Maguitman [2001] argue that this
has led to the fact that context has largely been ignored by the AI com-
munity. This observation still holds some truth, despite some earlier work
on context and AI, like Doug Lenat’s discussion of context dimensions
[Lenat, 1998], and the other work we discuss later in this section.
Ekbia andMaguitman’s paper is not a recipe on how to incorporate con-
textual reasoning into logistic systems, but rather an attempt to point out
the deficiencies and suggest possible directions AI could take to include
context. Their work builds on the work by the American philosopher
John Dewey. According to Ekbia and Maguitman, Dewey distinguishes
between two main categories of context: spatial and temporal context, co-
herently know as background context; and selective interest. The spatial
context covers all contemporary parameters. The temporal context con-
sists of both intellectual and existential context. The intellectual context is
what we would normally label as background knowledge, such as tradi-
tion, mental habits, and science. Existential context is combined with the
selective interest related to the notion of situation. A situation is in this
work viewed as a confused, obscure, and conflicting thing, where a hu-
man reasoner attempts to make sense of this through the use of context.
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This view, by Dewey, on human context leads to the following suggestion
by the pragmatic approach [Ekbia and Maguitman, 2001, p. 5]:
1. Context, most often, is not explicitly identifiable.
2. There are no sharp boundaries among contexts.
3. The logical aspects of thinking cannot be isolated from material con-
siderations.
4. Behaviour and context are jointly recognisable.
Once these premises have been set, the authors show that the logical
approach to (artificial) reasoning has not dealt with context in any consis-
tent way. The underlying argument is that AI has been using an absolute
separation between mind and nature, thus leading to the problems associ-
ated with the use of context. This view on the inseparability of mind and
nature is also based on Dewey’s work. This view is not unique for Dewey.
In recent years this view has been proposed in robotics as situatedness by
Brooks [1987, 1991a,b], and in ecological psychology by Gibson [1979].
Through the discussion of different logic-based AI methods and sys-
tems, the authors argue that AI has not yet parted company with the
limitations of logic with regards to context. Furthermore, they stress the
point of intelligence being action-oriented; based on the notion of situa-
tions described above.
The notion of intelligence being action-oriented, thus making context a
tool for selecting the correct action, is shared by many people within the
computer science milieu. Most notably the work by Strat [1993], where
context is applied to select the most suitable algorithm for recognition in
computer vision, and by Öztürk and Aamodt [1998] who utilised context
to improve the quality and efficiency of Case-Based Reasoning.
Strat [1993] reports on the work done in computer vision to use contex-
tual information in guiding the selection of algorithms in image under-
standing. When humans observe a scene they utilise a large amount of
information (context) not captured in the particular image. At the same
time, all image understanding algorithms use some assumptions in order
to function, creating an epistemic bias. Examples are algorithms that only
work on binary images, or that are not able to handle occlusions.
Strat defines three main categories of context: physical, being general
information about the visual world independent of the conditions under
which the image was taken; photogrammetric, which is the information
related the acquisition of the image; and computational, being information
about the internal state of the processing. The main idea in this work is
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to use context to guide the selection of the image-processing algorithms
to use on particular images. This is very much in line with the ideas
proposed by Ekbia and Maguitman, where intelligence is action-oriented,
and context can be used to bring order to diffuse and unclear situations.
This action-orientated view on reasoning and use of context is also ad-
vocated by Öztürk and Aamodt [1998]. They argue that the essential
aspects of context are the notion of relevance and focus. To facilitate im-
provements to Case-Based Reasoning a context model is constructed. This
model builds on the work by Hewitt, where the notion of intrinsic and ex-
trinsic context types are central. According to Hewitt, intrinsic context is
information related to the target item in a reasoning process, and extrinsic
is the information not directly related to the target item. This distinction
is closely related to the concepts of selective interest and background context
as described by Dewey. The authors refine this view by focusing on the
intertwined relationship between the agent doing the reasoning, and the
characteristics of the problem to be solved. This is exactly the approach
recognised as being missing in AI by Ekbia and Maguitman.
Öztürk and Aamodt build a taxonomy of context categories based on
this merger of the two different worlds of information (internal vs. exter-
nal). Beside this categorisation, the authors impose the action, or task,
oriented view on knowledge in general, and contextual knowledge in
particular. The goal of an agent focuses the attention, and thereby the
knowledge needed to execute tasks associated with the goal. The exam-
ple domain in their paper is from medical diagnostics, where a physi-
cian attempts to diagnose a patient by the hypothesise-and-test strategy.
The particular method of diagnostics in this Case-Based Reasoning sys-
tem is related to the strategy used by Strat. They differ insofar that Strat
used contextual information to select the algorithms to be used, whereas
Öztürk and Aamodt have, prior to run-time, defined the main structure
of a diagnostic situation, and only use context to guide the sub-tasks in
this process.
Zibetti et al. [2001] focus on the problem of how agents understand sit-
uations based on the information they can perceive. To our knowledge,
this work is the only one that does not attempt to build an explicit on-
tology on contextual information prior to run-time. The idea is to build
a (subjective) taxonomy of ever-complex situations solely based on what
a particular agent gathers from the environment in general, and the be-
haviour of other agents in particular.
The implementation used to exemplify this approach contains a number
of agents “living” in a two-dimensional world, where they try to make
sense of the world by assessing the spatial changes to the environment.
Obviously the acquisition of knowledge starting with a tabula rasa is a
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long and tedious task for any entity. To speed up the process the authors
predefined some categories with which the system is instantiated.
All in all, this approach lies in between a complete bottom-up and the
top-down approaches described earlier.
F.3 Activity Theory
In this section, we concentrate on the use of Activity Theory (AT) to sup-
port the modelling of context. Our aim is to use AT to analyse the use of
technical artefacts as instruments for achieving a predefined goal in the
work process as well as the role of social components, like the division
of labour and community rules. This helps us to understand what pieces
of knowledge are involved and the social and technological context used
when solving a given problem.
First in this section, we will give a short summary of aspects of AT that
are important for this work. See Nardi [2003] for a short introduction to
AT and Bødker [1991]; Nardi [1996a] for deeper coverage. The theoretical
foundations of AT in general can be found in the works of Vygotsky [1978,
1985]; Leont’ev [1978].
Activity Theory is a descriptive tool to help understand the unity of
consciousness and activity. Its focus lies on individual and collective work
practise. One of its strengths is the ability to identify the role of material
artefacts in the work process. An activity (Fig. F.1) is composed of a
subject, an object, and a mediating artefact or tool. A subject is a person
or a group engaged in an activity. An object is held by the subject, and
the subject has a goal directed towards the object he wants to achieve,
motivating the activity and giving it a specific direction.
Artefact
ObjectSubject
Figure F.1.: Activity Theory: The basic triangle of Mediation
Some basic properties of Activity Theory are:
• Hierarchical structure of activity: Activities (the topmost category)
are composed of goal-directed actions. These actions are performed
consciously. Actions, in turn, consist of non-conscious operations.
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• Object-orientedness: Objective and socially or culturally defined
properties. Our way of doing work is grounded in a praxis which
is shared by our co-workers and determined by tradition. The way
an artefact is used and the division of labour influences the design.
Hence, artefacts pass on the specific praxis they are designed for.
• Mediation: Human activity is mediated by tools, language, etc. The
artefacts as such are not the object of our activities, but appear al-
ready as socio-cultural entities.
• Continuous Development: Both the tools used and the activity itself
are constantly reshaped. Tools reflects accumulated social knowl-
edge, hence they transport social history back into the activity and
to the user.
• Distinction between internal and external activities: Traditional
cognitive psychology focuses on what is denoted internal activities
in Activity Theory, but it is emphasized that these mental processes
cannot be properly understood when separated from external activ-
ities, that is the interaction with the outside world.
Taking a closer look on the hierarchical structure of activity, we can find
the following levels:
• Activity: An individual activity is for example to check into a hotel,
or to travel to another city to participate at a conference. Individ-
ual activities can be part of collective activities, e.g. when someone
organises a workshop with some co-workers.
• Actions: Activities consist of a collections of actions. An action is
performed consciously, the hotel check-in, for example, consists of
actions like presenting the reservation, confirmation of room types,
and handover of keys.
• Operations: Actions consist themselves of collections of non-con-
scious operations. To stay with our hotel example, writing your
name on a sheet of paper or taking the keys are operations. That
operations happen non-consciously does not mean that they are not
accessible.
It is important to note that this hierarchical composition is not fixed
over time. If an action fails, the operations comprising the action can
get conceptualised, they become conscious operations and might become
actions in the next attempt to reach the overall goal. This is referred to as a
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Artefact
ObjectSubject
Division of LabourCommunityRules
Figure F.2.: Cultural Historical Activity Theory: Expanded triangle, incor-
porating the community and other mediators.
breakdown situation. In the same manner, actions can become automated
when done many times and thus become operations. In this way, we gain
the ability to model a change over time.
An expanded model of Activity Theory, Cultural Historical Activity
Theory (CHAT), covers the fact that human work is done in a social and
cultural context [compare e.g. Kutti, 1996; Mwanza, 2000]. The expanded
model (depicted in Fig. F.2) takes this aspect into account by adding a
community component and other mediators, especially rules (an accumu-
lation of knowledge about how to do something) and the division of labour.
In order to be able to model that several subjects can share the same
object, we add the community to represent that a subject is embedded in
a social context. Now we have relationships between subject and commu-
nity and between object and community, respectively. These relationships
are themselves mediated, with rules regarding to the subject and the di-
vision of labour regarding to the object.
This expanded model of AT is the starting point for our use of AT in
the modelling of context for intelligent systems.
178
F.4. Activity Theory and Context Awareness
F.4 Activity Theory and Context Awareness
The next step is to identify which aspects of an Activity Theory based
analysis can help us to capture a knowledge level view of contextual
knowledge that should be incorporated into an intelligent system. This
contextual knowledge should include knowledge about the acting sub-
jects, the objects towards which activities are directed and the community
as well as knowledge about the mediating components, like rules or tools.
F.4.1 Activity Theory for the Identification of Context Components
As an example, we want the contextual knowledge to contain both in-
formation about the acting subject itself (like the weight or size) and the
tools (like a particular software used in a software development process).
To this end, we propose a mapping from the basic structure of an activ-
ity into a taxonomy of contextual knowledge as depicted in Table F.1 (the
taxonomy is described in more detail in Section F.5). We can see that the
personal context contains information we would associate with the acting
subject itself.
Table F.1.: Basic aspects of an activity and their relation to a taxonomy of
contextual knowledge
CHAT aspect Category
Subject Personal Context
Object Task Context
Community Spatio-Temporal Context
Mediating Artefact Environmental Context
Mediating Rules Task Context
Mediating Division of Labour Social Context
We would like to point out that we do not think that a strict one to one
mapping exists or is desirable at all. Our view on contextual knowledge
is contextualised itself in the sense that different interpretations exist, and
what is to be considered contextual information in one setting is part of
the general knowledge model in another one. Likewise, the same piece of
knowledge can be part of different categories based on the task at hand.
The same holds for the AT based analysis itself: the same thing can
be an object and a mediating artefact from different perspectives and in
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different task settings. The mapping suggested here should lead the de-
velopment process and allow the designer to focus on knowledge-level
aspects instead of being lost in the modelling of details without being
able to see the relationship between different aspects on a socio-technical
system level.
Artefact
ObjectSubject
Division of LabourCommunityRules
Outcome
Environmental Context
Personal Context
Task Context Spatio-Temporal Context Social Context
Task Context
Figure F.3.: Mapping from Activity Theory to context model
As an example, let us consider a software development setting where a
team is programming a piece of software for a client. The members of the
team are all subjects in the development process. They form a community
together with representatives of the client and other stake-holders. Each
member of the team and personnel from other divisions of the software
company work together in a division of labour. The object at hand is the
unfinished prototype, which has to be transformed into something that
can be handed over to the client. The task is governed by a set of rules,
some explicit like coding standards some implicit like what is often re-
ferred to as a working culture. The programmers use a set of mediating
artefacts (tools), like methods for analysis and design, programming tools,
and documentation.
When we design a context-aware system for the support of this task, we
include information about the user of the system (subject) in the personal
context and about the other teammembers in the environmental context. As-
pects regarding the special application a developer is working on (objects)
are part of the task context, it will change when the same user engages
in a different task (lets say he is looking for a restaurant). The rules are
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part of the task context since they are closely related to the task at hand
– coding standards will not be helpful when trying to find a restaurant.
We find the tool aspects (artefacts) in the environmental context since access
to the different tools is important for the ability of the user to use them.
Knowledge about his co-workers and other stake-holders (community) are
modelled in the spatio-temporal context. Finally, his interaction with other
team members (division of labour) is described as part of the social context.
In the design process, we can also make use of the hierarchical struc-
ture of activities. On the topmost level, we can identify the activities the
context-aware system should support. By this, we can restrict the world
view of the system and make the task of developing a context model
manageable. Further on, we can make use of the notion of actions to iden-
tify the different situations the system can encounter. This helps us to
asses the different knowledge sources and artefacts involved in different
contexts, thereby guiding the knowledge acquisition task. Finally, since
operations are performed subconsciously, we get hints on which processes
should be supported by automatic and proactive behaviour of the system.
Let us consider our example again. We know that the activity we want
to support is the development of an IT system. Therefore, we can restrict
ourselves to facets of the world which are related to the design process,
and we do not (necessarily) have to take care of supporting e.g. meetings
some of the teammembers have as players at the company’s football team.
On the other hand, the system has to be concerned with meetings with the
customer. Further on, different actions which are also part of the activity
should be supported, like e.g. team meetings or programming sessions,
and the different actions involved can lead to the definition of different
situations or contexts.
A context-aware application should therefore at all times know in which
action the user is engaged. This is, in fact, the main aspect of our under-
standing of the term context awareness. At last, to support the operations of
the user, it might be necessary to proactively query different knowledge
sources or request other resources the user might need without being ex-
plicitly told to do so by the user. This is at the core of what we refer to
as context sensitivity in order to distinguish between these two different
aspects of context.
It is important to keep in mind that the hierarchical structure of ac-
tivities is in a constant state of flux. Activity Theory is also capable of
capturing changing contexts in break-down situations. Lets consider that
a tool used in the development process, such as a compiler, stops work-
ing. The operation of evoking the compiler now becomes a conscious
action for the debugging process. The focus of the developer shifts away
from the client software to the compiler. He will now be involved in a
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different task where he probably will have to work together with the sys-
tem administrators of his work-station. In this sense other aspects of the
activity, such as the community, change as well. It is clear that the con-
textual model should reflect these changes. The ability of Activity Theory
to identify possible break-down situations makes it possible for the sys-
tem designer to identify these possible shifts in situation and model the
anticipated behaviour of the system.
F.4.2 Other Aspects of Activity Theory and Context
Other work on the use of AT in modelling context has been conducted
e.g. by Kaenampornpan and O’Neill [2004]. This work is focusing on
modelling features of the world according to an activity theoretic model.
However, the authors do not carry out a knowledge level analysis of the
activities. We argue that our knowledge intensive approach has the ad-
vantage of giving the system the ability to reason about context so that it
does not have to rely on pattern matching only. This is helpful especially
in situations where not all the necessary features are accessible by the sys-
tem, for example because of limits of sensory input in mobile applications.
On the other hand, Kaenampornpan and O’Neill further on develop a no-
tion of history of context in order to elicit a users goals [Kaenampornpan
and O’Neill, 2005]. This work deals with the interesting problem of repre-
senting the user’s history in context models which we have not addressed
explicitly in this article.
Li et al. [2004] propose an activity based design tool for context aware
applications. The authors’ focus lies not on the use of Activity Theory in
the context model itself but on supporting the designer of context aware
applications with a rapid-prototyping tool. An interesting idea is the pro-
posed integration of temporal probabilistic models.
Wiberg and Olsson [1999] make also use of Activity Theory, but their
focus lies on the design of context aware tangible artefacts. The usage
situation is well defined upfront and no reasoning about the context has
to be done.
When we look at the design of IT-systems in general and not only the
issue of context-awareness, we find that Activity Theory has been applied
to many different areas of system development. For example, AT was
used in health care settings as a tool to support development of informa-
tion systems [Korpela et al., 2001]. It has also been used in the design of
augmented reality systems, as reported in Fjeld et al. [2002] and for a pos-
teriori analysis of computer systems in use [Bødker, 1996]. A comparative
survey of five different AT based methods for information systems de-
velopment with pointers to additional examples was conducted by Quek
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and Shah [2004].
In our own work, we are also using Activity Theory to support mod-
elling other, not context depending aspects of intelligent systems. For
example are we focusing on breakdown situations in order to enhance
the explanatory capabilities of knowledge-rich Case-Based Reasoning sys-
tems [Cassens, 2004].
F.5 Context model
The context model used in this work draws on a subjective view on situa-
tions. That is, even though the model is general, any instance of the model
belongs to one user only. Thus, as in Zibetti et al. [2001], any situation will
be described form the personal perspective, leading to the possibility of
many instances describing the “same” situation. This is in contrast to
the leading perspective, where a system will describe objective situations,
and leans towards Polanyi’s perspective of all knowledge being personal
[Polanyi, 1964].
In the extreme consequence the model used by any subject could also
be personal and unique. However, to avoid the problem of a tabula rasa
we have chosen a pragmatical view on how to model context. The model
is based on the definition of context given by Dey [2001], applying the
following definition:
Context is the set of suitable environmental states and set-
tings concerning a user, which are relevant for a situation sen-
sitive application in the process of adapting the services and
information offered to the user.
This definition from Dey does not explicitly state that context is viewed
as knowledge. However, we believe that the knowledge intensive ap-
proach is required if we wish a system to display many of the character-
istics mentioned in the introduction. At the same time we also adhere to
the view advocated by Brézillon and Pomerol [1999] that context is not a
special kind of knowledge. They argue that context is in the eye of the
beholder: “. . . knowledge that can be qualified as ‘contextual’ depends on
the context!” [Brézillon and Pomerol, 1999, p.7]
Even though we argue for a context model where context is not a spe-
cial type of information, we also believe that only a pragmatical view on
context will enable us to construct actually working systems. Following
this pragmatic view we impose a taxonomy on the context model in the
design phase (see Fig. F.4). This taxonomy is inherited from the context-
aware tradition and adopted to make use of the general concepts we find
in Activity Theory.
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User Context
Environmental ContextTask Context Social Context Spatio-Temporal Context
Mental ContextPhysiological Context
Personal Context
Figure F.4.: Context taxonomy
The context is divided into five sub-categories (a more thorough discus-
sion can be found in Göker and Myrhaug [2002] or Kofod-Petersen and
Mikalsen [2005b]):
1. Environmental context: This part captures the users surroundings,
such as things, services, people, and information accessed by the
user.
2. Personal context: This part describes the mental and physical infor-
mation about the user, such as mood, expertise and disabilities.
3. Social context: This describes the social aspects of the user, such as
information about the different roles a user can assume.
4. Task context: the task context describe what the user is doing, it can
describe the user’s goals, tasks and activities.
5. Spatio-temporal context: This type of context is concerned with
attributes like: time, location and the community present.
The model depicted in Fig. F.4 shows the top-level ontology. To enable
the reasoning in the system this top-level structure is integrated with a
more general domain ontology, which describes concepts of the domain
(e.g., Operating Theatre, Ward, Nurse, Journal) as well as more generic
concepts (Task, Goal, Action, Physical Object) in a multi-relational seman-
tic network. The model enables the system to infer relationships between
concepts by constructing context-dependent paths between them. We are
approaching the situation assessment by applying knowledge-intensive
Case-Based Reasoning [Aamodt, 2004]. One of the important aspects of
knowledge-intensive Case-Based Reasoning is the ability to match two
case features that are syntactically different, by explaining why they are
similar [Aamodt, 1994; Jære et al., 2002].
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The generic concepts are partly gathered through the use of activity
theoretic analysis. These concepts include the six aspects shown in Fig.
F.3. The top-level taxonomy including the concepts acquired from AT is
depicted in Fig. F.5. The context model is now primed to model situations
and the activities occurring within them.
User Context
Mental ContextPhysiological Context
Personal Context
part of part of
part of part of part of part of part of
Service
Environmental Context
ArtefactPerson
Goal Action
Task Context
Task
Rule
Social Context
Role
Spatio-Temporal Context
LocationTime Community
part of part of part of part of part of
part of
part of
part of
achieves triggers
results in performs
offers
has ahas a
cast inhas a
part of
Figure F.5.: Populated context structure
If we look at the model we can see how each of the AT aspects are
modelled. The artefact exists within the environmental context, where it can
offer services that can perform actions, which assist the subject (described in
the personal context) in achieving the goals of the role (in the social context)
played by the subject. Other persons, being part of the situation through
the environmental context, can also affect the outcome (goal) of the situa-
tion. They are cast in different roles that are part of the community existing
in the spatio-temporal context. The roles also implicitly define the division of
labour in the community. The rules governing the subject are found in the
task context.
F.6 Ongoing and Future Work
We have outlined how the design of context-aware systems can bene-
fit from an analysis of the underlying socio-technical system. We have
introduced a knowledge-level perspective on the modelling task, which
makes it possible to identify aspects of knowledge that should be mod-
elled into the system in order to support the user with contextual infor-
mation. We have furthermore proposed a first mapping from an Activity
Theory based analysis to different knowledge components of a context
model. The basic aspects of our socio-technical model fit nicely to the
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taxonomy of context categories we have introduced before, thus making
AT a prime candidate for further research.
The use of Activity Theory allows for system designers to develop the
general models of activities and situations. General models are neces-
sary to support the initial usage of the system. They are an important
prerequisite for the Case-Based Reasoning system to integrate new situa-
tions; thereby adapting to the personal and subjective perspective of the
individual user.
In Section F.5 we have formulated the problem of identifying the tasks
connected to a particular situation, the goals of the user, and the arte-
facts and information sources used. We argue that our Activity Theory
based approach is capable of integrating these cognitive aspects into the
modelling process.
The integration of an a posteriorimethod of analysis with design method-
ologies is always challenging. One advantage AT has is that it is process
oriented, which corresponds to a view on systems design where the de-
ployed system itself is not static and where the system is able to incor-
porate new knowledge over time [Aamodt, 1995]. Activity Theory has its
blind spots, such as modelling the user interaction of the interface level.
However, in this particular work we are not focusing on user interfaces;
thus, these deficiencies do not affect this work directly. Still, one of our
future goal is to combine AT with other theories into a framework of dif-
ferent methods supporting the systems design process [Cassens, 2005].
Nevertheless, one of the next steps is to formalise the relationship be-
tween different elements of an AT based analysis and the knowledge con-
tained in the different contextual aspects of our model. This more for-
malised relationship is being put to the test on a context modelling task,
using an AT based analysis of a socio-technical system to support the
design of our context-aware intelligent system (see for an example Kofod-
Petersen and Mikalsen [2005a] for a description of the system).
We have recently initiated a project where everyday situations in a
health care setting are being observed and documented. These obser-
vations are being used to test the situation assessment capabilities of our
system. We have used a modelling approach based on Cultural Histor-
ical Activity Theory. This allows us to identify the different actions the
medical staff is involved with and the artefacts and information sources
used.
We have already instantiated a context model for this scenario using the
topology described earlier in this paper. We are currently in the process
of populating the model based on our observations. At the same time, we
are refining our knowledge engineering methodologies for translating the
findings into a knowledge model.
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Our system also includes an agency part, which is described in Lech
and Wienhofen [2005]. Based on the context-aware situation assessment
being carried out, this agency supplies context-sensitive problem solving
[Gundersen and Kofod-Petersen, 2005]. We are in the process of extend-
ing the analysis of the situations to model the way our decompose agent
decomposes and solves problems.
Acknowledgements
Part of this work was carried out in the AmbieSense project, which was
supported by the EU commission (IST-2001-34244).
Bibliography
Agnar Aamodt. Knowledge-intensive case-based reasoning in CREEK.
In Peter Funk and Pedro A. González Calero, editors, Advances in Case-
Based Reasoning: Proceedings ECCBR 2004, number 3155 in Lecture Notes
in Artificial Intelligence, pages 1–15, Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. Springer.
Agnar Aamodt. Explanation-driven case-based reasoning. In Stefan Wess,
Klaus-Dieter Althoff, and Michael M. Richter, editors, Topics in Case-
Based Reasoning: Proceedings of the 1st European Workshop EWCBR 1993 –
Selected Papers, volume 837 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
274–288, Berlin Heidelberg, 1994. Springer. ISBN 3-540-58330-0.
Agnar Aamodt. Knowledge acquisition and learning by experience –
the role of case-specific knowledge. In Gheorghe Tecuci and Yves Ko-
dratoff, editors, Machine Learning and Knowledge Acquisition – Integrated
Approaches, chapter 8, pages 197–245. Academic Press, 1995.
Susanne Bødker. Applying activity theory to video analysis: How to make
sense of video data in human-computer interaction. In Nardi [1996b],
pages 147–174.
Susanne Bødker. Activity theory as a challenge to systems design. In
Hans-Erik Nissen, Heinz K. Klein, and Rudy Hirschheim, editors, In-
formation Systems Research: Contemporary Approaches and Emergent Tradi-
tions, pages 551–564. North Holland, 1991.
Patrick Brézillon and Jean-Charles Pomerol. Contextual knowledge shar-
ing and cooperation in intelligent assistant systems. Le Travail Humain,
62(3):223–246, 1999.
187
Bibliography
Rodney A. Brooks. Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelli-
gence, 47:139–159, 1991a.
Rodney A. Brooks. Planning is just a way of avoiding figuring out what
to do next. Technical report, MIT, 1987.
Rodney A. Brooks. New approaches to robotics. Science, 253:1227–1232,
1991b.
Jörg Cassens. Knowing what to explain and when. In Pablo Gervás and
Kalyan May Gupta, editors, Proceedings of the ECCBR 2004 Workshops,
Technical Report 142-04, pages 97–104, Madrid, 2004. Departamento de
Sistemas Informáticos y Programación, Universidad Complutense de
Madrid.
Jörg Cassens. User aspects of explanation aware cbr systems. In
Maria Francesca Costabile and Fabio Paternó, editors, Human-Computer
Interaction – INTERACT 2005, volume 3585 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 1087–1090, Rome, 2005. Springer. URL http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1007/11555261_111.
Anind K. Dey. Understanding and using context. Personal and Ubiquitous
Computing, 5(1):4–7, 2001.
Ken Ducatel, Marc Bogdanowicz, Fabiana Scapolo, Jos Leijten, and Jean-
Claude Burgelman. ISTAG scenarios for ambient intelligence in 2010.
Technical report, IST Advisory Group, 2001.
Hamid R. Ekbia and Ana G. Maguitman. Context and relevance: A prag-
matic approach. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2116:156–169, 2001.
Geraldine Fitzpatrick. The Locales Framework: Understanding and Design-
ing for Cooperative Work. Ph.d. thesis, The University of Queensland,
Australia, 1998.
Morten Fjeld, Kristina Lauche, Martin Bichsel, Fred Voorhoorst, Helmut
Krueger, and Mathias Rauterberg. Physcial and virtual tools: Activity
theory applied to the design of groupware. CSCW, 11(1-2):153–180,
2002.
James J. Gibson. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Houghton
Mifflin, 1979.
Ayse Göker and Hans Inge Myrhaug. User context and personalisation.
In Workshop proceedings for the sixth European Conference on Case Based
Reasoning, 2002.
188
Bibliography
Odd Erik Gundersen and Anders Kofod-Petersen. Multiagent based
problem-solving in a mobile environment. In Eivind Coward, editor,
Norsk Informatikkonferance 2005, NIK 2005, pages 7–18. Institutt for In-
formatikk, Universitetet i Bergen, November 2005. ISBN 82-519-2081-7.
Martha Dørum Jære, Agnar Aamodt, and Pål Skalle. Representing tem-
poral knowledge for case-based prediction. In Susan Craw and Alun
Preece, editors, Advances in Case-Based Reasoning: Proceedings ECCBR
2002, number 2416 in Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, pages 174–
188, Aberdeen, 2002. Springer.
Manasawee Kaenampornpan and Eamonn O’Neill. Modelling context: an
activity theory approach. In Panos Markopoulos, Berry Eggen, Emilie
Aarts, and James L. Croeley, editors, Ambient Intelligence: Second Eu-
ropean Symposium on Ambient Intelligence, EUSAI 2004, volume 3295 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 367–374. Springer, November
2004.
Manasawee Kaenampornpan and Eamonn O’Neill. Integrating history
and activity theory in context aware system design. In Proceedings of
the 1st International Workshop on Exploiting Context Histories in Smart En-
vironments (ECHISE), May 2005.
Anders Kofod-Petersen and Marius Mikalsen. An architecture supporting
implementation of context-aware services. In Patrik Floréen, Greger
Lindén, Tiina Niklander, and Kimmo Raatikainen, editors, Workshop on
Context Awareness for Proactive Systems (CAPS 2005), Helsinki, Finland,
pages 31–42. HIIT Publications, June 2005a. ISBN 952-10-2518-2.
Anders Kofod-Petersen and Marius Mikalsen. Context: Representation
and reasoning – representing and reasoning about context in a mobile
environment. Revue d’Intelligence Artificielle, 19(3):479–498, 2005b.
Mikko Korpela, Hettie A. Soriyan, and Karen C. Olufokunbi. Activity
analysis as a method for information systems development. Scandina-
vian Journal of Information Systems, 12:191–210, 2001.
Kari Kutti. Activity theory as a potential framework for human-computer
interaction research. In Nardi [1996b], pages 17–44.
Bruno Latour. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers
Through Society. Harvard University Press, 1988. ISBN 0674792912.
Till C. Lech and Leendert W. M. Wienhofen. Ambieagents: A scalable
infrastructure for mobile and context-aware information services. In
189
Bibliography
AAMAS ’05: Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Au-
tonomous agents and multiagent systems, pages 625–631, New York, NY,
USA, 2005. ACM Press.
Doug Lenat. The dimensions of context-space. Technical report, Cy-
corp, Austin, TX, October 28 1998. URL http://www.cyc.com/doc/
context-space.pdf.
Aleksei N. Leont’ev. Activity, Consciousness, and Personality. Prentice-Hall,
1978.
Yang Li, Jason I. Hong, and James A. Landay. Topiary: a tool for prototyp-
ing location-enhanced applications. In UIST ’04: Proceedings of the 17th
annual ACM symposium on User interface software and technology, pages
217–226, New York, NY, USA, 2004. ACM Press. ISBN 1-58113-957-8.
doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1029632.1029671.
Chistopher Lueg. Representaion in pervasive computing. In Proceedings
of the Inaugural Asia Pacific Forum on Pervasive Computing, 2002a.
Christopher Lueg. Looking under the rug: On context-aware artifacts and
socially adept technologies. In Proceedings of the Workshop The Philosophy
and Design of Socially Adept Technologies at the ACM SIGCHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI 2002). National Research
Council Canada NRC 44918, April 2002b.
David McSherry. Mixed-initative dialogue in case-based reasoning. In
Workshop Proceedings ECCBR-2002, Aberdeen, 2002.
Daisy Mwanza. Mind the gap: Activity theory and design. Technical
Report KMI-TR-95, Knowledge Media Institute, The Open University,
Milton Keynes, 2000.
Bonnie A. Nardi. A brief introduction to activity theory. KI – Künstliche
Intelligenz, 1:35–36, 2003.
Bonnie A. Nardi. Activity theory and human computer interaction. In
Context and Consciousness Nardi [1996b], pages 7–16.
Bonnie A. Nardi, editor. Context and Consciousness. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1996b.
Allen Newell. The knowledge level. Artificial Intelligence, (18):87–127, 1982.
Pinar Öztürk and Agnar Aamodt. A context model for knowledge-
intensive case-based reasoning. International Journal of Human Computer
Studies, 48:331–355, 1998.
190
Bibliography
Michael Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy.
N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1964.
Amanda Quek and Hanifa Shah. A comparative survey of activity-
based methods for information systems development. In Isabel Seruca,
Joaquim Filipe, Slimane Hammoudi, and Jose Cordeiro, editors, Pro-
ceedings of sixth International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems
(ICEIS 2004), volume 5, pages 221–229, Porto, Portugal, 2004. ISBN
972-8865-00-7.
Mahadev Satyanarayanan. Pervasive computing: Vision and challenges.
IEEE Personal Communications, 8(4):10–17, August 2001. URL citeseer.
ist.psu.edu/satyanarayanan01pervasive.html.
Thomas M. Strat. Employing contextual information in computer vision.
In DARPA93, pages 217–229, 1993.
Lucy A. Suchman. Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human-
Machine Communication. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY,
USA, 1987. ISBN 0-521-33137-4.
Peter Totterdell and Paul Rautenbach. Adaptation as a design problem.
In Adaptive User Interfaces, pages 59–84. Academic Pres, 1990.
Lew S. Vygotsky. Mind in Society. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1978.
Lew S. Vygotsky. Ausgewählte Schriften Bd. 1: Arbeiten zu theoretischen und
methodologischen Problemen der Psychologie. Pahl-Rugenstein, Köln, 1985.
Mark Weiser. The computer for the 21st century. Scientific American, pages
94–104, September 1991.
Mikael Wiberg and Charlotte Olsson. Designing artifacts for context
awareness. In Proceedings of IRIS 22 Enterprise Architectures for Virtual
Organisations, pages 49–58, Jyväskylä, 1999. Dept. of Computer Science
and Information Systems, University of Jyväskylä.
Elisabetta Zibetti, Vicenc Quera, Francesc Salvador Beltran, and Charles
Tijus. Contextual categorization: A mechanism linking perception and
knowledge in modeling and simulating perceived events as actions.
Modeling and using context, pages 395–408, 2001.
191
Bibliography
192
GUsing Activity Theory to Model Context Awareness:a Qualitative Case Study
Authors:
Jörg Cassens and Anders Kofod-Petersen
Abstract:
In this paper, we describe an approach to modelling context-aware sys-
tems starting on the knowledge level. We make use of ideas from Activity
Theory to structure the general context model and to assess empirical
data. We further on describe how the data-driven and the model-driven
aspects of our approach are combined into a single knowledge model. We
outline the design of an empirical study conducted to gather information
about a concrete workplace environment. This information is then used
to populate our context model. We describe also how the collected data
can be used to validate our approach.
Main Result:
The context model proposed in Paper F is implemented in a context aware
system for a hospital ward domain, and a qualitative empirical study of
its performance in a simulated environment is given.
Published in:
Geoff C. J. Sutcliffe and Randy G. Goebel, editors, Proceedings of the Nine-
teenth International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference,
pages 619–624, Melbourne Beach, 2006. AAAI Press.
Copyright:
© 2006 American Association for Artificial Intelligence.
193
G. AT and Context Awareness: a Qualitative Case Study
My main contributions to the paper:
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G.1 Introduction
The area of context-awareness in pervasive computing has gained con-
siderable momentum over the last years. Not only in the number of re-
searchers dealing with this issue, but the scenarios and visions have also
grown more sophisticated. Originally, Weiser proposed the world of ubiq-
uitous computing as a world populated with ordinary items augmented
to assist people in their day to day activities [Weiser, 1991].
Since then the complexity of the tasks that pervasive computing has to
solve has steadily grown. The systems envisioned today are often pro-
active and described as intelligent environments; or ambient intelligence.
Examples of these systems are the Aura system in Satyanarayanan [2001,
p. 3], which, for example, is able to infer that sensitive information should
not be presented at a talk, as unfamiliar faces are present. A similar
example is available in Ducatel et al. [2001, p. 4], where Maria’s visa has
been negotiated automatically, thus allowing her to walk right through
immigrations when arriving at her foreign destination.
Just attempting to approach these visions is a daunting task. The degree
of pro-activity, autonomous behaviour, and complicated reasoning abili-
ties is staggering. However, one of the central issues when autonomous
systems are to function in an environment is the ability to perceive and
make sense of that environment. Systems as described in the above exam-
ples are situated [Brooks, 1987] in the environment, and to a large degree
inseparable from it [Gibson, 1979].
The area of context awareness attempts to deal with the issues of mod-
elling, representing, and to some degree reasoning about the environ-
ment. However, historically there has been a close connection between
the concept of context and location, often they have been regarded as syn-
onymous. This is not surprising, as we, the users, are mobile. However,
one very important aspect of situations that has largely been ignored is
activity. We believe that focusing on activities will allow us to gain a better
understanding of context and context awareness.
Several interesting approaches to investigate activities have been pro-
posed; such as Actor-Network Theory [Latour, 1988], Situated Action
[Suchman, 1987] or the Locales Framework [Fitzpatrick, 1998]. Another
fascinating starting point is Activity Theory, which is based on the works
of Vygotsky [1978]; Leont’ev [1978]. In this paper, we propose the use of
Activity Theory to model context and describe situations.
Most of the recent research in context aware systems has been largely
technology driven. It is “. . . driven by what is technically feasible rather
than by what might be helpful in a situation.” [Lueg, 2002b, p. 1] One
main obstacle is the lack of a common understanding of what constitutes
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context. This lack of common understanding is by no means surprising,
since no common theory on context understanding in humans seems to
exist. Thus, it would be unreasonable to expect a common theory for
artificial entities.
However, it is reasonable to assume that knowledge and reasoning play
an important role when humans assess situations. Thus, it seems feasible
to regard context in artificial systems from a knowledge level perspective
[Newell, 1982]. This will give systems the advantage of reasoning about
context, rather than relying on pattern matching only.
Furthermore, as IT systems are used by humans in social settings, it
is viable to perform an analysis of context on the level of socio-technical
systems [Lueg, 2002a]. In fact, the integration of intelligent systems into
workplace environments marks a shift from mere tool usage to partner-
ship between humans and intelligent artefacts.
This work is organised as follows: First, a short introduction to Activity
Theory is given. Second, we describe the context model utilised in this
work. This is followed by a demonstration on the use of Activity Theory
to identify contextual information. Afterwards, we discuss which infor-
mation is needed in order to design a system for a hospital ward scenario
and how the data is gathered. The next section details how the context
model is populated with domain knowledge and information about spe-
cific situations. Finally, a conclusion and outlook on future work is given.
G.2 Activity Theory
Activity Theory (AT) is a descriptive psychological framework helping to
understand the unity of consciousness and activity. It is best described
with a set of basic principles. These guiding principles include [Bannon
and Bødker, 1991]:
• Hierarchical structure of activity: Activities (the topmost category)
are composed of goal-directed actions. These actions are performed
consciously. Actions, in turn, consist of non-conscious operations.
• Object-orientedness: Objective and socially or culturally defined
properties. Our way of doing work is grounded in a praxis which
is shared by our co-workers and determined by tradition. The way
an artefact is used and the division of labour influence the design.
Hence, artefacts pass on the specific praxis they are designed for.
• Mediation: Human activity is mediated by tools, language, etc. The
artefacts as such are not the object of our activities, but appear al-
ready as socio-cultural entities.
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• Continuous Development: Both the tools used and the activity it-
self are constantly reshaped. Tools reflect accumulated social knowl-
edge, hence they transport social history back into the activity and
to the user.
• Distinction between internal and external activities: In contrast to
traditional cognitive psychology, Activity Theory emphasises that
internal mental processes cannot be properly understood when sep-
arated from external activities, that is the interaction with the out-
side world.
A basic notion of Activity Theory is that the subject participating in an
activity does so because he wants to achieve a certain goal. His interest
is directed towards the object of an activity which he tries to use and
modify to achieve an anticipated outcome. His interaction with this object
is mediated by tools, creating the basic triangle of Subject, Object, and
Mediating Artefact.
Figure G.1.: Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT)
Since we consider social activities, the acting subject is part of a com-
munity. The relations between the acting subject and the community as
well as between the community and the object are mediated by a set of
rules and the division of labour (since the desired outcome is anticipated
to be shared by the community, a solitary view on the relation between
one subject and the object would miss important aspects).
The expanded model, including a community component and other
mediators, is commonly referred to as Cultural Historical Activity Theory
(CHAT). It is often depicted as the triangle shown in Figure G.1.
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G.3 Context Model
The context model utilised in this work assumes a subjective view on sit-
uations. This is in contrast to the prevailing view where context normally
describes an objectively defined situation. We argue that any experience
is personal, thus the choice of contextual parameters and their weight will
also be personal.
Figure G.2.: Context model
If we were to take this argument to the extreme, we could argue that
not only the experiences are personal, but also the model and the repre-
sentation. However, since our goal is to build artefacts that are useful and
feasible to develop, we have chosen a pragmatic view on how to model
context. The model is based on the definition given by Dey [2001]:
Context is the set of suitable environmental states and set-
tings concerning a user, which are relevant for a situation sen-
sitive application in the process of adapting the services and
information offered to the user.
This definition does not explicitly state that context is regarded as knowl-
edge. However, following the argument in the introduction, we argue that
context must be viewed from a knowledge perspective. Concurrently, we
support the view maintained by Brézillon and Pomerol that context is not
a special kind of knowledge. They argue that the knowledge regarded
as context is dependent on the circumstances: “. . . knowledge that can be
qualified as ‘contextual’ depends on the context!” [Brézillon and Pomerol,
1999, p.7]
Keeping to the pragmatic view on building artefacts, we impose a tax-
onomy on the context model during the design phase (Figure G.2). This
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taxonomy incorporates the tradition in context aware systems, and the
general concepts found in Activity Theory. The taxonomy divides context
into five sub-categories [Kofod-Petersen and Mikalsen, 2005]:
1. Environmental context: This part captures the user’s surrounding,
such as things, services, people, and information accessed by the
user.
2. Personal context: This part describes the mental and physical infor-
mation about the user, such as mood, expertise and disabilities.
3. Social context: This describes the social aspects of the user, such as
information about the different roles a user can assume.
4. Task context: the task context describes what the user is doing, it
can describe the user’s goals, tasks and activities.
5. Spatio-temporal context: This type of context is concerned with
attributes like: time, location and the community present.
The context model is represented as a multi-relational semantic net-
work. It is used within the Creek framework for knowledge intensive
Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) [Aamodt and Plaza, 1994; Aamodt, 2004].
The model allows for the inference of relationships between concepts by
construction of contextual dependent paths between them. One important
feature is the ability to match two features that are syntactical different,
by explaining why they are similar [Aamodt, 1994; Jære et al., 2002].
G.4 Activity Theory for Identifying Context
We have further on brought this established knowledge model from the
domain of context aware computing together with our activity theoretic
approach to context awareness in order to design a context model which
is sound from a psychological perspective.
Our interest in Activity Theory for context awareness is two-fold. On
one hand, we use an activity theoretic model to build and justify a gen-
eral knowledge model for capturing context related knowledge. This is
a top-down, or model driven, approach to capture the essential aspects
on the knowledge level. On the other hand, we use the same activity
theoretic model to design empirical studies in the same setting where we
later want to deploy a context aware system. In this second phase, done
in a bottom-up way, or data driven, the data gathered in this process
is used to populate the knowledge model with domain- and situation-
specific knowledge.
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Since our system builds on the knowledge intensive Case-Based Rea-
soning (CBR) methodology [Aamodt, 2004], the domain-specific knowl-
edge gets incorporated into the general knowledge model of the system
and the situation-specific knowledge takes the form of cases.
The top-down approach of building the knowledge model is described
more thoroughly in Kofod-Petersen and Cassens [2006], so we will only
describe it shortly here and go into more detail on the data-driven part
later in this paper.
The contextual knowledge we want to capture includes knowledge about
the acting subjects, the objects towards which activities are directed, the
information sources accessed, and the community as well as knowledge
about the mediating components, like rules or tools. To this end, we have
proposed a mapping from the basic structure of an activity into the tax-
onomy of contextual knowledge as depicted in Table G.1. We can for
example see that the personal context contains information we would as-
sociate with the acting subject itself.
Table G.1.: Basic aspects of an activity and their relation to a taxonomy of
contextual knowledge
CHAT aspect Context Category
Subject Personal
Object Task
Community Spatio-Temporal
Mediating Artefact Environmental
Mediating Rules Task
Mediating Division of Labor Social
We would like to point out that we do not think that a strict one to one
mapping exists or is desirable at all. Our view on contextual knowledge
is contextualised itself in the sense that different interpretations exist, and
what is to be considered contextual information in one setting is part of
the general knowledge model in another one. Likewise, the same piece of
knowledge can be part of different categories based on the task at hand.
Other work on the use of AT in modelling context has been conducted
e.g. by Kaenampornpan and O’Neill [2004]. The authors focus on mod-
elling features of the world according to an activity theoretic model, but
they do not carry out a knowledge level analysis of the activities. This
is in contrast to our own approach, and we argue that our knowledge
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intensive approach has the advantage of giving the system the ability to
reason about context so that it does not have to rely on pattern match-
ing only. This is advantageous especially in situations where not all the
important features are accessible by the system, for example because of
limits of sensory input in mobile applications.
An interesting feature in Kaenampornpan and O’Neill’s further work
is the notion of history of context. The history is used to elicit a user’s
current goal [Kaenampornpan and O’Neill, 2005]. We do not explicitly
address the problem of representing the user history in context models.
The application area we are considering in this article features a set of
relatively well defined situations, and information about the user’s goal
is included in the cases of the underlying CBR system.
Li et al. [2004] propose an activity based design tool for context aware
applications. In contrast to our proposal, the authors focus on supporting
the designer of context aware applications with a rapid prototyping tool,
not on the use of Activity Theory in the Context model itself.
Wiberg and Olsson [1999] make also use of Activity Theory. The main
issue here is the design of context aware tangible artefacts. The usage
situation is well defined upfront and no reasoning about the context has
to take place. This differs considerably from our own approach.
G.5 Gathering Data
We now have a well defined semantic network serving as a knowledge
model which is sound both from an Activity Theory viewpoint and from
the tradition of context-aware computing. The next step is to populate the
model with data from real world situations.
The setting for our empirical study is supporting medical personnel
at a hospital ward. The persons involved deal with different activities,
like ward rounds, pre-ward round meetings, and different forms of ex-
amination. The staff has to access a large variety of different information
systems. The main goal is to have a system which makes the information
sources needed in different situations available pro-actively. To this end,
the system must first identify the activity the system’s user is involved in,
identify his role, and then query the information sources which are likely
to be accessed.
To gather data about this work processes, we have designed forms for
a study which allow us to focus on different parts of an activity theoretic
analysis of the work process. The forms had to meet certain requirements:
• It should be possible to clearly identify the different activities the
users were involved in. Further on, the goal for each situation
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should be identified, even if the users did not explicitly state these
goals. This would enable us to identify the different outcomes antic-
ipated by the users, and eventually could help us building a model
capturing the hierarchical structure of activities.
• The artefacts used should be identified, and different forms of use of
these artefacts should be recorded. This would give us hints about
the mediating role of artefacts. Special interest should be given to
the use of infomation sources.
• The different entities involved in the activity as depicted in the basic
triangle (see Figure G.1) should, if observable, be described in order
to be able to directly connect the data collected to the knowledge
level model.
• By observing the praxis of using artefacts, deeper insight on exter-
nalisation of cognitive processes can be gained. Although this is not
in the scope of our current work, a study design which takes this
aspect into consideration could help us evaluating the capabilities
an intelligent system would have to provide to its users in order to
be seen as an intelligent partner.
• Although a truly intelligent system would be able to adapt itself
to completely new situations, we consider the usage situation, e.g.
with regard to the governing rules and the capabilities of the tools
used, as being relatively constant. Therefore, our study design did
not particularly deal with issues of continuous development.
At the same time, the resulting form could not be too extensive since it
was to be filled out by a single person observing the activities. The end
result was a form which captured essentially the following aspects:
• Location: The room where the situation occurred
• User: The user of the system
• Role: The role of the user
• Present: Other persons present
• Role: The role of each of the persons present
• Patient: The ID of the patient in question
• Time: The time of day
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• Source: Information sources and targets
• I/O: The direction of the information flow
• Information: Type of information
The data was collected through a period of one month at the St. Olavs
Hospital in Trondheim, Norway. A medical student followed several em-
ployees and recorded the situations that occurred throughout the days on
the forms we had designed for this task.
G.6 Populating the Context Model
The context aware system we are describing in this article is realised
within the Creek framework for knowledge intensive CBR [Aamodt, 2004].
The knowledge components of Creek are modelled as a semantic net-
work. The semantic network for our context aware application integrates
the following components:
1. The basic knowledge, which holds the generic concepts necessary
for modelling the general domain and case knowledge. See Aamodt
[2004] for a more thorough description.
2. The general taxonomy as described in Section “Context Model”.
3. General aspects of the activities, such as roles, artefacts, communi-
ties, and the relation between them as described in Section “Activity
Theory for Identifying Context”.
4. The adaptation of the generic model to the work environment at
hand, in this case the hospital. The adaptation to each specific sce-
nario consists itself of two different parts. The task is:
a) To enrich the context model with domain specific information,
like which artefacts were used and which services they offered
and consumed, and
b) to populate the context model by adding concrete situations
(cases) that were observed.
G.6.1 Domain Specific Information
In order to adapt the generic context aware system we have described to a
particular working environment, the tasks performed in this environment,
the communities of labour existing, and the specific artefacts used, we
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have to enrich the knowledge model with specific information about the
environment modelled. This enrichment includes: the different locations
at the wards; the roles that employees, patients, and visitors assume; the
classes of persons encountered in the wards; artefacts and services they
offer and consume.
The empirical study performed was used to extract the necessary knowl-
edge and model it in the Creek framework. A typical example for this
kind of knowledge would be the observation that we have two distinct
types of health workers (nurses and physicians), and that there are differ-
ent types of physicians (e.g. consulting physicians, temporary physicians,
and assistant physicians). Further more, this physicians could assume
different roles, like group leader or examiner. Another example would
be that five distinct laboratories are used, and that an ECG was placed at
specific locations.
This knowledge was extracted from the collected data and modelled
manually into the system.
G.6.2 Situation Specific Information
The data set contains 360 situations, 197 for cardiology and 163 for gas-
troenterology. The empirical evaluation of the system’s performance is
done in two steps. First, a qualitative evaluation of the data from the car-
diology ward was carried out in order to review the context model and
the integration on the knowledge level. This work has been completed.
Second, data from both wards will be used in an quantitative evaluation
of the final system architecture. This second step has not been completed
yet.
The data describing the context of situations includes some information
which could easily be sensed through available hardware, like location
and the users involved and the time of the situation occurring. Some of
the other data might not be easily available, like the presence of a patient’s
relatives.
However, since we are mainly concerned with methodological issues in
this paper, we have not addressed the more technical aspects of collecting
and fusing sensory information yet.
For the quantitative evaluation, approximately half of the situations
were fed into the system manually, thereby giving the system a set of
initial cases to reason about. The second half was used to test whether
the system could successfully classify situations and identify the correct
information sources needed.
The 197 situations at the cardiology ward which have been incorporated
into the systen are distributed as described in Table G.2.
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Table G.2.: Distribution of observed data for cardiology
Situation AL7 AL9 AL14 OL9
∑
Pre pre ward 5 5
Pre ward round 7 22 11 26 66
Ward round 7 21 11 26 65
Examination 8 2 9 19
Post work 8 9 13 30
Pre discharge 2 4 6
Heart meeting 1 1 2
Discharge meeting 4 4
Eight different types of situations have been identified in the data set.
Four different physicians were observed, where three were assistant physi-
cians (AL7, AL9, and AL14) and one was a consultant physician (OL9).
Beside these, several nurses, patients, and relatives were present in differ-
ent situations.
The first qualitative analysis has shown that the CBR system was able to
successfully identify new situations based on the initial set of cases. Fur-
ther on, based on the knowledge about the sequence of actions contained
in the previously seen cases, the system was able to identify the correct
sequence of actions needed in the ongoing activity.
G.7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown that context aware intelligent systems can benefit from
the socio-technical analysis made possible by applying Activity Theory.
Moreover, taking socio-technical aspects into account is a necessity when
intelligent systems are not used as mere tools but are designed to be more
of a partner in a work process. It is beneficial to be able to make use
of a sound psychological framework when defining a knowledge model
as well as when constructing guidelines for observations. Our approach
described in this paper can be used to design studies in real world settings
which can be used as starting points for the deployment of context aware
systems.
We have outlined how the observational data can be integrated into
a knowledge level model to form a coherent multi-relational semantic
network, which allows for the perception of the environment, reasoning
about context to identify situations, and problem-solving based on this
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understanding.
Based on the data for the cardiology ward, we have populated our ex-
isting general model with domain- and situation-specific knowledge. At
the same time, we have focused on identifying generic solution strategies
corresponding to the situations we have discovered.
After the context aware system has successfully identified the current
context and the potential goals of the human actors, the knowledge con-
tained in the specific cases together with the domain-specific knowledge
about possible courses of action make it feasible to support the human
activities by offering guidance and retrieve necessary information.
As for empirical validation, we have performed an initial qualitative as-
sessment of the system’s integrity, and tested the ability of our reasoning
component to correctly identify new situations on a subset of the collected
data. Our initial results indicate that a knowledge intensive approach to
combine situational data with general and domain specific knowledge can
be regarded as being very promising when tackling the intricate problem
of identifying situations. The next step is to execute a full simulation of
the system on all available data.
On the methodological side, we will use the results from our empirical
work to further formalise the relationship between different aspects of an
AT based analysis and the different knowledge containers we can utilise
in our system. Equally important is the development of a methodological
approach to study design and data assessment.
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• Construction of example
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H.1 Introduction
Although a wide variety of knowledge engineering methodologies exists
(see the following section), there seems to be a lack of methods focusing
on the peculiarities of explanatory knowledge. These special features of
explanations include in particular their role in enhancing the user experi-
ence by adding a level of self reflection about the actions of the system and
the importance of explanations to gain the user’s trust into the system’s
capabilities.
In human to human interaction, the ability to explain its own behaviour
and course of action is a prerequisite for a meaningful interchange, there-
fore a truly intelligent system has to provide comparable capacities. In
order to make sure that the system has sufficient knowledge about it-
self and that potential interests a user can have towards explanations can
be satisfied, the design of explanatory capabilities should be an integral
component of the system’s design process.
Additionally, if we have an interest in the widespread adoption of ex-
planation aware systems, we have to integrate the methods focussing on
knowledge aspects with other software development methodologies to
make the design of intelligent system accessible for a large group of soft-
ware engineers. To this end, it is our aim to develop a formal notation to
support a design methodology which is based on experiences both in the
intelligent systems and software development communities. We therefore
propose the use of patterns, especially the use of problem frames, in order
to start the discussion of such methodologies.
The structure of this article is as follows: first, we give a short overview
about the notion of explanations as used in this paper. Second, we refer to
some related work both from the knowledge engineering and the software
engineering disciplines. In the following step, we propose a description
of user goals following Jackson’s notion of problem frames. Thereafter,
we present a simplified example of explanation aware re-engineering of
an existing ambient intelligent solution before concluding with some re-
marks about further work.
H.2 Explanations
The ability to generate explanations is an important aspect of any intelli-
gent system [Roth-Berghofer and Cassens, 2005; Sørmo et al., 2005]. We
deem it necessary to investigate the explanatory capabilities from an early
point onward in the design process to assure that the finished system can
sufficiently explain itself. Therefore, an analysis of explanatory needs of
both user and system should be part of the requirements engineering pro-
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cess. It is equally important to provide the system designers with methods
to assure that explanatory knowledge and methods can be integrated into
the application.
We have previously presented a framework for explanations in intelli-
gent systems with a special focus on case-based reasoning [Sørmo et al.,
2005]. Specifically, we have identified five goals that explanations can sat-
isfy. The goal of transparency is concerned with the system’s ability to
explain how an answer was reached. Justification deals with the ability to
explain why the answer is good. When dealing with the importance of
a question asked, relevance is the goal that must be satisfied. Conceptual-
isation is the goal that handles the meaning of concepts. Finally, learning
is in itself a goal, as it teaches us about the domain in question. These
goals are defined from the perspective of a human user. His expectations
on what constitutes a good explanation is situation dependend and has a
historic dimension [Leake, 1995].
Roth-Berghofer has explored some fundamental issues with different
useful kinds of explanation and their connection to the different knowl-
edge containers of a case-based reasoning system [Roth-Berghofer, 2004].
Based on earlier findings from natural language explanations in expert
systems, five different kinds of explanation are identified: conceptual expla-
nations, which map unknown new concepts to known ones, why-explana-
tions describing causes or justifications, how-explanations depicting causal
chains for an event, purpose-explanations describing the purpose or use
of something, and cognitive explanations predicting the behaviour of in-
telligent systems. Roth-Berghofer further on ties these different kinds of
explanation to the different knowledge containers of case-based reason-
ing systems [Richter, 1995], namely case base, similarity measure, adaptation
knowledge, and vocabulary.
Building on the last two works, we have earlier started to investigate a
combined framework of user goals and explanation kinds [Roth-Berghofer
and Cassens, 2005]. The goal of this work was to outline a design method-
ology that starts from an analysis of usage scenarios in order to be able
to identify possible expectations a user might have towards the explana-
tory capabilities of an intelligent system. The requirements recognised
can further on be used to identify which kind of knowledge has to be rep-
resented in the system, and which knowledge containers are best suited
for this task. In that work, we have also identified the need for a socio-
psychological analysis of workplaces in order to be able to design systems
which can meaningful engage in socio-technical interactions.
We have also previously proposed the use of activity theory, a theory
of human interaction with other humans and technical artefacts from in-
dustrial and organisational psychology, to investigate when explanations
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are important to the user [Cassens, 2004]. The same theory has shown
its usefulness in designing a case-based reasoning system geared towards
ambient intelligence [Kofod-Petersen and Cassens, 2006]. This work has
recently been extended to explicitly take explanatory capabilities into ac-
count.
We are now in the process of investigating how these different aspects –
a socio-technical analysis, user goals with explanations, and the different
kinds of explanations – can fit into a design methodology which can be
handled by knowledge and system engineers.
H.3 Related Work
The use of patterns [Alexander et al., 1977] is common for different soft-
ware engineering approaches. Patterns can be used in different software
development phases and they can have different foci. We can also identify
knowledge engineering approaches making use of patterns.
When we look towards the software engineering world, we can see that
patterns are used in different phases of the design process.
Early on in the requirements engineering process, problem frames [Jack-
son, 2001] are a method to classify software development problems. Prob-
lem frames look out into the world and attempt to describe the problem
and its solution in the real world. Problem frames introduce concepts like
‘Information Display’ and ‘Commanded Behaviour’.
Jackson’s set of basic problem frames can be extended to be better able
to model domain specific aspects. For example, Hatebur and Heisel [2005]
introduce new problem frames for security problems. Their proposal in-
cludes problem frames for issues like ‘Accept Authentication’ and ‘Secure
Data Transmission’. They also provide architectural patterns connected to
these problem frames.
On the software architecture level, we find architecture patterns [Avge-
riou and Zdun, 2005]. At this level, we encounter concepts like ‘Black-
boards’, ‘Model-View-Controller’, or ‘Pipes and Filters’.
For finer grained software development close to the actual implemen-
tation, one can make use of design patterns which look inside towards
the computer and its software [Gamma et al., 1995]. Design patterns deal
with concepts like ‘Factories’, ‘Facade’, and ‘Decorater’.
Patterns can also be useful for modelling non-functional requirements.
HCI design patterns are such a special class of patterns. Rossi et al. [2000]
introduce HCI patterns for hypermedia applications (like ‘Information on
Demand’ and ‘Process Feedback’). Another collection of HCI patterns
can be found in van Welie and Trætteberg [2000], covering aspects like
215
H. Designing Explanation Aware Systems
‘Wizards’ or ‘Preferences’.
Some research has been done on the issue of how patterns on different
levels are related with each other. For example, Wentzlaff and Specker
[2006] apply case-based reasoning to construct design patterns from de-
veloped problem frames. The problem part of the cases consist of problem
frames, and the solution part is a corresponding HCI pattern.
Choppy et al. [2006] relate architectural patterns to problem frames.
The design problem at hand can be divided into multiple frames, and
the authors offer a modular approach to refining the problem frames into
architectural patterns.
Methods and languages which use patterns and focus explicitly on the
knowledge aspects of system design exist as well. There are for example
efforts to provide reusable architectures by describing the abilities of (a li-
brary of) generic problem solving methods. An example for a component
model is the Unified Problem-Solving Method Development Language
UPML, cf. Fensel et al. [1999].
Plaza and Arco [1999] describe an application of the UPML model to
case-based reasoning (CBR). They propose the ABC software architecture,
based on the three components task description, domain model, and adap-
tors. The authors focus on the reuse part of the CBR cycle [Aamodt
and Plaza, 1994] and interpret problem-solving as constructing a (case-
specific) model of the input problem.
The INRECA [Bergmann et al., 2003] methodology is aimed at devel-
oping (industrial) case-based reasoning applications. Software process
models from existing CBR applications are stored in an experience base
which is structured at three levels. The common generic level is a collection
of very generic processes, products, and methods for CBR applications.
At the cookbook level, we find software models for particular classes of ap-
plications (so called recipes). At the specific project level, experiences from
particular projects are stored. We can identify the recipes at the cookbook
level as patterns.
Another well-known approach can be found with the CommonKADS
methodology [Schreiber et al., 2000]. It encompasses both a result per-
spective with a set of models of different aspects of the knowledge based
system and its environment, and a project management perspective starting
from a spiral life-cycle model that can be adapted to the particular project.
The CommonKADS template knowledge model provides a way of (par-
tially) reusing knowledge models in new applications and can be under-
stood as patterns in the software engineering sense of the word.
Building on the KADS model and extending it explicitly towards soft-
ware engineering, Gardner et al. [1998] introduce the notion of KADS
Objects. The KADS Object framework allows direct support for object-
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oriented decomposition and utilises research on human cognition. The
authors also supply a library of generic problem-solving templates, which
themselves can be seen as software engineering patterns.
Unfortunately, despite the fact that a lot of work has been done on
knowledge engineering methodologies and in particular the reuse of ex-
perience gained, it seems that little attention has been paid to the specifics
of explanatory knowledge outlined above.
H.4 Explanation Problem Frames
The main purpose of any problem frame [Jackson, 2001] is to propose a
machine which improves the combined performance of itself and its en-
vironment by describing the machine’s behaviour in a specification. The
most important approach is to address the frame concern. To explain ones
behaviour a problem frame must be constructed that relates the behaviour
the system shows to different parts of knowledge used by the system to
support the chosen course of action in a specification.
Jackson [2001] originally described five different basic frames, each
of which comes in different flavours and variants: ‘required behaviour’,
‘commanded behaviour’, ‘information display’, ‘simple workpieces’ and
‘transformation’. Each basic frame has its own requirements, domain
characteristics, domain involvement, and frame concern.
In general, a problem frame assumes a user driven perspective. Except
for the ‘required behaviour’ basic frame, each frame assumes that the user
is in control and dictates the behaviour of the machine. Since intelligent
systems (ideally) take a much more pro active approach and mixed initia-
tive issues become relevant, new problem frames addressing these topics
have to be developed. For the course of this paper, we will focus exclu-
sively on frames targeting explanatory aspects and will not discuss other
types of problem frames.
Problem frames can be described by problem frame diagrams. These
diagrams consist basically of dashed ovals, representing the requirements,
plain rectangles, denoting application domains, and a rectangle with a
double vertical stripe, standing for the machine (or software machine)
domain to be developed. These entities become the nodes of the frame
diagram. They are connected by edges, representing shared phenomena
and denoting an interface. Dashed edges refer to requirement references.
Dashed arrows designate constraining requirement references.
The domains can be of different types, indicated by a letter in the
lower right corner. Here, a ‘C’ stands for a causal domain whose prop-
erties include predictable causal relationships among its phenomena. A
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‘B’ denotes a biddable domain which lacks positive predictable internal
behaviour. Biddable domains are usually associated with user actions.
Finally, an ‘X’ marks a lexical domain. Such a domain is a physical repre-
sentation of data and combines causal and symbolic phenomena.
In the software development process, problem frames are used in the
following way. First, we start with a context diagram, which consists of
domain nodes and their relations, but without the requirements. After-
wards, the context diagram is divided into sub problems. The resulting
sub problems should, whenever possible, relate to existing generic problem
frames. These generic problem frames are hereby instantiated do describe
the particular sub problem at hand.
In the remainder of this section, we propose a set of new generic prob-
lem frames to capture aspects of explanations connected to the aforemen-
tioned different user goals identified in [Sørmo et al., 2005].
H.4.1 Transparency Explanation
Figure H.1.: Transparency Explanation. An explanation supporting this
goal gives the user some insight into the inner working of the
system. To this end, the system inspects its own reasoning
trace when formulating the explanation.
This goal is concerned with an explanation of how the system reached the
answer.
“I had the same problem with my car yesterday, and charging the battery fixed
it.”
The goal of an explanation of this kind is to impart an understanding
of how the system found an answer. This allows the users to check the
system by examining the way it reasons and allows them to look for ex-
planations for why the system has reached a surprising or anomalous
result.
The frame diagram depicted in Figure H.1 highlights that in order to
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support the transparency goal, the software system has to inspect its rea-
soning trace and represent the relevant facts of its reasoning process to
the user. We expect a transparency explanation usually to be given after
the reasoning process has terminated.
H.4.2 Justification Explanation
Figure H.2.: Justification Explanation. In contrast to the transparency ex-
planation, the user is here not primarily interested in why
the system exposes a particular behaviour, but wants to have
evidence supporting that this behaviour is correct. Therefore,
other knowledge has to be taken into account besides the rea-
soning trace.
When supporting the justification goal, we want to explain why the an-
swer given is a good answer.
“You should eat more fish - your heart needs it!”
“My predictions have been 80% correct up until now.”
This is the goal of increasing the confidence in the advice or solution of-
fered by the system by giving some kind of support for the conclusion
suggested by the system. This goal allows for a simplification of the ex-
planation compared to the actual process the system goes through to find
a solution. Potentially, this kind of explanation can be completely decou-
pled from the reasoning process, but it may also be achieved by using
additional background knowledge or reformulation and simplification of
knowledge that is used in the reasoning process.
A explanation supporting the justification goal, as shown in Figure H.2,
has not only to take the reasoning of the machine into account, but it will
also make use of other parts of the system’s knowledge in order to gen-
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erate after the fact explanations supporting its actions or decisions. Since
justification explanations complement transparency explanations, we ex-
pect it to be given usually after the reasoning process has terminated.
H.4.3 Relevance Explanation
Figure H.3.: Relevance Explanation. An explanation supporting this goal
should instil confidence by indicating that the system’s be-
haviour is connected to the task at hand. Consequently, the
reasoning and dialogue traces should be taken into account
as well as other (domain) knowledge.
An explanation targeting this goal gives hints about why a question asked
is relevant.
“I ask about the more common failures first, and many users do forget to
connect the power cable.”
An explanation of this type would have to justify the strategy pursued
by the system. This is in contrast to the previous two goals that focus on
the solution. The reasoning trace type of explanations may display the
strategy of the system implicitly, but it does not argue why it is a good
strategy. In conversational systems, the user may wish to know why a
question asked by the system is relevant to the task at hand. It can also be
relevant in other kinds of systems where a user would like to verify that
the approach used by the system is valid.
Since this goal, depicted by the frame diagram in Figure H.3, is of par-
ticular interest for mixed initiative systems, the explaining machine has
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to relate its explanation both to its own dialogue with the user (and here
in particular the questions asked by the system or the actions performed),
the reasoning trace (in oder to relate to the situation the system assumes
it is in) and the system knowledge relevant. In contrast to the first two
goals, an explanation supporting this goal is important to be given during
the reasoning process of the system.
H.4.4 Conceptualisation Explanation
Figure H.4.: Conceptualisation Explanation. By giving a conceptualisa-
tion explanation, the system explicates its own conceptuali-
sation of the domain or the task at hand to the user. Hence, it
will connect the concept to be explained with its own knowl-
edge components.
The conceptualisation goal deals with the need to clarify the meaning of
concepts.
“By ‘conceptualisation’ we mean the process of forming concepts and rela-
tions between concepts.”
One of the lessons learned after the first wave of expert systems had been
analysed was that the users did not always understand the terms used
by a system. This may be because the user is a novice in the domain,
but also because different people can use terms differently or organise the
knowledge in different ways. It may not be clear, even to an expert, what
the system means when using a specific term, and he may want to get an
explanation of what the system means when using it.
This explanation machine, represented with the frame diagram de-
picted in Figure H.4, builds on its own system knowledge. This highlights
the fact that explanations supporting this goal should set unknown con-
cepts in the context of the other knowledge the system has, and which is
expected to be shared with the user already. Conceptualisation explana-
tions are important both during the reasoning process (e.g. in addition to
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a relevance explanation) and after the reasoning process has terminated
(e.g. in addition to a justification explanation).
H.4.5 Learning Explanation
Figure H.5.: Learning Explanation. This goal is special, since it focuses on
the user’s interest in the application domain (hence the real
world), and not on some particular behaviour of the system.
The learning goal focuses on the interest of the user to learn something
about the application domain.
“When the headlights won’t work, the battery may be flat as it is supposed to
deliver power to the lights.”
This goal is of specific interest for educational applications, which have
learning as the primary goal of the whole system. In these systems, we
cannot assume that the user will understand even definitions of terms,
and may need to provide explanations at different levels of expertise. The
goal of the system is typically not only to find a good solution to a prob-
lem, but to explain the solution process to the user in a way that will
increase his understanding of the domain. The goal can be to teach more
general domain theory or to train the user in solving problems similar to
those solved by the system. In other words, the explanation is often more
important than the answer itself.
The Figure H.5 highlights this fact by pointing out that the explanatory
machine has to connect its own system knowledge with the real world
(representing the application domain) in order to generate explanations
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supporting the user in gaining a better understanding of the application
domain. The explanation given should also relate to the system’s assump-
tions about its user, which is influenced by the dialogue trace. Because of
the nature of this goal, it will usually be important during the system’s
reasoning process.
H.5 Example
Like mentioned in the introduction, we have designed and implemented
an ambient intelligent application [Cassens and Kofod-Petersen, 2006]
where the main purpose is to identify ongoing situations and proactively
acquire digital information required by the persons present.
The system consists of three main components: one component ac-
quiring data from the environment relevant for classifying the situation
[Kofod-Petersen and Mikalsen, 2005]; one component assessing the on-
going situation through the use of case-based reasoning, which we un-
derstand as being context aware [Kofod-Petersen and Aamodt, 2006]; and
finally one component conducting a task decomposition to solve the prob-
lem in the ongoing situation, which we understand as being context sen-
sitive [Gundersen and Kofod-Petersen, 2005].
To exemplify how problem frames can assist us in building explana-
tion aware applications, let us look at a typical engineering task where
we start with the existing system and want to re-engineer it to include
explanations.
As an example, we have the instance where the system correctly clas-
sifies an ongoing situation as a pre-ward round. A pre-ward round is a
particular type of meeting that occurs every morning. Here the physician
in charge and the nurse in charge go over the status of the patients on
the ward, and decide on the treatment plan. The current condition of the
patients in question is reviewed in light of any changes, test results, and
the like.
We know from the knowledge acquisition and modelling process [Cas-
sens and Kofod-Petersen, 2006] that the goal of this type of situation can
be decomposed into the following sequence of tasks:
1. Acquire name of patient;
2. Acquire changes in patient’s condition since yesterday;
3. Acquire any new results from tests;
4. Examine, and possible change, medication scheme;
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5. Note changes in treatment.
If we focus on the context sensitive part of the system, its main purpose
is to examine the artefacts, represented by agents, in the environment
and find those that can supply relevant information. If we examine a
particular pre-ward round situation, here one occurring at the cardiology
ward, the problem can be decomposed as depicted in Figure H.10.
Figure H.10 demonstrates how the initial problem of finding the name
of the patient can be facilitated by the Patient List Agent. Further on,
the ‘Acquire Information’ task is decomposed into one task that acquires
changes which are supplied by the Electronic Patient Record, the WiseW
application and the Patient Chart, and another task that acquires results
which can be delivered by the Patient Chart and the WiseW application.
So far this application only supplies information without any explanation
of its behaviour.
In order to demonstrate how the explanation goal problem frames can
be used to model explanatory needs in the problem domain, we will start
with a simplified problem diagram for our application (Figure H.6). We
have modified Jackson’s information display problem frame (Figure H.7)
and used it as a starting point for the diagram. You can see three do-
mains representing (groups of) the agents mentioned in Figure H.10 and
explained above.
Additionally, you see the ‘Display’ domain which stands for the infor-
mation display of the system and ‘System Knowledge’ for deciding which
data sources to use. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, we have ab-
stracted away the sensor parts of as well as the context aware parts of our
example application and focus solely on the information gathering and
display parts.
Let us now assume that the results displayed by the system are of such
a nature that the physician using the system requires an explanation. Let
us further focus on the transparency and justification explanations.
The transparency and justification explanations are related in the sense
that they to some degree serve the same purpose. Namely, to persuade
the user of the validity of the proposed solution and/or the validity of the
problem solving approach chosen by the system. In the work presented
here, we decide upon which of the two explanations to present as a func-
tion of the user’s level of competence. That is, expert users are subject to
transparency explanations and novice users to justification explanations
[Mao and Benbasat, 2000].
To model the explanatory capabilities of the system, we want to inte-
grate the explanation sub problems described by the two problem frame
diagrams for the Transparency and the Justification goal with the original
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Figure H.6.: Simplified problem diagram for an ambient intelligent sys-
tem for displaying medical information in pre-ward rounds.
Figure H.7.: Jackson’s information display problem frame diagram.
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Figure H.8.: Simplified problem diagram with explanation problem
frames added.
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application problem diagram. The goal is to compose a single problem
diagram for the three sub problems depicted in Figure H.8.
Figure H.9.: Simplified problem diagram with explanation problem
frames integrated and user model added.
Figure H.9 shows one possible problem diagram for an explanation
aware patient information display system. In order to be able to chose
the right type of explanation – transparency or justification – we have in-
cluded a user model component in this diagram. The need for this domain
became clear when we tried to integrate the two different explanation ma-
chines. Please note also that we now share one common display for both
the information delivery and explanation delivery.
The problem diagram depicted in Figure H.9 is a simplified version of
a real world diagram. The solution shown is probably not the best one
possible, but it can be seen that different sub problems can be composed
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into a larger problem diagram. Some of the domains of the problems
can be shared, whereas others might only be used by one or some sub
problems (please note the user model in our example).
Figure H.10.: Decomposition tree for a pre-ward round situation, as con-
structed by our context sensitive component.
After we have included the explanatory machine in our problem dia-
gram, we can re-visit the problem described above. The expert user physi-
cian might wish to know how the particular combination of information
displayed was reached. According to the transparency explanation prob-
lem frame, this explanation can be achieved by displaying the reasoning
trace. This can for example be done by showing that the top task ‘Pre-
ward round’ was selected as a function of the classification, by display-
ing how the decomposition tree looks like, and by supplying information
about the agents which were selected.
For the justification explanation, the novice user physician would like
to know why this combination of information is any good. This can be
achieved by relating the reasoning trace to the domain model of the sys-
tem. For example, according to the domain model, the ‘Acquire Medica-
tion’ task could be satisfied not only by the Patient Chart but also by the
Electronic Patient Record. However, as the Electronic Patient Record agent
was busy serving other requests only the Patient Chart could respond to
this request.
This example shows how the use of explanation goal problem frames
can explicate which kind of explanatory knowledge is necessary to sup-
port the explanatory needs of the users of the system. It can help identify-
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ing the structure of the problem at hand and the knowledge components
required. It can further on be used as a means of communication between
prospective users, software engineers, and knowledge engineers.
H.6 Conclusion and Future Work
This is ongoing work, but we have sketched how a set of problem frames
targeted specifically towards explanatory capabilities of knowledge based
systems can support the engineering process of explanation aware sys-
tems. With the explicit use of patterns, we have started to formalise
the previously introduced notions of explanation goals and explanation
kinds.
Until now, we have only looked out into the environment in which
the intelligent system has to function, and proposed a formal notation
for the description of user goals. These outward looking descriptions
should further be connected with another view looking inwards towards
the implementation of the system.
There are two directions of research we want to explore. One direction
is to amend the explanation problem frames and to further analyse the
relation between explanation goals and explanation kinds. To this end,
we have to formalise the previously proposed stepwise refinement pro-
cess from goals to kinds [Roth-Berghofer and Cassens, 2005] so that we
can construct combined patterns for goals and kinds. By this, we are go-
ing to populate the proposed model with examples for how the outward
directed view on the non functional user requirements for explanation
aware systems can be combined with the inward directed view of neces-
sary explanatory knowledge.
The other direction is aimed at relating the proposed explanation goal
problem frames with architectural patterns. Ideally, this would enable
us to discuss explanation issues, knowledge aspects, HCI aspects, and
functional requirements at a very early stage of the development process
without any a priori assumptions about the problem solving methods
used.
Further on, it is necessary to extend the formalism at “both ends”,
meaning that we on one hand have to revisit our analysis of how the
necessary knowledge to support the different explanation kinds can be
represented in the actual system, and that we on the other hand have to
refine our socio-technical analysis to end up with a psychologically plau-
sible model for elucidating the explanatory needs of the prospected users.
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I.1 Introduction
Recent insights into both ubiquitous and pervasive computing have lead
to the realisation that to achieve the scenarios and visions proposed, sys-
tems must be viewed as more complex than initially argued by Weiser
[1991]. This has lead to the developments jointly labelled as ambient in-
telligence [Ducatel et al., 2001]. The explicit focus on intelligence stands
in stark contrast to the original argument by Weiser, where: “no revo-
lution in artificial intelligence is needed – just the proper embedding of
computers into the everyday world” [Weiser, 1991, p. 3].
The core of an ambient intelligent systems is the ability to appreciate
the system’s environment, be aware of persons in this environment, and
respond intelligently to their needs. To realise the abilities of an ambi-
ent intelligent system, three main areas of responsibility can be identi-
fied [Kofod-Petersen and Aamodt, 2006]: first, the initial responsibility of
perceiving the world that the system inhabits; second, the responsibility
of being aware of the environment and reason about ongoing situations,
which traditionally has been labelled as context awareness; and third, ex-
hibit appropriate behaviour in ongoing situations by being context sensitive
[Kofod-Petersen and Aamodt, 2006; Yau et al., 2002].
Arguably one of the most important aspects of an ongoing situation is
the activity that is occurring. For an ambient intelligent system to function
it must be able to reason about its own, as well as other ongoing activities.
Systems that aim at exhibiting the properties connected with ambient in-
telligence must be more than mere reactive systems, where deliberation
and reasoning plays an important part.
Marx [1867] demonstrates this difference by arguing that even though
a spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee
humbles many an architect, there is a significant difference between them.
Even the worst architects raise the structures in their imagination before
they are erected in reality. At the end of each labour-process, we get a
result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer. The labourer
not only affects the materials used, but also realises a purpose that gives
the law to his modus operandi, and to which the labourer’s will must
be subordinated. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process
demands that, during the whole operation, the workman will be steadily
in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he
is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried
on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to
his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.
The elementary factors of the labour-process are: i) the personal activity
of the labourer, ii) the subject of the work, and iii) its instruments.
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This is also the starting point for activity theory. To capture the activity
related aspects of any situation, activity theory [Vygotsky, 1978; Leont’ev,
1978] can be used to acquire and model the relevant knowledge. Briefly,
activity theory considers activities as a set of actions and operations on an
object. These actions and operations are conducted by a labourer, or sub-
ject, to achieve an already imagined outcome. The subject’s actions and
operations are mediated by the use of certain instruments, or artefacts.
We will elaborate on this later.
According to Turing [1950], one indication that a system is intelligent is
its ability to appear intelligent; i.e. by passing the Turing test. Therefore,
we need to understand what makes humans appear intelligent.
Following Kant, human understanding has as a necessary constituent
the ability to conceptualise perceived phenomena (structured through
‘categories of understanding’) through an active, discursive process of
making sense of the intuitive perception [Kant, 1787, p. 58].
In later works, Kant gives us a more detailed description of his un-
derstanding of human reason. He makes clear that the human ability of
reasoning has perceptivity (attentio), abstraction (abstractio), and reflec-
tion (reflexio) as its necessary preconditions [Kant, 1798, p. 138].
Further on, it is important to note that the ability of human beings to
act freely, the ability to initiate a causal chain from freedom, is coupled
with his ability to act morally (Kant describes freedom as the ratio essendi
of the moral law, while the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom
[Kant, 1788, p. 4]). Kant couples the ability to act morally (and thus freely)
with the ability to give a rational explanation of the behaviour in his cate-
gorical imperative – “Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the
same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation” [Kant, 1788,
p. 30]. Therefore, we can ascribe the ability of explaining ones behaviour
and motives to every rational being, that means to every intelligent entity.
We therefore count explanatory capabilities, in particular the ability to ex-
plain ones own understanding of the world and ones own behaviour, as a
necessary precondition for appearing intelligent.
I.2 Background
One approach to realising intelligent behaviour is by employing case-based
reasoning [Aamodt and Plaza, 1994]. This method springs from under-
standing reasoning as an explanation process [Schank, 1986]. Our under-
standing of common occurrences assists us in comprehending stories, in
such a way that details omitted or assumed implicitly do not make a story
incomprehensible for us. Our general knowledge about situations, the ex-
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pectations, and the behaviour which should be exhibited are stored in
what has been referred to in psychology as scripts [Schank and Abelson,
1977], which are closely related to the concept of schema [Bartlett, 1932;
Rumelhart, 1980].
Sørmo et al. [2005] present a framework for explanations in intelligent
systems with a special focus on case-based reasoning. Specifically, they
identify five goals that explanations can satisfy. The goal of transparency
is concerned with the system’s ability to explain how an answer was
reached. Justification deals with the ability to explain why the answer
is good. When dealing with the importance of a question asked, relevance
is the goal that must be satisfied. Conceptualization is the goal that han-
dles the meaning of concepts. Finally, learning is in itself a goal, as it
teaches us about the domain in question. These goals are defined from
the perspective of a human user. His expectation on what constitutes a
good explanation is situation dependend and has a historic dimension
[compare e.g. Leake, 1995].
Roth-Berghofer has explored some fundamental issues with different
useful kinds of explanations and their connection to the different knowl-
edge containers of a case-based reasoning system [Roth-Berghofer, 2004].
Based on earlier findings from natural language explanations in expert
systems, five different kinds of explanation are identified: conceptual expla-
nations, which map unknown new concepts to known ones, why-explana-
tions describing causes or justifications, how-explanations depicting causal
chains for an event, purpose-explanations describing the purpose or use
of something, and cognitive explanations predicting the behaviour of in-
telligent systems. Roth-Berghofer, further on, ties these different kinds of
explanation to the different knowledge containers of case-based reasoning
systems [Richter, 1995], namely case base, similarity measure, adaptation
knowledge, and vocabulary.
Building on these two works, we have earlier started to investigate a
combined framework of user goals and explanation kinds [Roth-Berghofer
and Cassens, 2005]. The goal of this work was to outline a design method-
ology that starts from an analysis of usage scenarios in order to be able to
identify possible expectations a user might have towards the explanatory
capabilities of an intelligent system. The requirements recognised can fur-
ther on be used to identify which kind of knowledge has to be represented
in the system, and which knowledge containers are best suited for this
task. In this work, we have identified the need for a socio-psychological
analysis of workplaces in order to be able to design systems that can
meaningful engage in socio-technical interactions.
In order to further explore the assumed advantages of designing sys-
tems from a socio-technical perspective, we have later on investigated the
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use of theories from industrial and organisational psychology in design-
ing a case-based reasoning system geared towards ambient intelligence.
The work presented here shows how the user-centric explanation goals
can be satisfied by relating kinds of explanations in context awareness
and context sensitivity with a socio-technical approach to modelling con-
text.
I.3 Use of Activity Theory as a Means to Model Context
We have published some work on using activity theory to model con-
text awareness [Kofod-Petersen and Cassens, 2006; Cassens and Kofod-
Petersen, 2006]. Although we have discussed the use of this theoretical
framework to help understand when to deliver an explanation [Cassens,
2004], we have not previously explored how to make use of the same theo-
retical framework for designing explanatory capabilities for context aware
systems. We will now outline how these deficiencies can be overcome.
First in this section, we will give a short summary of aspects of activity
theory that are important for this work. See Nardi [2003] for a short in-
troduction to activity theory and Bødker [1991]; Nardi [1996a] for deeper
coverage. The theoretical foundations of activity theory in general can be
found in the works of Vygotsky and Leont’ev Vygotsky [1978]; Leont’ev
[1978]; Vygotsky [1985].
Activity theory is a descriptive tool to help understand the unity of
consciousness and activity. Its focus lies on individual and collective work
practice. Some of its basic properties are:
• Hierarchical structure of activity: Activities (the topmost category)
are composed of goal-directed actions. These actions are performed
consciously. Actions, in turn, consist of non-conscious operations.
If an action fails, the operations comprising the action can get con-
ceptualised and might become conscious actions in the next attempt
to reach the overall goal. This is referred to as a breakdown situation.
• Object-orientedness: Objective and socially or culturally defined
properties. Our way of doing work is grounded in a praxis which
is shared by our co-workers and determined by tradition. The way
an artefact is used and the division of labour influences the design.
Hence, artefacts pass on the specific praxis they are designed for.
• Mediation: Human activity is mediated by tools, language, etc. The
artefacts as such are not the object of our activities, but appear al-
ready as socio-cultural entities.
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• Continuous Development: Both the tools used and the activity itself
are constantly reshaped. Tools reflects accumulated social knowl-
edge, hence they transport social history back into the activity and
to the user.
• Distinction between internal and external activities: Traditional
cognitive psychology focuses on what is denoted internal activities
in activity theory, but it is emphasised that these mental processes
cannot be properly understood when separated from external activ-
ities, that is the interaction with the outside world.
We have used an expanded model of activity theory, the Cultural His-
torical Activity Theory [CHAT, compare e.g. Kutti, 1996; Mwanza, 2000],
in order to analyse the use of technical artefacts as instruments for achiev-
ing a predefined goal in the work process as well as the role of social
components, like the division of labour and community rules.
We have linked these different aspects of an activity to related categories
of context in order to build a psychologically plausible context model.
At the same time, we have used the model to guide our analysis of the
work processes to be modeled into the system. However, we have not
exploited all of the above mentioned aspects of activity theory in order to
gain insight into the expectations and needs of the prospective users with
regard to explanations.
I.4 Explanations and Context
The term explanation can have different foci. Either as goals that explana-
tions can satisfy or as kinds of explanations that can be given. In addition,
Leake identifies three different facets of explanations within the context
of case-based reasoning [Leake, 2004]:
• Using explanations to support the case-based reasoning process
• Generating explanations by case-based reasoning
• Using cases for explaining system results to an external user
With our notion of user goals, we can subsume the last two facets as
both being targeted towards the user of the system. In our understand-
ing, showing the case to the user is a special case of ‘generating expla-
nations by case-based reasoning’, making use of the case-based reasoning
assumption that similar problems have similar solutions. Provided that
the user has some knowledge about the similarity function and that the
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case structure is understandable by the user, the displayed case acts as an
explanation to the user [see e.g. Sørmo et al., 2005; Cunningham et al.,
2003]. We are left with two functions of an explanation, as described in
Aamodt [1991]: first, enhancing and promoting the reasoning process.
Second, delivering some knowledge about the reasoning process, its re-
sults, or implication to the user. We call the first aspect the system centric
view on explanation and the second one the user centric view on explana-
tion:1
• Explanation as part of the reasoning process itself.
Example: a knowledge intensive case-based reasoning system can
use its domain knowledge to explain the absence/variation of fea-
ture values.
• Giving explanations of the found solution, its application, or the
reasoning process to the user.
Example: in an engine failure diagnosis system, the user gets an
explanation on why a particular case was matched.
We have earlier argued that an ambient intelligent system consists of
three layers, each with their own responsibility [Kofod-Petersen and Aa-
modt, 2006]. The top layer is responsible for perceiving the world and order
the perceived data into a coherent context structure on which reasoning is
possible. The awareness layer is responsible for assessing the context and
classify an ongoing situation. This layer demonstrates the ability of context
awareness. Finally, the third layer is responsible for selecting and executing
suitable behaviour based on the classification done in the awareness layer.
This ability is referred to as context sensitivity.
In this architecture, context serves two purposes. Initially it is used as
a focussing lens on the part of the world that can be perceived. Here the
context limits the parts of the knowledge that the system uses to classify
the situation. The second use of context is in the context sensitivity layer,
where context is viewed as a lens that focuses the part of the system’s
knowledge that is to be used to satisfy the goal of the situation.
Figure I.1 depicts the dual use of context. Initially the Situation Context
is what the context aware part uses to execute the case-based reasoning
process that classifies the situation. Once the situation has been classified
a suitable goal for this situation is found. This goal further limits the part
of the context that is necessary for the context sensitivity part to exhibit
appropriate behaviour. The goal as well as the context are made available
to the context sensitivity part, as is indicated by the Goal arrow and the
Goal Context in the figure.
1This distinction is valid not only for case-based reasoning systems.
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Figure I.1.: Dual use of Context
For the purpose of this paper we will disregard the perception layer of
the architecture as the perception layer demonstrates no reasoning capa-
bilities, and only structures perceived data syntactically. Following our
earlier arguments introduced in Kofod-Petersen and Aamodt [2006], we
identify these two aspects as two distinct steps in the reasoning process:
• Context Awareness: Trying to detect which situation the system is
in.
Example: An ambient intelligent system for supporting health per-
sonnel figures out that the user is on a ward-round because of the
time of the day, the location, and the other persons present.
• Context Sensitivity: Acting according to the situation the system
thinks it is in.
Example: the same system fetches the newest versions of electronic
patient records of all patients in the room from the hospital sys-
tems. When the user stands close to the bed of a patient, the system
automatically displays them.
Combining these views on explanation and on context, we end up with
two dimensions of inquiry as depicted in Table I.1. This table shows the
four different areas where explanations can be required, divided into a
system centric and user centric view.
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Table I.1.: Context and Explanations
Context Awareness Context Sensitivity
System Centric Generate an
explanation to
recognise the situation
Identify the behaviour
the system should
expose
User Centric Elucidate why the
system identifies a
particular situation
Explicate why a certain
behaviour was chosen
In the system centric view where explanations are a part of the rea-
soning process it is possible to initially generate an explanation used to
recognise the situation. In this step we are using explanations to find out
what situation we are in, by explaining similarities between a new situa-
tion and previously experienced situations. Following the recognition of a
situation we can now use explanations to identify appropriate behaviour.
When dealing with the user centric view we can initially use explana-
tions to elucidate why the system assumes that we are in a certain sit-
uation. The system can use all available sources of knowledge in order
to gain the user’s confidence in its capabilities. In the situation where
the the system is required to explicate the behaviour that it exhibits, the
explanation is used to explain why it takes a specific action.
As described above, activity theory has been used to recognise contex-
tual facets of a work situation. By integrating the knowledge necessary
for supporting the different explanatory goals of the user with this contex-
tual information, the explanatory capabilities of the system are coupled
with the different contexts. Hence, the hypothesis is that this explanatory
knowledge will indeed primarily be used in the appropriate context.
We will now explore the relations between the basic properties of activ-
ity theory and explanation goals.
Hierarchical structure of activity: The fact that activities are hierarchi-
cally structured, and that changes in these structures occur, facilitates cer-
tain explanation goals. Actions that are performed often will be trans-
formed into operations. Vice versa, if an anticipated outcome of an op-
eration does not occur, non-conscious operation will become conscious
actions. This is called a breakdown situation. The explanatory capabili-
ties of a system should support this. In fact two goals are relevant in these
situations:
• Transparency: If parts of the non-conscious operations are carried
out by artefacts, the system might need sufficient knowledge to ex-
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plain the artefacts inner working in case of a breakdown.
• Relevance: If an artefact involved in an action can behave differ-
ently than expected, it should be made clear why the unexpected
behaviour occurred.
Object-orientedness: In the activity theoretical sense of the term object-
oriented, the meaning of this term is twofold. On one hand, it highlights
that all human activities have an objective, a goal, and therefore points to-
wards the mental part of an activity. On the other hand, it refers to the fact
that this mental objectives are directed towards the physical world. This
holds for automated processes insofar as the automation already assumes
a goal, and is supposed to support this goal:
• Transparency: It should be possible for a system to explain its rela-
tion to the physical processes.
• Justification: An intelligent system should be able to explain its
goals to the user.
Mediation: Every activity will incorporate some tools, be it physical (like
machinery) or psychological artefacts (like language). If parts of the ac-
tivity are carried out by an intelligent artefact, this artefact both acts as
a mediator in the physical world and as a mediator of the psychological
processes of the user:
• Justification: The system should be able to explain the connection
between its actions and the reasoning process.
Continuous development: The aspect of continuous development deals
with the continuous change in the way we interact with the world. Both
the user’s activities and the artefacts used are changing. It should be
noted that this includes the necessity for an intelligent system to adopt to
changes over time:
• Learning: The system should be able to support the user’s learn-
ing processes. If the system is extended, or new capabilities are
included, the system should be able to act as teacher. It should
therefore incorporate knowledge about how the new component fa-
cilitates the problem solving process.
Distinction between internal and external activities: Activity theory
tries to overcome the dichotomy of mental processes and the outside
world by focussing on the relation between internal and external activ-
ities. It is therefore crucial that the system supports the user in building
an understanding of the artefacts used.
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• Conceptualisation: The system should support the user’s under-
standing of it by providing means of explaining its own world model
to him.
Not all explanation goals can be satisfied by an activity theoretical per-
spective alone. Some goals can only be satisfied by inspecting other parts
of the knowledge model, either in all cases or for certain situations. As an
example, when recognising a situation the transparency goal can be satis-
fied by supplying a trace of the reasoning process used for classification.
The different sources of knowledge required to satisfy the different goals
will be further discussed in the following section.
I.5 Identifying Explanations Kinds from Goals
With the combination of explanations and context described above it is
now possible to identify different kinds of explanations by identifying the
explanation goals of the user. The four different areas where explanations
can be required are shown in Table I.1. For the purpose of this paper we
will focus on the user centric perspective where explanations are used to
elucidate why the system identifies a particular situation and to explicate
why a certain behaviour was chosen.
As we have stated before, users do not interact with an ambient in-
telligent system by traditional means only but also through behavioural
interfaces. This means also that if the system gets everything right, it
should be unobtrusive and supportive. The main situations where ex-
planations are necessary are when something goes wrong, i.e. the system
does not recognise the correct context or follows a path of actions which
the user perceives as wrong, unusual, or unexpected. So while we do not
dismiss the option that a user wants some explanation from the system
even if it does what the user expects, we do not focus on this aspect in
this paper. But it has to be kept in mind that the system’s explanatory ca-
pabilities should also cover its ability to explain itself when nothing goes
wrong. This is of special importance during the beginning of the use of
the system in order to gain the user’s trust into the system.
We would also like to point out that we have chosen not to consider
the learning goal in this paper. The learning goal is specifically targeted
towards educational systems. The goal of such a system is typically not
only to find a good solution to a problem, but to explain the solution
process to the user in a way that will increase his understanding of the
domain. We do not consider this type of systems at the time being.
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I.5.1 Context Awareness
In case of the context aware user centric perspective the system might
misclassify a situation. In this case the system must satisfy the goals of
transparency, justification and conceptualisation. In case of transparency and
justification they explain the process through which the classification was
reached. The choice between a transparency or justification goal is gov-
erned by the user’s proficiency level. Where an expert user will require
transparency, a novice user requires justification2. These two goals map to
the ‘how’ and ‘why’ explanation kinds, where ‘how’ explains the causal
chain of events leading to the classification, and ‘why’ justifies why the
system thinks that the answer is good. The knowledge required to supply
these kinds of explanations is found within the reasoning method, e.g.
similarity measures in case-based reasoning.
I.5.2 Context Sensitivity
When dealing with the context sensitive user centric perspective, the sys-
tem has two main situations in which explicating is required (not counting
the situation where the system exhibits flawless behaviour). These two
main situations are when the system exhibits wrong behaviour for the sit-
uation, and when it exhibits unexpected behaviour. Both of these situations
can result in a breakdown situation as defined by activity theory. In case
of a wrong behaviour the system’s goal is not in line with the user’s goal,
any operations performed by the user will fail and become actions, thus
a breakdown situation is occurring. In this case, the system displaying
wrong behaviour must satisfy the same goals as when misclassifying the
situation. This means that the transparency/justification goals must be sat-
isfied. As with the case of misclassification, these goals map to the ‘why’
and ‘how’ kinds, which require knowledge about the reasoning process
employed. In addition, the hierarchical structure principle in activity the-
ory can guide the process through which these goals are satisfied.
From a user perspective, the system can behave unexpectedly in several
different manners: it can request an unexpected action from the users, non-
user actions can be performed by a new or alternative person or by a new or
unexpected artefact.
When the system requests a new action from the user, a breakdown sit-
uation occurs, and the user must respond consciously. Again, the goals
of transparency/justification must be satisfied. In addition, the system must
satisfy the relevance goal by explaining the relevance of the requested ac-
tion, and in case of previously unperformed actions conceptualization is
2This separation will be used consistently throughout the rest of the paper.
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required. The hierarchical structure principle in activity theory can guide
the process through which the transparency/justification and relevance goals
are satisfied, whereas the conceptualization goal can be satisfied by inspect-
ing the specific domain model. The relevance goal maps to the ‘purpose’
kind where an explanation of the purpose of the requested action gives
the relevance. Finally the conceptualization goal maps to the ‘conceptual-
ization’ kind, mapping unknown concepts to known ones.
If a non-user action is performed by a new or alternative artefact, three
goals must be satisfied: transparency/justification, relevance and conceptual-
ization. The mediation principle in activity theory can guide the process
where the transparency/justification goal is satisfied, whereas the relevance
and conceptualization goals are satisfied by inspecting the specific domain
model. As aforementioned the transparency/justification goals map to the
‘why’ and ‘how’ kinds and the conceptualization goal maps to the ‘con-
ceptualization’ kind. In the case of the relevance goal, this maps to the
‘purpose’ kind when dealing with alternative artefacts by describing the
purpose of this artefact. When dealing with a new artefact, the relevance
goal also maps to the ‘conceptualization’ kind.
For non-user actions performed by a new or alternative person, the de-
scription is similar to the one for artefacts. However, one important dis-
tinction exists. In the activity theoretical part of the knowledge model
persons are part of the community that cooperates with the user through
a division of labour. However, our current modelling of persons and roles
does not distinguish between the two. Thus, even though an action is per-
formed by a new or alternative person, the fact that the role is unchanged
means that the activity as viewed from the system is unchanged. This is
contrary to the way artefacts are perceived, where using a new or alter-
native artefact to perform an action will result in a change in the activity.
This means that no activity theoretical principle can guide the satisfaction
of the goals, thus other parts of the knowledge model must be inspected.
I.6 Example
We will briefly investigate the relations between context and explanation
by the means of an example. Let us consider the following scenario: We
have a case-based diagnostic system for aircraft failures. An engineer is
equipped with an intelligent mobile assistant and one of his tasks is to
diagnose the probable causes of engine problems. Let us assume that
the engineer is working both at his home base and at line stations where
faults have occurred.
Scenario 1 – Misclassified Context: Let us assume that our engineer
248
I.7. Summary and Future Work
is going to work with the head of engineering on a new schedule for
sending engineers to line stations. He is doing administrative work and
not working on technical problems. The time of this meeting, however,
is at a time where there is usually a briefing with all engineers, and the
system also recognises that some of the other people usually participating
at this meeting are present. However, instead of being in a meeting room,
we are at the office of the head of the engineering group, a fact which
contradicts the assumption of being in the briefing. The system might
now explain away this unusual facet by generalising that both the meeting
room and the office are rooms and that an office to a certain degree serves
the same purpose as a meeting room. Therefore, the system assumes that
we are in a briefing and delivers fault information about the airplanes
which are scheduled to be worked on.
When this error becomes obvious to the engineer, he might want to
check why the system displayed this kind of information. So we are in the
explicate phase of Table I.1. If he is an expert user of the system, he might
have an interest what lead to the problem, so his goal is transparency. The
kind of explanation helpful is a ‘why’ explanation, in particular one where
the system displays the best matched cases and that it has classified the
office as a general kind of room.
Scenario 2 – New Artefact Used: Let us now assume that the engineer
is working on a diagnostic task and, in the course of this task, needs access
to some performance data. This is recognised by the system. The knowl-
edge source usually used for this kind of data is temporarily not available,
so the system queries a different system which was added recently. This
comes as a suprise to the engineer who was not aware of neither the un-
availability of the first system nor the existence of the second.
The engineer now wants to know why the data from the new system
is helpfull, he has a relevance goal. This can be supported by a ‘purpose’
kind of explanation, and by inspecting its own domain knowledge, the
system can describe the purpose of the new data source, for example by
explaining that the new data source is a backup system for performance
data.
I.7 Summary and Future Work
This paper builds on a view of ambient intelligence encompassing first
an understanding of the situation (context awareness) and then decisions
on behaviour (context sensitivity). It has been argued that in both phases,
explanations can be viewed from a system centric as well as a user centric
perspective. It has further been described how explanations play a key
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role in ambient intelligent systems as a necessary prerequisite for a system
being perceived as intelligent by human users.
The conceptual framework presented here describes how explanations
can be used in the different parts of an ambient intelligent system. Fur-
ther on, it describes how knowledge about requirements for explanations
which can fulfil different user goals can be gained. We have introduced
a means of taking user goals into account which is both psychologically
plausible and in line with the tradition in context aware computing.
We have further on outlined how an understanding for user goals can
be obtained both from an activity theoretic analysis of the activity environ-
ment and from the general and domain specific knowledge encompassed
in the system at hand.
We have described how different user goals for explanations are related
to different kinds of explanation and by this have outlined what knowl-
edge a system has to contain in order to fulfil the user’s goals. However,
we have not yet tied this into a detailed methodology for intelligent sys-
tems design.
The three layered conceptual architecture (perception – awareness – sen-
sitivity) combined with our conceptual model of explanations in ambient
intelligence gives a foundation for the development of explanation aware
applications. The different goals a user might have towards explanations
together with their mapping to kinds and the inclusion of socio-technical
analytic methods help us integrating the explanatory capabilities of the
application at an early stage of the design process.
Our current implementation of an ambient intelligent case-based rea-
soning system can cater to the system centric perspective of explanations
to some degree, but this has to be developed further. Regarding the user
centric perspective, the current application does support the transparency,
conceptualization and justification goals, where the latter is only sup-
ported partially due to the underlying issues with plausible inheritance in
the current Java implementation. For the other goals, further implemen-
tation work is necessary.
Another aspect that deserves further attention is our model of the di-
vision of labour. In order to reconcile our view on artifacts and humans,
we have to find ways to integrate the modelling of different persons as
subjects into our generic context model.
Additionally, we want to augment existing design guidelines with meth-
ods for the analysis of social aspects which can lead to a better under-
standing of the environment in which the ambient intelligent system has
to function than ad-hoc methods can give. It is also important to note that
we have not yet fully utilised some aspects of our theoretical foundations
in organisational psychology, like the notions of breakdown situations or
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functional organs in activity theory, or the use of semiotics for the organ-
isation of the user interface itself.
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My main contributions to the paper:
• Background on explanation and CBR
• Original version of facets of explanation and context
• Description of the different relations
The following aspects were jointly developed by the authors:
• Final version of facets of explanation and context
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Ambient intelligent systems are described by their ability to be aware of
its users, perceive their needs and respond intelligently to them [Duca-
tel et al., 2001]. To achieve this, such a system must exhibit pro-activity
and reasoning. Thus, contrary to traditional systems where the user is
in charge and the system plays a passive role, ambient intelligent system
can assume responsibility and behave proactively. The shift from passive
systems, to what could be regarded as a partnership between humans
and intelligent artefacts, fosters the need for social adept system [Marsh,
1995], in such a way that intelligent systems have to show certain abilities
traditionally ascribed to humans [Pieters, 2001]. Among these abilities,
we would count a system’s ability to explain its behaviour.
Further, the nature of an ambient intelligent system dictates that the
way we traditionally interact with computer systems are substituted with
multi modal interfaces and in particular behavioural interfaces. It is not
only the input devices where behavioural interfaces are used; the main
output device for an ambient intelligent system is its behaviour. Thus, a
user now runs the risk of having to master the methods of behavioural
psychology to use an ambient intelligent system. Relying solely on ob-
serving the behaviour of an ambient intelligent system will, at best, give
us a limited understanding of its behaviour. It will not allow us to con-
sider any internal organisation. Yet, to persuade the user of a system’s
usability and credibility, explanations are in order
The work presented here argues that explanations are not just an addi-
tion to an ambient intelligent system; rather it is an approach to the design
and implementation of such a system. Explanations are a useful approach
to both the reasoning process from a system centric perspective, as well
as a means of communication viewed from a user centric perspective.
This paper is structured as follows: First, an overview on how expla-
nations and case-based reasoning are related is given. Secondly, an intro-
duction to the use of case-based reasoning in ambient intelligence, as well
as a short overview of the system employed here, is presented. Thirdly,
a description of the theoretical framework underpinning our approach to
the use of explanations and case-based reasoning in ambient intelligence
is given. A summary and pointers to future work ends the paper.
J.2 Explanations and Case-based Reasoning
Originally, case-based reasoning did emerge from an understanding of
reasoning as an explanation process [Schank, 1983, 1986]. Schank de-
scribes explanations as the most common method used by humans to
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support their decision making. An understanding of common occurrences
assists in comprehending stories; in such a way that details omitted or as-
sumed implicitly do not make a story incomprehensible.
Sørmo et al. [2005] present a framework for explanations in intelligent
systems with a special focus on case-based reasoning. Specifically, they
identify five goals that explanations can satisfy. The goal of transparency
is concerned with the system’s ability to explain how an answer was
reached. Justification deals with the ability to explain why the answer
is good. When dealing with the importance of a question asked, relevance
is the goal that must be satisfied. Conceptualization is the goal that handles
the meaning of concepts. Finally, learning is in itself a goal, as it teaches
us about the domain in question.
Roth-Berghofer has explored some fundamental issues with different
useful kinds of explanation and their connection to the different knowl-
edge containers of a case-based reasoning system [Roth-Berghofer, 2004].
Five different kinds of explanation are identified: conceptual explanations,
which map unknown new concepts to known ones, why-explanations de-
scribing causes or justifications, how-explanations depicting causal chains
for an event, purpose-explanations describing the purpose or use of some-
thing, and cognitive explanations predicting the behaviour of intelligent sys-
tems. Roth-Berghofer further on ties these different kinds of explanation
to the different knowledge containers of case-based reasoning systems
[Richter, 1995], namely case base, similarity measure, adaptation knowl-
edge, and vocabulary.
Building on the last two works, we have earlier started to investigate a
combined framework of user goals and explanation kinds [Roth-Berghofer
and Cassens, 2005]. The goal of this work was to outline a design method-
ology that starts from an analysis of usage scenarios in order to be able to
identify possible expectations a user might have towards the explanatory
capabilities of an intelligent system. The requirements recognised can be
used to identify which kind of knowledge has to be represented in the
system, and which knowledge containers are best suited for this task. In
this work, we have identified the need for socio-psychological analyses of
workplaces in order to be able to design systems which can meaningful
engage in socio-technical interactions. The advantages of designing sys-
tems from a socio-technical perspective has been investigated through the
use of activity theory as a method for designing an ambient intelligent
case-based reasoning system [Kofod-Petersen and Cassens, 2006].
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J.3 Case-based Reasoning and Ambient Intelligence
Weiser, who coined the term ubiquitous computing, did explicitly state
that artificial intelligence was unimportant when realising the visions de-
scribed [Weiser, 1991, p.3]. This view that proper embedding of comput-
ers is sufficient does also to a large degree saturate the field of pervasive
computing. However, the insight that achievement of the visions described
in pervasive computing does indeed require some degree of reasoning
has lead to the developments jointly labelled as ambient intelligence.
The IST Advisory Group to the European Commission (ISTAG) de-
scribes ambient intelligence as human beings surrounded by intelligent
interfaces, supported by computing and network technology embedded
in everyday objects. More importantly, the environment should be aware
of the presence of a person, perceive the needs of this person and respond
intelligently to them [Ducatel et al., 2001].
The ability to be aware of the environment, reason about ongoing sit-
uations and decide about appropriate behaviour is closely linked with
being knowledgeable about the world. Case-based reasoning in general,
and knowledge intensive case-based reasoning in particular [Díaz-Agudo
and González-Calero, 2000; Aamodt, 2004], appears to be a promising
candidate for reasoning about situations and behaviour in an ambient in-
telligent setting.
Zimmermann reports on case-based reasoning used to generate recom-
mendations based on the user’s context in a mobile environment [Zim-
mermann, 2003]. The user context is encapsulated inside cases to facilitate
comparison of contexts, generating recommendations based on case sim-
ilarities, and learning of user behaviour. The cases are structured around
a context describing the user’s environment as the findings and a recom-
mendation for a particular audio file as the solution.
Along the same lines of adapting solutions to users is the work by Ma
et al., where case-based reasoning is used to adapt the behaviour of smart
homes to user preferences [Ma et al., 2005]. The cases are represented
as frames, where the findings are: the user, the environment, the time,
and the values of the active devices. When new cases are instantiated;
the similarities between the new and existing cases are calculated and a
setting for the appliances in the house is selected.
Recently Bénard et al. have investigated the use of case-based reason-
ing as a mechanism for selecting suitable behaviour in different situations
[Bénard et al., 2006]. They propose an agent-based architecture that uses
perceived information, or context, as the findings of a case and the pro-
posed action as the solution. The existing cases in the case base are pre-
classified situations modelled by a domain expert. The authors briefly
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describe how the case-based reasoning process approaches the problem
of behaviour selection. Initially a new context is compared to the findings
in the existing cases and the best matching case is retrieved. Secondly, the
retrieved case is adapted to fit the new context.
The work presented here builds on the experience gained by apply-
ing case-based reasoning to situation assessment in an ambient intelligent
system [Kofod-Petersen and Aamodt, 2003]. The architecture developed
and system implemented approaches ambient intelligence by separating
the main responsibilities into three layers.
The architecture has been implemented as an ambient intelligent system
in a hospital ward [Kofod-Petersen and Aamodt, 2006]. The personnel at
the hospital ward are involved in many different activities, such as doing
ward rounds, meetings and different forms of examinations. The system’s
main purpose is to recognise ongoing situations and proactively acquired
digital information relevant for the user.
Figure J.1 depicts the functional system architecture. The Context Mid-
dleware [Kofod-Petersen and Mikalsen, 2005b] provides an infrastructure
that perceives the environment by collecting and maintaining a coherent
model of available context. The CREEK agent implements and extends
the knowledge intensive case-based reasoning method CREEK [Aamodt,
2004], which is responsible for assessing occurring situations through con-
text awareness. This is done by constructing an unsolved case where the
findings are the context received from the Context Middleware. This case
is then matched to existing cases and the best matching case contains the
goal for this particular type of situation. This goal is then transmitted
to the Decomposer Agent, which decomposes according to the existing
artefacts and persons described in the context. Each of these entities are
described by an Application Agent that supplies information. These two
types of agents are together responsible for executing suitable system be-
haviour by being context sensitive.
The knowledge model utilised in this system is structured as a multi-
relational semantic network, where each of the five different parts are
integrated. Three parts of the knowledge model are universal for any
CREEK application: the top-level ontology, called ISOPOD; the domain-
specific model of general and factual knowledge; and the case base. In
addition to these, two parts have been developed for the ambient intel-
ligent system, namely the Basic Context Model and the Activity Theory
Model.
The Basic Context Model is structured around a meronomy based on
tradition in pervasive computing [Kofod-Petersen and Mikalsen, 2005b;
Göker and Myrhaug, 2002], which imposes a structure that facilitates
easy development of context sensitive applications [Kofod-Petersen and
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Figure J.1.: Functional System Architecture
Mikalsen, 2005a]. The Activity Theory Model captures knowledge re-
garding activities, which is one of the most important aspect of situations
[Cassens and Kofod-Petersen, 2006].
J.4 Facets of Explanation and Context
As outlined in Section J.2, the term explanation can have different focii in
artificial intelligence. In his introduction to the ECCBR-04 Workshop on
Explanation in case-based reasoning, David Leake [2004] has identified
three different facets of explanation and case-based reasoning:
• Using explanations to support the case-based reasoning process
• Generating explanations by case-based reasoning
• Using cases for explaining system results to an external user
With our notion of user goals, we can subsume the last two facets as
both being targeted towards the user of the system. In our understand-
ing, showing the case to the user is a special case of ‘generating expla-
nations by case-based reasoning’, making use of the case-based reasoning
assumption that similar problems have similar solutions. Provided that
the user has some knowledge about the similarity function and that the
case structure is understandable by the user, the displayed case acts as an
explanation to the user [see e.g. Sørmo et al., 2005; Cunningham et al.,
2003]. We are left with two functions of an explanation, as described in
Aamodt [1991]: first, enhancing and promoting the reasoning process.
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Table J.1.: Explanations
Context Awareness Context Sensitivity
System Centric Generate an
explanation to
recognise the situation
Identify the behaviour
the system should
expose
User Centric Elucidate why the
system identifies a
particular situation
Explicate why a certain
behaviour was chosen
Second, delivering some knowledge about the reasoning process, its re-
sults, or implication to the user. We call the first aspect the system centric
view on explanation and the second one the user centric view on explana-
tion:
• Explanation as part of the reasoning process itself.
Example: a knowledge intensive case-based reasoning system can
use its domain knowledge to explain the absence/variation of fea-
ture values.
• Giving explanations of the found solution, its application, or the
reasoning process to the user.
Example: in an engine failure diagnosis system, the user gets an
explanation on why a particular case was matched.
When we now look at the use of context, we can again identify different
views on context during the reasoning process and the use of the system.
First, the system has to identify an unknown situation out of its internal
state and the percieved state of the world. Here the system has to find
out which situation it is in. Second, the system has to act according to the
percieved state of the world and an assumed context. Following our ear-
lier argumentation introduced in Kofod-Petersen and Aamodt [2006], we
identify these two aspects as two distinct steps in the reasoning process:
• Context Awareness: Trying to figure out which situation the system
is in.
Example: An ambient intelligent system for supporting health per-
sonnel recognises that the user is on a ward-round because of the
time of the day, the location, and the other persons present.
• Context Sensitivity: Acting according to the situation the system
thinks it is in.
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Example: the same system fetches the newest versions of electronic
patient records of all patients in the room from the hospital sys-
tems. When the user stands close to the bed of a patient, the system
automatically displays them.
Combing these views on explanation and on context, we end up with two
dimensions of inquiry as depicted in Table J.1.
J.5 Using Explanations in an Ambient Intelligent System
We will further investigate the relationship between context and expla-
nations by examining an example from our current implementation. At
this time, our system is capable of assessing ongoing situations in a sim-
ulated hospital (cardiology) ward domain. The system’s main purpose is
to identify ongoing situations and proactively acquire digital information
required by the persons present.
Recognise:
In this step, we are using explanations to recognise the current ongoing sit-
uation. The system uses all available resources in its reasoning process.
Let us assume that the ongoing situation is a ward round. Normally ward
rounds take place in a patient room, however the current situation is oc-
curring in the hallway. This discrepancy can be explained away by the
system generalising that both locations can indeed contain patient beds.
When CREEK retrieves a matching case, the system has no explicit knowl-
edge stating that a hallway can contain hospital beds. The initial match is
of a syntactical nature only. However, it can use its general knowledge and
the reasoning mechanism of plausible inheritance to generate an explana-
tion supporting the hypothesis that beds can be located in the hallway, for
example because they are both some kinds of rooms, and beds are some
kinds of objects which have a room as a location. Therefore, as all other
parameters are consistent with a ward round, the system assumes that it
is indeed a ward round situation.
The explanation used by the system in this example states that a hallway
is a room and can therefore contain a hospital bed.
Elucidate:
We now want to generate an explanation for the user that tells the user why the
system assumes a certain situation. The system will make use of all avail-
able sources of knowledge in order to gain the user’s confidence in its
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capabilities. It will also have to consider the user’s goals when chosing
a specific explanation. It has been shown that simply presenting the rea-
soning trace is not always sufficient (it can even be counter productive)
[Majchrzak and Gasser, 1991; Gregor and Benbasat, 1999]. The system
might therefore generate an after-the-fact explanation, which for example
justifies its assumption instead. Since the ward round situation is occur-
ring at an unusual place, CREEK will point out the time of the day, the
availability of the other expected participants, and the fact that hallways
might contain beds, as the reason for its assumption instead of only dis-
playing its generalisation of the location.
The explanation shown to the user is a justification of the system’s be-
lieve of being on a ward round.
Identify:
After the system has successfully identified the context, it is using explana-
tions to generate a plan for a reasonable course of action. Now, it is using only
the knowledge sources important for the situation at hand (the context
is acting as a focus lense [Kofod-Petersen and Aamodt, 2006]). When we
now presume that the system has recognised that we are on a ward round,
discussing medical conditions and treatments with several patients, it will
try to prepare all the relevant information to be presented to the user. This
includes all test results. The system can now ask other available artefacts
for test results on the user, and the medical images database can offer a
MR image whereas the patient record offers a textual description of the
MRI. Because of limitations of handheld devices, the system will for ex-
ample not be able to display high resolution MR images. When choosing
which of the artefacts to query, the system will reject the medical image
database and only query the electronic patient record database.
The explanation used by the system is based on the knowledge that a
high resolution image displaying device is not available on a ward round.
Explicate:
Looking at the user centric part again, we are now in need of generating
an explanation for why the systems takes a specific action. The system will
take into account which situation it assumes it is in and the possible goals
the user might have for an explanation. In executing its plan, the system
proposes its user to visit the isolation room with patients which should be
kept seperate. The user is surprised since he is not aware that any of the
patient he should see at the ward round is in the isolation room, and no
information on this was exchanged in the morning briefing. The system
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can then generate an explanation that shows the relevance of the proposal
by pointing out that one particular patient had to be moved to the isolation
room for medical reasons since the time of the morning meeting, and
this information was available via the patient information system. This
explanation would not be useful if it had not been established already
that we are on a ward round and the aim was to visit the patients. Vice
versa, if the system would generate a justification for its assumption of
being on a ward round, this would still not satisfy the need of the user to
know why he should go to the isolation room.
The explanation shown to the user is pointing out the relevance of per-
forming a particular action, namely visiting the isolation room.
J.6 Summary and Future Work
This paper has presented an approach to combine explanations and case-
based reasoning in context awareness. It has been argued that expla-
nations can be viewed from both a system centric and user centric per-
spective. It has further been described how explanations play a key
role in ambient intelligent systems, where traditional interaction has been
changed, and division of responsibility has been shifted from user initi-
ated to mixed initiative.
The current implementation does support some of the goals seen from
an user centric perspective; that is elucidating why it assumes that a given
situation is occurring. The transparency goal is satisfied by CREEK’s abil-
ity to graphically represent the case-match and the underlying semantic
network representation, as well as a textual representation of the overall
match strength and individual feature matches. A textual representation
of explanations used in the reasoning process is also shown to the user.
The conceptualization goal is supported by providing a means to the user
to explore the relation of the case to the underlying knowledge base. By
examining the relations of the case features to this underlying knowledge
structure, the user can gain some insight into the conceptual model the
system has of the domain at hand.
The justification goal is to some degree supported in our current imple-
mentation. CREEK does explain why two different features are similar by
means of plausible inheritance [Sørmo, 2000].
The most important future development is to apply the facets of expla-
nation to the context sensitive part of our system. Here the Decomposer
and Application agents must be able to use a system centric perspective
on identifying a suitable behaviour in a given situation; as well as expli-
cating why a given behaviour was chosen to the user.
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Another direction for future research we want to explore is to tie our
findings back in to our earlier work on a design methodology for expla-
nation-aware intelligent systems with a socio-technical perspective. Our
research has shown that ambient intelligent systems can benefit from a
psychologically plausible knowledge model, but we have not yet explored
the relation to the different knowledge containers in detail.
Additionally, we want to augment existing design guidelines with meth-
ods for the analysis of social aspects that can lead to a better understand-
ing than ad-hoc methods. It is also important to note that we have not
yet fully utilised some aspects of our theoretical foundations in organisa-
tional psychology, like the notions of breakdown situations or functional
organs in Activity Theory, or the use of Semiotics for the organisation of
the user interface itself.
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Main Result:
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My main contributions to the paper:
• Background on ambient intelligence
• General remarks on semiotics in computing
The following aspects were jointly developed by the authors:
• Discussion of the relations between semiotics and ambient intelli-
gence
272
K.1. Introduction
K.1 Introduction
If we want an artefact to be considered intelligent, it must exhibit intelli-
gent behaviour. What we generally refer to when we say this is behaviour
that is contextually appropriate. An ability to accurately read context is
important for any animal if it is to survive, but it is especially important
to social animals and of these perhaps humans have made the most out
of being able to read context, where such an ability is tightly linked to
reasoning and cognition [Leake, 1995].
The necessity of exhibiting some kind of intelligent behaviour has lead
to the developments jointly labelled as ambient intelligence [Ducatel et al.,
2001]. But to successfully create intelligent artefacts, the socio-technical
processes and their changes through the use of mediating artefacts have
to be examined more closely. This paper focuses on how a social-semiotic
theory of language, in which context is seen as integral to understanding
communication, can be usefully employed to create ambient intelligence
both in architectural aspects and in intelligent response aspects. Ambient
intelligence and its requirements from semiotics is further discussed in
section K.2 below.
Not only do the artefacts present themselves through semiosis, but the
process of creating and developing these artefacts is a semiotic process.
Semiotics, as we interpret it in this paper through a Hallidayian model
(see section K.3), can be helpful not just in understanding the use of the
artefacts and their role in an overall sense making process, but also in
understanding and modelling the creation process. The relationship be-
tween semiotics and ambient intelligence is outlined in section K.4 below.
A semiotic analysis before beginning to develop artefacts can provide a
rich description of the environment in which devices will be embedded,
and this will ultimately lead to better devices, not only in the immediate
instance, but for future devices as well. In this paper we discuss one par-
ticular ways in which semiotics can be useful, namely in defining abstract
concepts, see in section K.5.
We conclude this paper by pointing to future work in this area. While
we have focused on devices designed to interact closely with a single user,
humans typically interact in groups, so it will be necessary to consider
the impact of this for environments where not all users share the same
meaning system.
K.2 Ambient Intelligence
In understanding human cognition and reasoning, disciplines such as
neuroscience, psychology, sociology, linguistics, and philosophy have had
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to take a stance on context as a concept. Setting aside the more mechanis-
tic views taken on reasoning, which typically need not consider context at
all, positions on context tend to fall into two broad domains: those who
see context as vast and unable to be coded and those who see it as vast
but able to be coded. This divides roughly along the same lines as the
relativism debate: those who believe in an ultimate reality and those who
believe reality is relative. For most this debate can remain largely theo-
retical impinging little on day to day research, for the field of artificial
intelligence however, this debate has very real consequences. Because of
the need to study reasoning in the real world, ambient intelligence has,
like fields such as anthropology, been forced to work with context how-
ever underelaborated the models.
At the core of any ambient intelligent system lies its ability to take
account of its environment, be aware of persons in this environment, and
respond intelligently to the persons needs and actions. Several authors
have identified three main aspects to realise the abilities of an ambient
intelligent system [for example Kofod-Petersen and Aamodt, 2006; Yau
et al., 2002]: first, the initial act of perceiving the world that the system
inhabits; second, being aware of the environment and reasoning about
ongoing situations, (traditionally labelled context awareness); and third,
exhibit appropriate behaviour in ongoing situations (often called being
context sensitive).
The idea that ambient intelligent systems have to exhibit awareness
makes modelling context a genuine artificial intelligence problem. The
artefact to be designed has to display some kind of behaviour which
makes it possible for human users to subscribe to its reasoning behaviour
as being the behaviour of an intelligent actant.
We consider that, besides the state changing activity, communication
and sense making processes occurring belong to the most consequential
aspects of an ongoing situation, and therefore the context. In this paper,
we are considering how intelligent devices can be integrated in the overall
sense making process during these activities. That is, we consider the
communication processes between the different actors involved, be they
human or artificial.
Intelligent computing devices, as additional actants, are construed
against the backdrop of an existing social context. At the same time, like
human actors, they bring their own history and abilities into this social
context, thus reconstruing the whole socio-technical process. If intelligent
devices are to be useful in a given social context, we have to understand
the interdependencies of these relations, and the ways in which intelligent
devices can change and be integrated into the existing communication
processes.
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Since these devices will serve specific purposes, they will not simply
observe, but will have to actively interact with other actants. The be-
haviour of the artefacts will change the situation, and these changes have
to be meaningful and useful for the human actants if the integration of
the artefacts is to be successful. Therefore, we argue that for an ambient
intelligent system to function, it must be able to reason about its own,
as well as other’s ongoing activities and communications. Ambient in-
telligence requires more than mere reactive systems. Deliberation and
reasoning must play an important part, and this means understanding
meaning making systems and how they are utilised in context.
K.3 Semiotics
Semiotics, or the study of sign systems, “has a past which acts on its
present and its future” [Hodge and Kress, 1988]. It is not our intention
in this paper to review the body of work surrounding semiotics though
we are mindful of the impact of this work on the field today, in particu-
lar the work of Saussure [1966], Peirce [1904] and Voloshinov [1973]. For
a comprehensive account of semiotics as it is applied to computing we
recommend works such as Gudwin and Queiroz [2006] (in particular An-
dersen and Brynskov [2006] and Clarke et al. [2006]) as well as de Souza
[2005]. The intelligent artefacts that we consider in this paper are an in-
tegral part of social interaction. They change the sense making process
on the side of the human users as well as their own functioning as signs
(contextualised by the users). Ideally, the artefact should be able to adapt
to its use and user, and the means for this adaptation will have to be laid
out by the designers.
In this research, we have used the social semiotics outlined by Halliday
(see for example Halliday [1978] and Halliday and Matthiessen [2004]).
Halliday combines the strengths of the approaches of Saussure, Pierce,
and Voloshinov. He brings together the tradition of relational thinking
from Saussure, the understanding that different modalities have conse-
quences for the structure of meanings from Pierce, and from Voloshinov,
the insistence that the sign is social.
Halliday’s Systemic Functional Theory of language (SFL) is a social
semiotic theory that sets out from the assumption that humans are so-
cial beings that are inclined to interact [Halliday, 1978]. In this paper we
examine the value of the SFL notion of context, which views context as
all the features of a social process relevant to meaning making. These
features are organised into 3 core parameters of context: Field, Tenor and
Mode, where field is “the nature of the social activity. . . ”, tenor is “the na-
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ture of social relations. . . ”, and mode is “the nature of contact. . . ” [Hasan,
1999]. Context, in SFL is one of four linguistic levels (see below), which
are related realizationally rather than causally, meaning that patterns on
one level both construe and construct patterns on another level. Halli-
day manages the complexity of language by modelling it as a multidi-
mensional system. The most crucial dimensions of this multidimensional
system for our purposes are: stratification and instantiation. We examine
how these key notions of SFL make this model of context valuable for AI.
Stratification: Halliday uses a stratified model of language that incor-
porates the levels of the expression plane (including sound systems - pho-
netics and phonology, gesture, pixels etc), lexicogrammar (lexis/grammar
- or wording and structure), semantics (the meaning system) and context
(culture and situation - elements of the social structure as they pertain
to meaning). Description on each stratum is functionally organised into
systems. All levels can be represented as networks of options with the
networks rendering any degree of complexity by combining 5 primitives:
• or: option between X or Y
• and: option between X and Y
• only if: only if x and y
• both: both X and Y
• iteration: re-enter the system and choose over.
By building in values for probabilities we arrive at a weighted descrip-
tion that is customised to the ’typical-actual’ of a given situation type (or
register, see below). Individual situations, roles, or participants can be
profiled by their pathways through the networks and/or by the ensemble
of options across the levels which are most typically invoked [Halliday
and Matthiessen, 2004].
Instantiation: Halliday uses a tripartite representation of language,
which has language as system, language as behaviour and language as
knowledge. Language as system encapsulates the abstract structure of
language. This accounts for the regularised (though changeable) pattern-
ings that we see in language. It is this regularity that makes prediction
and a certain degree of formalism (at least of a functional nature) possible.
Language as behaviour looks at the activity of language, while language
as knowledge looks at the way in which we know language. But we do
not do these things independently. We do not know language as a set of
abstract rules. Rather we know language in the sense of knowing how to
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Figure K.1.: The dimensions of language - Halliday and Matthiessen
use it, in the sense of knowing how to communicate with others [Halli-
day, 1978]. In practice these things occur together. When we try to build a
device, it is language behaviour and knowledge that we face, yet it is the
seemingly inaccessible system that we need to encode in order to produce
intelligent seeming behaviours and knowledge in the device.
The concept that encapsulates this problem is what Halliday calls the
cline of instantiation. This is a way of looking at the relationship between
System (which at the level of context means the culture) and Instance
(which at the level of context means the situation that we are in). This is
represented in figure K.1. Here we see in the foreground the system view
of language, and its grounding in the instance.
Instances that share a similar function, e.g. instances of ward rounds
in hospitals, typically share a similar structure. Halliday refers to these
situation types as registers and they represent a functional variety of lan-
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guage [Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004]. The value of register is that we
do not have to describe everything. Register can be thought of as an aper-
ture on the culture. So, we are not faced with the full complexity of the
culture. This does not mean that we do not keep the culture in mind. Any
picture of a part of the system necessarily has the full system behind it.
With register we set out from the instance, but keep in mind that each in-
stance is a take on the system. Our notion of what constitutes an instance
is shaped by our understanding of the culture/system. So, although Hal-
liday represents the relationship between system and instance as a cline
of instantiation, it is probably best understood as a dialectic since the two
are never actually possible without each other. Register does not so much
sit between system and instance, as it is a take on system and instance at
the one time. It is the culture brought to bear on the instance of the social
process.
For ambient intelligence, this means that we are not faced with the un-
helpful uniqueness of each instance, because we are viewing it through
the system and therefore foregrounding the shared aspects. Neither are
we confronted with the seemingly impossible task of transcribing the in-
finity of culture, because we are viewing the culture through the aperture
of the instance.
K.4 Semiotics in Ambient Intelligence
Interaction is a process of exchanging and interpreting symbols referring
to objects. The user of a computer systems sees his interaction with the
system against this background. When typing a letter, a user does not
send mere symbols, but signs to the computer, and the feedback from the
machine, the pixels on the screen, are interpreted as signs: to the user,
the computer is a semiotic machine. The question that arises is whether a
computer is actually itself taking part in the sense making process.
If we follow the lead of philosophers such as Kant, human understand-
ing has as a necessary constituent the ability to conceptualise perceived
phenomena through an active, discursive process of making sense of the
intuitive perception [Kant, 1787, p. 58]. This poses problems for com-
puter systems which are only processing signals, lacking the necessary
interpreting capabilities humans have. They only manipulate symbols
without conceptualising them. However, intelligence is in the eye of the
beholder, and it can be argued that even mere signal processing units can
appear as sign processors to the human if they mimic sufficiently human
behaviour.
The pragmaticist approach, by contrast, following for example Peirce
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and Dewey, avoids this question altogether by focusing not on whether
the machine is itself a sense maker, but on how its use changes the ongo-
ing socio-technical process, and whether it can mediate the sense making
process. From this point of view, the computer can be a sense making
agent if its actions are appropriate in terms of the user’s expectations.
Both approaches lead to a change in the issues we deal with when
constructing an ambient intelligent system. The problem is transformed
from one where the issue is to build a machine which itself realizes a
sense making process to one in which the issue is to build a computer
that displays actions appropriate to the context it is in and that exhibits
sufficient sign processing behaviour.
We argue that, in order to make an ambient intelligent system that be-
haves intelligently in a context, it must be able to execute actions that
make a difference to the overall sense making process in a given context.1
One important challenge here is the features that allow the system to
display its abilities. This can be described as a communication problem:
the system has to interpret the actions of the user and perceived con-
textual information in a meaningful way and itself present results that
make sense for the user. This process of sense-making is highly interac-
tive: an intelligent partner in a communication process asks (meaningful)
questions if an unclear situation occurs and is able to explain its own
actions. Therefore, it is desirable that the artefacts mimic some abilities
usually ascribed to humans (e.g. explanatory capabilities). Contextually
appropriate explanatory abilities are essentially a meaning making phe-
nomenon. This means that semiotics should be well positioned to assist
in understanding how such abilities can be introduced to artefacts.
K.5 Abstract Concepts
Abstraction, or the ability to create a more general category from a set of
specifics by whatever principle is arguably one of the most useful men-
tal tools that humans possess [Butt, 2006]. Indeed Whorf [1956] suggests
that the abstract categories that form part of our everyday life and lan-
guage, are typically below conscious attention and only become apparent
through linguistic analysis.
In the hospital environment, ’emergency’ has a specific meaning that is
distinct from the meaning in other contexts. Not only is there a hospi-
tal specific meaning (culture specific), but the meaning varies according
1Which differs from the interaction with traditional systems in which case the sense-
making falls wholly on the side of the human user: You do not expect a text processor to
understand your letter, but you expect an ambient intelligent system to display behaviour
as if it understands relevant parts of the context you are in.
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to the situation as well (situation specific). To function intelligently in
context, artefacts must be able to recognise ’emergency’ and respond ap-
propriately. They may need, for example, to "be quiet" while the doctor
deals with an ’emergency’ or they may need to "provide new information"
needed by the doctor in an ’emergency’.
To account for these complexities, a rich, but targeted, description of
the culture is needed. To do this we will use the notions of register and
generic structure potential [Hasan, 1994] and a contextual model of lan-
guage. In order to establish what emergency means in this context we
need to see its place in the system. That means we need to understand
how it fits in the hospital culture. Understanding the richness of the cul-
ture is part of adequately embedding a device into that culture. Not doing
so runs the risk of producing an artefact unsuited to its purpose and thus
unintelligent. Part of what makes something (appear) intelligent is the
ability to read and respond to the context. Context here is not just the im-
mediate setting of the artefacts, or the context of situation, but the culture
of which that setting is a part.
Consider the meaning of ’emergency’ for a ward round. The notion of
a ward round is itself a functional abstraction of all the behaviours, re-
lations, and communications that go into completing a ward round. We
are able to recognise from experience that certain behaviours by differ-
ent participants, combined with certain roles and relations (e.g. ward
doctor, ward nurse, patient, specialist) combined with the exchange of
certain types of information (receiving information, requesting informa-
tion, giving information) together constitute a ward round. None of these
behaviours, relations or communications on their own constitutes a ward
round, indeed, they are each necessary parts of other hospital functions
as well. By studying many instances we arrive at a ’typical’, or a generic
structure potential for a ward round. This does not mean that there will
not be variation. This perspective on the context is a necessary part of
understanding what a ward round is, but it is not the only perspective
that is necessary. Ward rounds must also be seen from the perspective
of how they fit into the hospital culture. Ward rounds are a part of the
function of the hospital, which, can be said to be restoration of health. In
order to make artefacts capable of dealing with change, it is necessary to
consider the culture in which ward rounds are embedded. the function
ward rounds perform in the hospital culture is to monitor health. Because
it has a ’monitoring’ function within the hospital culture, the ward round
will be able to be interrupted by ’emergencies’ from the wider hospital.
By building up a picture not only of what a ward round is, but also of
how it fits into the broader hospital culture, we are better able to see its
function, and thus what the meaning of ’emergency’ is likely to be in this
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situation. There are two broad categories of emergency: those constituting
an interruption to the ward round (when the hospital culture impinges
on the ward round) and those constituting a change to the ward round
(when there is internal variation in the ward round context). Because the
first involves changes to the field (a new topic, ward, and focus), tenor
(very different participants and role relations), it is likely to require a
’new information response’. The second, will not involve changes to the
field or tenor, or at least not major changes and so is likely to require a
’be quiet and await query’ response. By utilising the notion of register to
limit what we have to consider in the culture, and the concept of generic
structure potential to model a typical view of the situation based on our
study of the instances, we are able to better understand the context of the
ward round and how to model abstract concepts for this context.
K.6 Conclusion and further work
In this paper we have considerered one of several ways that semiotics
can be made fruitful in ambient intelligence. We have discussed how the
notion of abstract concepts and the use of the analytical tool of register
can help us to avoid an Althusserian trap of the last instance [Althusser,
1962] in our modelling efforts.
Systemic Functional Linguistics offers a unified approach to many of
the issues in ambient intelligence. If we utilise this approach to semiotics,
then we are in a position to draw on the work that is being done for other
projects where it is relevant to the context that we study. For example,
there is a lot of work being done around the world on hospital environ-
ments for different purposes. When this work is carried out using SFL, we
can generalise the findings to our own domain. This significantly reduces
the work load and labour cost, and still provides a rich description of the
context. This is only possible because we consider what is shared between
contexts while keeping in mind that each instance is a unique take on the
system.
This research has suggested many areas of future investigation. In this
project we have focused on the individual, but the sign making process is
a negotiated process. It is not simply one meaner that has to be consid-
ered. In any exchange there are always at least two meaners, and more
typically more than two. Multiparticipant communication represents a
challenge to modelling. We have to keep in mind that others may share
our conceptualisations and meanings only to a certain extent. When am-
bient intelligent systems link different people this is an important thing
to remember. The closer a person is in our social network the more likely
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they are to share our meanings, while the further out in our social net-
work the less likely they are to share meanings. In the hospital environ-
ment, ambient intelligent devices can belong to different groups of users.
Should we model them in a way that the assistant of a nurse is more
likely to share concepts with the assistant of another nurse than that of a
physician?
Ambient intelligent systems will have deal with these kinds of chal-
lenges. Another point to consider is where in the network the system
itself sits. What is the relation of the system to its user? To other per-
vasive devices? To their users? We are effectively dealing with a case
of dialectal variation. Certain users may find some signs transparent and
others not, while other users may find the exact opposite. If ambient intel-
ligent systems are used to link people how do they best utilise signs to do
this? This issue becomes very important when health care professionals
from different cultural and language backgrounds have to interact.
Another issue we would like to explore further is the extent to which it
is possible to relate a semiotic approach to ambient intelligent systems de-
sign to other socio-technical theories already in use in the field of ambient
intelligence. A promising candidate is for example activity theory. Bødker
and Andersen [2005] have outlined some properties of a socio-technical
approach taking advantage of ideas from both theoretical frameworks,
and we would like to extend this to cover specific aspects of SFL and
Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT). This will potentially extend
the number of projects from which we can borrow findings, meaning a
richer description of the hospital environment.
Another point we have not fully explored yet is the relation of concepts
from SFL with specific methods from the field of artificial intelligence. For
example, the notion of genres in SFL seems to be a likely candidate for
knowledge poor lazy learning mechanisms, while the descriptive power
of the register might be exploitable in knowledge intensive or ontology
based approaches. A promising candidate to combine these aspects is
knowledge-intensive case-based reasoning.
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Abstract:
Explanations are an important vehicle to convey information in everyday
human-human interaction. They enhance the knowledge of the commu-
nication partners in a way that furthers acceptance and understanding
for statements made or actions taken. Systems in general, and intelligent
systems in particular, should also have the capacity of explaining their
behaviour to users. To this end, it is important to be able to model the
explanatory needs of the human users and connect those to explanatory
capabilities of the system. This work looks at problem frames for expla-
nations and investigates how problem frames can be utilised to elicitate,
analyse, and specify explanation-specific requirements. These require-
ments are then coupled to the different ways in which explanations can
be used in ambient intelligent systems. The results can help designers in
modelling the knowledge needed to support the explanatory capabilities
of the system.
Main Result:
Building on the concept of explanation problem frames we have intro-
duced earlier (see Paper H), we further develop problems frames for am-
bient intelligent and explanation aware systems. We give an example of
how to use the newly developed frames in requirements engineering. To
this end, we take a step towards the re-design of an existing application
from the hospital ward domain and show how explanation patterns can
help to model requirements towards the explanatory capabilities of the
system.
285
L. Problem Frames for Explanation-Aware AmI Systems
Submitted to:
ECAI 2008 – The 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 21-
25 July 2008. Patras, Greece.
Copyright:
© 2007 Jörg Cassens and Anders Kofod-Petersen.
My main contributions to the paper:
• Discussion of related work
• Example for re-design
• Connection to user-centric/system-centric explanations
The following aspects were jointly developed by the authors:
• Refinements of explanation problem frames
286
L.1. Introduction
L.1 Introduction
Ambient intelligence describes environments where human beings are
surrounded by intelligent artefacts supported by computing and network
technology. Such environments augment everyday objects such as furni-
ture and clothes. In addition, an ambient intelligent environment should
be aware of the presence of a person, perceive the needs of this person,
and respond to them in an unobtrusive and intelligent manner [Duca-
tel et al., 2001]. Ambient intelligence can be seen as the intersection of
pervasive computing, ubiquitous computing, and AI.
The ability to explain itself, it’s reasoning and actions, has been iden-
tified as one core capability of any intelligent entity [Sørmo et al., 2005].
The question of what is considered to be a good explanation is context
dependent [Leake, 1995], leading to the necessity to design the explana-
tory capabilities of the system together with the modelling of the different
situations the ambient intelligent system is likely to encounter.
The work presented in this paper targets the requirements elicitation,
analysation, and specification processes. We make use of the notion of
problem frames [Jackson, 2001], which appears to be a promising method
both in helping to elicit requirements and in later transformation of de-
sign documents into actual systems. Cassens and Kofod-Petersen have
previously suggested additional problem frames that target explanatory
capabilities explicitly [Cassens and Kofod-Petersen, 2007], and building
on their work we will demonstrate how problem frames can be put to
use in revealing limitations of an existing ambient intelligent systems de-
sign and can help to take needs into account arising from explanatory
capabilities when (re-) designing such a system.
L.2 Related Work
The use of patterns [Alexander et al., 1977] is common for different soft-
ware engineering approaches. Patterns can be used in different software
development phases and they can have different foci. We can also iden-
tify knowledge engineering approaches that make use of patterns for the
development of intelligent systems.
There are several methods and languages that use patterns and focus
explicitly on the knowledge aspects of system design. For example, the
goal of the INRECA [Bergmann et al., 2003] methodology is to support
the development of (industrial) case-based reasoning (CBR) applications.
Software process models from existing CBR applications are stored in an
experience base that is structured at three levels. The common generic level
is a collection of very generic processes, products, and methods for CBR
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applications. At the cookbook level, we find software models for particular
classes of applications (so called recipes). At the specific project level, expe-
riences from particular projects are stored. We can identify the recipes at
the cookbook level as patterns.
Another well-known approach is the CommonKADSmethodology [Sch-
reiber et al., 2000]. It is based on two different views on the development
process of knowledge based systems: the result perspective encompasses
a set of models of different aspects of the knowledge based system and
its environment, and the project management perspective starts from a spi-
ral life-cycle model that can be adapted to the particular project. The
CommonKADS template knowledge model provides a way of (partially)
reusing knowledge models in new applications and can be understood as
patterns in a software engineering sense.
When we look towards the software engineering world, we can see that
patterns are used in different phases of the design process.
On the software architecture level, we find architecture patterns [Avge-
riou and Zdun, 2005]. At this level, we encounter concepts like ‘Black-
boards’, ‘Model-View-Controller’, or ‘Pipes and Filters’. For finer grained
software development close to the actual implementation, one can make
use of design patterns that look inside towards the computer and its soft-
ware [Gamma et al., 1995]. Design patterns deal with concepts like ‘Fac-
tories’, ‘Facade’, and ‘Decorater’.
Early on in the requirements engineering process, problem frames [Jack-
son, 2001] is a method to classify software development problems. Prob-
lem frames look out into the world and attempt to describe the problem
and its solution in the real world. Problem frames introduce concepts like
‘Information Display’ and ‘Commanded Behaviour’.
Jackson’s set of basic problem frames can be extended to be better able
to model domain specific aspects. For example, Hatebur and Heisel [2005]
introduce new problem frames for security problems. Their proposal in-
cludes problem frames for issues like ‘Accept Authentication’ and ‘Secure
Data Transmission’. They also provide architectural patterns connected to
these problem frames.
Hall and Rapanotti [2005] have introduced extensions to the basic prob-
lem frames that will better facilitate socio-technical systems. They intro-
duce a ‘user interaction frame’, and employ the model-view-controller
perspective to ease decomposition. We will build on this results in our
own work on ambient intelligent systems as a special class of socio-tech-
nical systems where user interaction is not only achieved via explicit com-
munication, but also through the behaviour of both system and user.
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L.3 Problem Frames
The main purpose of any problem frame [Jackson, 2001] is to propose a
machine that improves the combined performance of itself and its envi-
ronment by describing the machine’s behaviour in a specification. Jack-
son originally described five different basic frames. In general, a problem
frame assumes a user driven perspective. Most basic frames assume that
the user is in control and dictates the behaviour of the machine. Since
intelligent systems (ideally) take a much more pro-active approach and
mixed initiative issues become relevant, new problem frames addressing
these topics have to be developed. For the course of this paper, we will
focus on frames targeting explanatory aspects and will not discuss other
types.
Problem frames can be described by problem frame diagrams. These
diagrams consist basically of dashed ovals, representing the requirements,
plain rectangles, denoting application domains, and a rectangle with a
double vertical stripe, standing for the machine (or software machine)
domain to be developed. These entities become the nodes of the frame
diagram. They are connected by edges, representing shared phenomena
and denoting an interface. Dashed edges refer to requirement references.
Dashed arrows designate constraining requirement references.
The domains can be of different types, indicated by a letter in the lower
right corner. Here, a ‘C’ stands for a causal domain whose properties
include predictable causal relationships among its phenomena. A ‘B’ de-
notes a biddable domain that lacks positive predictable internal behaviour.
Biddable domains are usually associated with user actions. Finally, an
‘X’ marks a lexical domain. Such a domain is a physical representation of
data and combines causal and symbolic phenomena.
L.4 Problem Frames and Ambient Intelligence
Following the definition of ambient intelligence [Ducatel et al., 2001], in
general an Ambient Intelligent system can be fitted into a Required Be-
haviour problem frame. Fig. L.1 illustrates this. AmI!C1 is the phenomena
shared between the machine and the environment, and controlled by the
systems; that is the actuators. The E!C2 is the phenomena shared between
the machine and the environment, which is not controlled by the machine;
that is the sensors. Finally, C3 refers to the behaviour that the machine is
to exhibit.
Even though required behaviour frames are generally and by definition
suitable for ambient intelligent systems, some special cases exist where ex-
plicit user interaction is required other than through behavioural interfaces.
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Figure L.1.: Ambient Intelligent Systems as a Controlled Behaviour Frame
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behaviour
C4,C5Interaction
machine
Figure L.2.: User Interaction Frame [adopted from Hall and Rapanotti,
2005]
It has been argued that any adaptive system in general, and an ambient
intelligent system in particular, must exhibit the ability to explain its be-
haviour [Kofod-Petersen and Cassens, 2007]. This ability requires that the
system is able to communicate with the user through suitable interfaces,
such as displays. In addition, the user should have the option to explic-
itly request an explanation of the system’s behaviour. Thus, a suitable
problem frame is required to capture this.
Following the argumentation of Hall and Rapanotti [2005], we employ
the User Interaction Frame, depicted in Fig. L.2. AmI!C4 is the symbolic
phenomena shared between the machine and the user, where the machine
can display information to the user. U!C5 is the causal shared phenomena
between the machine and the user, where the user initiates commands.
Finally, C4,C5 are the rules of conduct between the machine and the user.
Again following Hall and Rapanotti, we can combine these two frames
into an Interactive Ambient Intelligence Frame, as depicted in Fig. L.3. Here,
interactive, explanatory capabilities are combined with the environment
controlling aspects of ambient intelligent systems. This aggregation dif-
fers significantly from the original required behaviour frame [Jackson, 2001].
The behaviour of the ambient intelligent system is not mainly guided by
explicit input from the user, but is a result of the pro-activeness of the sys-
tem and implicit interaction (for example the location of the user). But it
opens up for direct interaction, for example by the user requesting an ex-
planation. This will, however, not directly command the whole behaviour
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Figure L.4.: Transparency Explanation
of the system, but only a small part of it. In that sense it further on differs
from the user commanded frame in Hall and Rapanotti [2005] as the sys-
tem can take actions that are not triggered through commands explicitly
issued by the user.
L.4.1 Explanation Problem Frames
Taking a closer look at Fig. L.3, we will see that the upper part captures
the behaviour of the ambient intelligent system, whereas the lower part
represents the interactive properties of the system. We will use this part of
the general frame to model the explanation abilities. To this end, however,
we have to decompose the lower part in order to model different types of
explanation.
The list of explanation requirements can be described as a list of the
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explanation goals that a system must be able to satisfy. Sørmo et al. iden-
tify five different explanations goals that a system might have to handle
[Sørmo et al., 2005]. This work has been further expanded in Kofod-
Petersen and Cassens [2007], where the explanation goals have been com-
bined with the ambient intelligence paradigm. Our own work focuses on
the four goals that are not related to applications as an educational tool:
The goal of transparency is concerned with the system’s ability to explain
how an answer was reached. Justification deals with the ability to explain
why the answer is good. When dealing with the importance of a question
asked, relevance is the goal that must be satisfied. Finally, conceptualisation
is the goal that handles the meaning of concepts.
We will briefly describe problem frames for the goals we consider in
this paper. Frames for other goals exist as well. The transparency goal is
concerned with how the system finds a solution to a given problem. This
allows the user to inspect the reasoning process to identify the cause of
any abnormal behaviour. The transparency explanation frame is depicted
in Fig. L.4. Here the Reasoning Trace is a lexical domain, which allows
the Transparency Machine to read the reasoning trace trough the shared
phenomena TM!Y1. The Transparency Explanation is the causal domain,
which the machine can control through the shared phenomena TM!Y2. In
short, the Transparency Machine has to inspect the reasoning trace and
present the relevant information to its user.
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Table L.1.: Context and Explanations
Context Awareness Context Sensitivity
System Centric Explanations to
recognise the situation
Identify the desired
system behaviour
User Centric Elucidate why a
situation was identified
Explicate why a certain
behaviour was chosen
The justification goal is closely related to the transparency goal. Justifi-
cation can be seen as a simplification of the reasoning process that the
system actually goes through. The main purpose of this explanation goal
is to convince the user that the reasoning is sound. Fig. L.5 displays the
problem frame of a justification explanation goal. This frame resembles
the one for transparency explanations, with the addition of the lexical do-
main System Knowledge. This domain facilitates the expansion of a trans-
parency explanation by allowing the Justification Machine to inspect
the system’s knowledge through the shared phenomena JM!Y2.
L.5 Hospital Ward System
The application in question is an ambient intelligent information system
for hospital wards. The system was developed through cooperation with
the cardiology ward at an university hospital. Following the definition of
ambient intelligence in Ducatel et al. [2001], the system perceives its envi-
ronment, becomes aware of ongoing situations, and is sensitive to the id-
iosyncrasies of the particular situations. The main purpose of this system
is to perceive the information needs of its user in ongoing situations (such
as specific journals, test results, and treatment plans), and pro-actively
fetch the required information.
The existing system is build around a multi-agent platform. Perception is
handled by a Context Middleware, the situation awareness is build around
a case-based reasoning [Kolodner, 1993] system, and the acquisition of
relevant information (sensitivity) is facilitated by dynamic task decompo-
sition. Situations were identified and the knowledge model populated
through an ethnographical study conducted at the cardiology ward. The
whole system was implemented using the Jade [Bellifemine et al., 2003]
agent framework.
In our system, we use explanations in two distinct ways: first, enhanc-
ing and promoting the reasoning process; called the system centric view.
Second, delivering some knowledge about the reasoning process, its re-
sults, or implication to the user; called the user centric view. Table L.1
293
L. Problem Frames for Explanation-Aware AmI Systems
shows how these two different usages of explanations relate to the aware-
ness and sensitivity aspects of our system. For the purpose of this paper
we will disregard the perception layer of the architecture as the percep-
tion layer demonstrates no reasoning capabilities, and only structures per-
ceived data syntactically.
In the setting of our general frame for interactive ambient intelligent
systems depicted in Figure L.3, the system centric explanations relate the
upper part, whereas the user centric explanations relate to the lower part.
The explanation problem frames for user goals can be put to use in the
lower part or user centric view, but modified versions reflecting the sys-
tem’s intentions are important for the upper part or system centric view
as well. For the remainder of this paper, we describe how to make use
of explanation problem frames for the explication aspect, describing the
user centric and context sensitive use of explanations.
L.5.1 Example
To clarify the functionality of this system, we will present a small example.
It sketches an execution taken from a simulated system run, using the real
data set gathered at the cardiology ward. In this case we are dealing with a
pre-ward round situation. A pre-ward round is a particular type of meeting
that occurs every morning. Usually, the physician in charge and the nurse
in charge are present. They discuss each of their patients, including their
current condition, any changes, and the treatment plan.
The Context Middleware monitors the different sensors in the environ-
ment, and discovers a change, which provokes a change in the current
context. This change in the context is transferred to the CBR sub-system,
which retrieves the best matching case based on the sensor values.
In this example, the CBR component retrieves a case describing another
pre-ward round. Having identified the ongoing situation as a pre-ward
round, the CBR engine now extracts the goal of this type of situation. In
this case, the goal is to gather the relevant information. This goal is sent
to the sensitivity part to be solved.
The Sensitivity part of this system receives the goal and matches it to a
general decomposition tree that contains the tasks required to satisfy the
goal. In this example the task tree that matches a pre-ward round goal is
as follows:
1. Acquire name of patient.
2. Acquire changes in patient’s conditions since yesterday.
3. Acquire any new results from tests.
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4. Examine, and possible change, medication scheme.
5. Note changes in treatment.
Each solvable task is matched to an action performed by an available,
willing and able agent. The system currently offers 19 different agents,
each representing one information system at the hospital ward. Together
these 19 agents offers 21 different information services. The initial prob-
lem of finding the name of the patient can be facilitated by the Patient
List Agent. Further on, the ‘Acquire Information’ task is decomposed into
one task that acquires changes which are supplied by the Electronic Pa-
tient Record, theWiseW application and the Patient Chart, and another task
that acquires results which can be delivered by the Patient Chart and the
WiseW application. This plan is now executed and the information ac-
quired through the different agents is returned to the user; thus ending
an execution cycle of this system.
L.6 Redesigning the Existing Application
In the first incarnation, explanatory capabilities were not explicitly in-
cluded in the design specifications. However, the socio-technical theory
used in the study design and application allows us to elicit the possible
explanation goals users of the system might have. Therefore, a re-design
on the grounds of the data already gathered is feasible.
L.6.1 Example
Revisiting the example of the previous section, we have the instance where
the system correctly classifies an ongoing situation as a pre-ward round.
If we focus on the context sensitive part of the system, its main purpose
is to examine the artefacts, represented by agents, in the environment and
find those that can supply relevant information. So far this application
only supplies information without any explanation of its behaviour.
In order to demonstrate how the explanation goal problem frames can
be used to model explanatory needs in the problem domain, we will start
with a simplified problem diagram for our application (Fig. L.6). This is
essentially modelling the behaviour of the system without direct user in-
teraction and reflecting the capabilities the existing system was designed
to have. This part is a decomposition of the upper part of the Interac-
tive Ambient Intelligence Frame from Fig. L.3. We have modified Jackson’s
information display problem frame and used it as a starting point for the
diagram. You can see three domains representing (groups of) the agents
mentioned above.
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Additionally, you see the Display domain which stands for the infor-
mation display of the system and System Knowledge for deciding which
data sources to use. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, we have ab-
stracted away the sensor parts of as well as the context aware parts of our
example application and focus solely on the information gathering and
display parts. Let us now assume that the results displayed by the system
are of such a nature that the physician using the system requires an ex-
planation. Let us for the sake of simplicity of the example further focus
on a subset of the identified explanation goals.
We want to integrate the explanation sub problems described by the
two problem frame diagrams for the Transparency and the Justification goal
to model the explanatory capabilities of the system. This combination is
covered in the frame depicted in Fig. L.7. This model is a decomposition
of the lower part of the Interactive Ambient Intelligence Frame from Fig. L.3.
By integrating Fig. L.6 modelling the ambient intelligence capabilities
without explicit user interaction and Fig. L.7 capturing direct user involve-
ment exemplified for explanations, we have a complete (albeit simplified)
model of our explanation aware ambient intelligent system. We can now
re-visit the example problem described above. The expert user physician
might wish to know how the particular combination of information dis-
played was reached. According to the transparency explanation problem
frame, this explanation can be achieved by displaying the reasoning trace.
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This can for example be done by showing that the top task ‘Pre-ward
round’ was selected as a function of the classification, by displaying how
the decomposition tree looks like, and by supplying information about
the agents selected.
For the justification explanation, the novice user physician would like
to know why this combination of information is any good. This can be
achieved by relating the reasoning trace to the domain model of the sys-
tem. For example, according to the domain model, the ‘Acquire Medica-
tion’ task could be satisfied not only by the Patient Chart but also by the
Electronic Patient Record. However, as the Electronic Patient Record agent
was busy serving other requests only the Patient Chart could respond to
this request.
L.6.2 Analysing the existing application
The results of our ethnographical study are pointing towards the necessity
to support four of the five different user goals introduced by Sørmo et al.
[2005], namely transparency, justification, relevance, and conceptualisation.
This can be expressed in design specification documents which explicitly
include the explanatory needs. When we look at the existing application,
we can see that it does support the transparency, conceptualisation, and
justification goals, where the latter is even only supported partially.
The fact that the system lacks certain explanatory capabilities is hardly
surprising since they were not the main focus of the earlier implemen-
tation. However, the use of problem frames in general and explanation
problem frames in particular helps us in identifying the deficiencies of the
existing design, understanding and communicating explanatory needs, as
well as exploring possible solutions to overcome these deficiencies.
Since we have started with data from an existing workplace analysis, we
have not tested the hypothesis that (explanation) problem frames can be
put to use in communicating with prospective users during the require-
ments elicitation phase. But we assume problems frames can enhance
the cooperation between the requirements engineers and these users, as
indicated by Phalp and Cox [2000].
In the requirements analysis, introducing explanation frames facilitates
the explication and formalisation of the findings of our ethnographical
study and thereby deepens our understanding of the problem domain.
The use of problem frames as a method during requirement specifica-
tion aids us in checking the completeness of the specification and helps us
to incorporate explanatory needs which could otherwise be overlooked.
This should also lead to a design which encompasses more features. If we
had done the original system specification with the help of (explanation)
298
L.7. Conclusion and Future Work
problem frames, the missing support for the relevance goal would have
been uncovered.
An explanation aware requirements specification is also fruitful in the
transition from design to implementation. Earlier work by Roth-Berghofer
and others has coupled explanation goals with the knowledge contain-
ers of case-based reasoning systems [Roth-Berghofer and Cassens, 2005].
Having an explicit representation of explanation goals helps in identify-
ing requirements for the knowledge containers, thereby easing the way
from a specification document to the structure and actual content of the
knowledge containers.
L.7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown how the use of explanation goal specific problem frames
can help in recognising and explicating design requirements resulting
from the perceived necessity of intelligent systems to be able to explain
their own reasoning and behaviour. By testing our suggestions on an
existing application, we have further on addressed how the use of (ex-
planation) problem frames can lead to additional insights and can help
testing the completeness of the requirements specification.
There are several issues which we have not addressed in this paper
and which are left for further work. For example, we have to further
explore the relation between the design documents and the actual im-
plementation. Our results show that problem frames help us to identify
which explanatory knowledge and mechanism should be provided, but
the methods for the next step in identifying the missing knowledge con-
tainers and suggesting remedies have to be extended over the existing
work on the relation between explanation goals, explanation kinds, and
knowledge containers. We are considering to couple problem frames with
design patterns to give system designers hints about the implementation
issues.
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